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Legitimacy and “Transitional Continuity” in a Monarchical Regime: Case of Morocco

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ABSTRACT

The Arab uprisings and outbreak of mass protest in many countries in the Arab world, requesting the change of regimes and political leaders, translate a deep malaise in the state-society relationship and an alarming crisis of the state legitimacy. Hence, this paper seeks to understand the intriguing nature of the Moroccan political system and its legitimacy formula as a monarchical regime. Using an integrated conceptual framework, this paper evaluates the Moroccan regime's legitimacy by considering the justificatory principles and normative sources of its authority in addition to examining the degree of consent from the people and exploring the relation between legitimacy and performance. For that purpose, a case method is adopted using a narrative approach combined with a historical institutional perspective showing a path dependency, and revealing a “transitional continuity” in Morocco displaying a process of change while maintaining a consistent pattern over time.

KEYWORDS

Legitimacy; monarchy; morocco; governance; democracy



Introduction

For many observers, 2011 Arab uprisings and its subsequent effects represent an important turning point in the Arab world. The outbreak of mass protest in many countries within the region, requesting a change of their respective regimes, translates a deep malaise in the state-society relationship and an alarming crisis of the political legitimacy. Far from being a recent or sporadic occurrence, political legitimacy has earlier been identified as a “central problem in the Arab world” (Hudson, 1977, p. 2). However, one of the contributions of the Arab uprisings in this matter has been to highlight the “need to broaden our focus from state and regime towards society, economy, culture and regional/global pressures” (Hudson, 2014, p. 31). Therefore, while referring to Weber's (1947) classical definition and accounts of legitimacy, we will adopt in this paper a more integrated analytical framework taking into consideration both state and society (Beetham, 1991). This approach is interesting as it challenges “the mistaken assumption that the state apparatus is entirely self-contained, and can be immunized from the attitudes and actions of the surrounding population” (Beetham, 1991, p. 118).

Legitimacy is definitely a complex subject and a multidimensional concept. It significantly matters given its implications and importance for countries'

stability and development (Englebert, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004; Gilley, 2009). Also, as pertinently pointed by Easton (1965), the central problem for all regimes and authorities consists in achieving and maintaining legitimacy. More importantly, when studying the legitimacy of political regimes, “we need to be context sensitive” (Thyen & Gerschewski, 2018, p. 51). In this perspective, we have chosen to focus on the case of Morocco to explore and analyze the “legitimacy formula” of a monarchical regime demonstrating an intriguing continuity in a context of popular protests and social mobilization (e.g., 20 Feb and Rif movements). In this case, both the state and society will be considered through the examination of the sources of legitimacy of the regime (i.e., justifications), and their subjective acceptance or rejection by citizens (i.e., consent). Also, the Moroccan case is instructive as it clearly illustrates what Razi (1987, p. 457) refers to as “the clash of subconscious psychological factors related to legitimacy and conscious factors related to rational performance”. Furthermore, this case helps arguing that beyond endurance and survival of political regimes, the stability of a state is a function of both legitimacy and performance given their interdependence.

In terms of methodology, a narrative perspective will be adopted to evaluate the normative aspects of legitimacy in the context of Morocco presented as a case study. This

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perspective is very relevant as it “enables legitimacy to be explored in a way that allows for multiple subjective analyses that are determined by context”, especially that it “has rarely been explored in public policy field” (Woodard, 2015, pp. 4, 17). Furthermore, as highlighted by Gilley (2006, p. 61) “no full account of the legitimacy of states could end with statistical explorations, both case studies and normative accounts are necessary”. Hence, we offer in this paper a qualitative account of legitimacy to make sense of the particular case of Morocco.

In sum, we will start by defining the concepts and presenting the conceptual framework related to legitimacy. In the second part, we will contextualize through the case of Morocco and explore its legitimacy formula to highlight the sources of legitimation of the Moroccan political power and its narrative justifications. In the third part, we will assess empirically, using secondary data, the degree of consent of the Moroccan people through the protest movements and examine the relation between legitimacy and performance through governance and democracy. We will then conclude by drawing some lessons.

Legitimacy: search for a conceptual framework

Legitimacy reveals to be a vague and unspecified concept. As underlined by (McLoughlin, 2014, p. 2), “understanding its meaning, let alone measuring it in real life situations, is the subject of lively debate in policy and academic spheres”. Legitimacy has been studied by various fields (i.e., law and political science, history of ideas and philosophy, and sociology) seeking to develop well-defined meanings of this concept while actually leading to divergent definitions. In its original conception, legitimacy concerns power. However, there is no consensus about what makes power legitimate. For legal experts, power is legitimate when its acquisition and exercise conform to established law. Legitimacy is therefore equivalent to legal validity. Meanwhile, philosophers would consider ‘legitimate’ what is morally justifiable or rightful in power relations. From their side, social scientists are concerned with legitimacy in particular historical societies rather than universally, being aware that what makes power legitimate in one society may differ from others. Legitimacy is therefore perceived as being “context specific” (Beetham, 1991, pp. 4–9). We fully subscribe to this approach by investigating this topic within a specific context (i.e., Morocco). For that, we need a theoretical framework to help us understand and analyze the salient subject of legitimacy and its implications both conceptually and empirically.

Weberian model of legitimacy

To understand the concept of legitimacy, we have to draw on Weber’s seminal work. Through his widespread definition, Weber considers the state as “an organization deploying a legitimate monopoly of coercive power or force over a defined territory” (Weber, 2004, p. 33). Meanwhile, he argues that a ruler, regime or government resting entirely on force and relying on fear can be maintained for a short run only. Hence, legitimacy appears to be “essential for long run stability and good government” (Weber, 1947, p. 125). Noticeably, every political system seeks to establish and cultivate legitimacy in different ways. Interestingly, the kind of legitimacy claimed has a direct effect on the type of governance adopted, the kind of administrative apparatus developed, the mode of decision-making, and noticeably an impact on the process and content of public policy. Weber (1978) presents three types of legitimacy that he correlates with patterns of authority (i.e., legal-rational, traditional and charismatic).

In this perspective, the legal-rational type of legitimate authority is represented by a bureaucratic administration based on an impersonal order and segregation of roles. Such system tends to promote education, equal opportunity, and sound public policies. By contrast, in the traditional authority type, the administration does not meet the characteristics of a bureaucracy. The system of governance is based on personal loyalty and obedience to the person of the ruler or the chief, which helps promoting status, kinship and favoritism while discouraging education, rational calculation, and thus affecting negatively the process of public policy and hindering economic development. The charismatic type of legitimacy is structured around an individual and not a society or any institutionalized order, though the charisma of a leader depends on its recognition by members of society and on his qualifications and capacity to maintain a personal trust. In this case, the administration is unstructured and there are no formal rules and therefore a limited room for adequate public policies.

Weber’s classification of the types of legitimacy and its sources have been criticized by many scholars without being falsified. The main critique addressed to this typology consists in the fact that “it considers mainly the holders of authority” while it overlooked the subjects of authority who “play a very shadow part” (Smith, 1970, p. 21). In other words, as pointed by Parsons (1958, p. 212), Weber treated legitimacy and the various types of authority as analytically independent from the rest of the social system. To remedy to this lacuna Easton (1958) suggests a behavioral approach to the issue of legitimacy by concentrating on the perception of the members of the society towards the authorities and the mode of exercising power in order to determine the degree to

which they are willing to give or withdraw their support. In the same vein, after criticizing Weber's model, Beetham (1991) offers a more comprehensive apprehension of the concept of legitimacy by including society in his framework through the crucial component of consent, since without public recognition there can be no authority. Furthermore, Easton (1965) points to another critique of the Weberian approach consisting in omitting an important element contributing to the legitimacy of a regime and consisting in performance. It is therefore important to integrate these salient elements in the study and analysis of legitimacy.

Integrated legitimacy framework

Defining legitimacy and identifying its sources and components is crucial to the understanding of political systems and durability or change of regimes. In his study of the legitimacy in the Arab world, Hudson (1977) used Easton's classification consisting in three types: structural, ideological and personal, as a framework of analysis. Arab leaders and regimes have used these legitimacy resources in varying ways. Personal leadership and ideologies, matching the charismatic and traditional Weberian ideal types, play a major legitimizing role in Arab regimes whether they are monarchies or republics. Meanwhile, of the three categories, the "structural legitimacy of most of the Arab regimes remains weak" (Hudson, 1977, p. 23). This category is associated with the concept of institutionalization defined by Huntington (1968, p. 13) as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability". Most Arab states have in varying degrees succeeded in institutionalizing their regimes by developing "elaborate and capable administrative structures particularly in the field of internal security"¹ (Hudson, 1977, p. 26). Such regimes, with extensive coercive power, are obviously lacking an important basis of legitimacy if we include in its conception and definition a missing component related to the consent and willing obedience of people. Some might argue that consent is important only in democratic regimes where people sovereignty is crucial to legitimacy. However, the Arab uprisings revealed concretely the "need to broaden our focus from state and regime towards society" (Hudson, 2014, p. 31).

In this perspective, we realize the pertinence of the framework presented by Beetham (1991) who starts with a critique of Weber's conception of legitimacy as being primarily a matter of subjective beliefs (in rules and procedures, in tradition, and in charisma, respectively), voiding the concept of any objective reference or moral content. He makes a subtle distinction or amendment to Weber's "received" definition by stating that "a given

power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs" (Beetham, 1991, p. 11). Hence, when we seek to assess the legitimacy of a regime, we should evaluate the degree of congruence between a given system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification.

In the same vein, a critique is addressed to Weber's typology for turning contributory components of legitimacy into a separate and fully self-sufficient type of legitimacy². Also, according to Beetham (1991, p. 17), for a political power to be fully legitimate three conditions are required consisting in: 1- its conformity to established rules, 2- the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs, 3- the express consent of the subordinate to the particular power relations. Therefore, legitimacy of power must be understood as a multi-dimensional and threefold structure, comprising legality, justification, and consent. The extent to which these factors are present in a given context will be a matter of degree in the absence of specific indicators, especially in authoritarian regimes. As pointed by Mitchell (2013, p. 69), "we must first understand the content of legitimacy in authoritarian contexts before creating methodologically sound quantitative measurements".

Also, this tripartite definition allows to distinguish different ways in which political power may lose or lack legitimacy through a breach of legality in the acquisition of power, normative inadequacy of the constitutional order, or the active delegitimation of government by the withdrawal of consent (Beetham, 1991, p. 211). Actually, this framework helps us to understand the legitimacy crisis in the Arab world in a more integrated way by considering the dynamic relation between the regime and the society. Mitchell (2013) used this framework, focusing on the need for social justification to explain why a rentier state, such as Qatar, goes far beyond allocation in its interactions with society to maintain its legitimacy. Meanwhile, for a deeper understanding of the Arab uprisings and its variation and ongoing mobilization throughout the region, we need to underline the distinction between the 'legitimacy' and the 'effectiveness' of regimes. According to Lipset (1984, p. 88), "Effectiveness means actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government, while legitimacy implies the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society". This leads us to explore the relation or nexus legitimacy-performance.

Legitimacy and performance

The actual relationship between government performance and political legitimacy is a complex one. Some

argue that legitimacy and performance are not necessarily correlated. The overthrow of the Iraqi (1958), Libyan (1969), and Iranian (1979) monarchies during times of economic expansion are provided as examples (Mitchell, 2013, p. 32). Meanwhile, governments' ineffectiveness and failure to secure the general interest represent valid reasons for social mobilization and deligitimation. Therefore, the stability of a regime depends upon both the legitimacy and performance of its political system. Performance can actually be considered as a salient legitimation criterion. Beetham (1991, p. 137) argues that "legitimacy affects the effectiveness of a political system, through the quality of performance it secures from its subordinates. In the same time, "the performance of government represents a necessary component of its legitimacy". This argument is also hold by Razi (1987, p. 462) stating that, "if the participants regard the government as illegitimate, there will be a minimum act of compliance affecting seriously the performance". On the other side, "if the authority is internalized by the population, and there are no demands for major restructuring of the system, there will be cooperation improving the performance".

To sum up, the legitimacy crisis as witnessed in the Arab world can be attributed to either a deficit in the sources of authority or a deficit in the government performance. The former refers to the inadequacy and lack of conformity of the political order with the culture and beliefs about the valid sources of authority in a given society, while the latter consists in the incapacity of the regime to resolve problems of government performance. The Iranian case is instructive in many ways and presents an excellent illustration of the nexus legitimacy-performance. As noticed by (Razi, 1987, pp. 453, 458), "the Shah's regime was doing relatively well in the area of performance, but it was doing poorly in the area of legitimacy", in other words, "Rapid economic development and improvements in the instruments of repression proved to be no substitute for solving the problem of legitimacy in Iran".

The case of Iran significantly portrays a regime change from a monarchy to an Islamic republic through a revolution displaying the motion and actual power of people. The deligitimation of the monarchical regime in this context can be explained by a deficit in the sources of authority and basis of legitimation. Its most important weakness was the "cultural alienation", with the subordination to the USA, and the "dilution of the Iranian identity". The Pahlavi monarchy, featuring the characteristics of a traditional and ideological type of legitimacy, distanced itself from the legitimating sources of its regime, most importantly Islam. Therefore, the mullahs were able to "link the Shah's lack of legitimacy with his policies of secularization and his disregard with the country's

religious heritage", and the return to Islam was offered as a solution to restore a political legitimacy based on religion (Beetham, 199, p. 199). Interestingly, the regime's change in Iran occurred through a process of popular deligitimation attacking its authority from within. Meanwhile, as noted by Razi (1987, p. 463), the failures of the Khomeini regime in performance, notably in the areas related to economics, education, and technology, have also seriously affected his initially overwhelming legitimacy base. This case illustrates clearly the interdependence between legitimacy and performance.

On another realm, China offers an edifying example of the use of performance as a legitimizing force to maintain the durability of its hegemonic single-party government. In this context, the regime has adopted a "pragmatic strategy of "performance legitimacy" to undertake the government's reform seeking to accomplish concrete goals such as economic growth, social stability, strengthening national power, and good governance to retain its legitimacy" (Zhu, 2011, p. 123). The Chinese government considers that good performance can generate and retain legitimacy. In this case, the durability of legitimacy depends on the success or failure in governance. Zhu (2011, p. 139) argues that "a performance based legitimacy is very fragile", and that "government action in political institutionalization toward a more accountable polity and a more balanced state-society relationship is definitely required". Also, according to Razi (1987, pp. 461–62), a research on legitimacy should be twofold, exploring on one side the "norms providing the psychological-moral bind that holds a political system together and create a set of understandings and expectations among the people", and on the other "the extent to which a relevant portion of population perceives that the regime is behaving accordingly".

Therefore, in order to understand the process of legitimation of a political system, and the stability or fragility of its regime, we need a contextual analysis using a narrative perspective. As pertinently pointed by Woodard (2015, p. 17), "legitimacy is related to narrative contextualization" given that the "exact narrative will be unique to the history and political context of each nation and government". Meanwhile, given the interdependence between legitimacy and performance, we need a set of indicators to assess the perceived and actual capacity of the political power to satisfy people's expectations. In a cross-national research exploring 23 performance indicators, Gilley (2006) refers to governance and democratic rights as the most critical causal variables affecting the levels of legitimacy. In the following sections, we will first present the normative legitimacy of the Moroccan regime and the justification

of its authority through a narrative perspective. We will then examine the degree of consent of the Moroccan people through the assessment of governance and democracy as the main indicators of performance in relation to legitimacy.

Contextualization of legitimacy: the “Moroccan Formula”

Hudson (1977) classified Arab polities in four categories (i.e., inert, unstable, controlled, and dynamic), based on the political cohesiveness of their societies and the effective capabilities of their governments. In this classification, Morocco lied in the category “unstable” (with Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Bahrain), while Tunisia was placed in the category “dynamic” with Kuwait, and countries like Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Algeria were in the “controlled” category. Interestingly, after over four decades, the regimes of almost all these countries have collapsed revealing a deep and manifest legitimacy crisis, while the Moroccan political system has been able to survive. This raises intriguing questions about the durability and continuity of the Moroccan regime, without being necessarily stable, and the degree of its legitimacy at the light of regional and national protest movements and social mobilization. Therefore, we propose to explore and present the legitimacy formula in the context of the Moroccan monarchical regime to understand the sources of its authority by using a narrative approach.

Sources of legitimacy: legitimating narrative

All regimes develop central narrative themes to legitimize their authority and governing power. According to Brand (2014, p. 24), “legitimacy rests on a resonant narrative”. Thus, the sources of ideas and beliefs for legitimacy are important to understand its nature and foundation. Also, as pointed by Woodard (2015, p. 17), “political legitimacy as narrative requires intense study of the subject situation or nation in order to provide an accurate portrayal of whether or not a government may be legitimate”. This statement is definitely appropriate and accurate especially in the context of a monarchical regime defying preconceived ideas and judgments³. *Prima facie*, the bases of the legitimacy formula of the Moroccan regime are encapsulated in the country’s official slogan: “God, the Nation, the King”. Hence, the legitimization sources consist of a threefold structure combining religion, nationalism and a monarchy or hereditary rule. In this context, the regime has been able to cultivate a normative legitimacy that has been nurtured throughout history securing a long-standing continuity. The kingdom of Morocco is considered the

oldest monarchy in the Arab world and the only surviving one in North Africa.

In the recent history of Morocco, and for three consecutive generations, there was a transition to a continued monarchical rule within the Alaouite dynasty in power since 1672⁴. Moroccan kings’ most obvious legacy was that of keeping a traditional monarchy in power for a long time and setting up a stable succession (Mohamed V: 1927–1961, Hassan II: 1961–1999, Mohamed VI: 1999–present). The transition of sovereignty and the regime change in Morocco can be succinctly summarized by the colloquial phrase: “*The king is dead, long live the king*”. Therefore, one of the main sources of legitimation of the Moroccan political identity consists in the sharifian rule⁵. Corollary, the king was granted the title of “Amir al-Mumineen”, commander of the faithful, and has been legitimized by his religious role. This led to the peculiarity of the Moroccan king holding both a religious authority and a secular sovereignty codified in the constitution and providing him a legal and traditional legitimacy.

The kings in Morocco have been able to sustain and ingrain the Alaouite monarchy through a dominant combination of traditional-ideological and charismatic-personal sources of legitimation. The establishment of the current ruling monarchy and the supremacy of the palace in the Moroccan political system can be traced back to the postcolonial period and largely attributed to Mohamed V. Considered as the father of independence, and a national hero with tremendous charisma, Mohamed V illustrates the charismatic and personal type of legitimacy (Pennell, 2003). His symbolic equation with Moroccan nationalism reinforced his traditional legitimacy. It put him in a better position to reduce diverse political groups and to secure a very strong position in the political life and become an influential political actor (Storm, 2007).

Succeeding to his father in 1961, Hassan II had to struggle to maintain the monarchical rule in the absence of a strong charismatic and personal legitimacy and in the midst of local and regional turmoil. Like many monarchies in the Arab world, the regime was expected to collapse under the reign of Hassan II in a period marked by “republic-revolutionary movements” promoting secular-ideological and technocratic types of legitimacy (Hudson, 2014). In contrast, the Sharifian monarchical regime has been able to survive and the king has been able to design a system to maintain himself in power. He deployed and displayed a number of legitimation tools such as the control of the army and the police, the influence over the countryside through patronage, co-optation of major political actors, in addition to the use of the normative and symbolic sources of legitimacy to sustain the political regime.

For a long period, during the years of lead (*années de plomb*), the king ruled by coercion exercising state violence and repression against dissidents. Realizing that his regime cannot survive by coercion alone, Hassan II needed well-grounded legitimacy to establish his reign and ensure the continuity of the Alaouite dynasty. Paradoxically, the most significant events offering him this ground consist notably in successive coup attempts, and the Green march. In the early 1970s, the king survived to two military coups, conferring him a sacred status embedded in the symbolic concept of *Baraka*. In 1975, Hassan II launched a large-scale national symbolic operation called the Green march serving as a political and mass mobilization involving all country's constituents. This event represents a pivotal point in the regime's history. It served to grant to Hassan II a title of "the Reunifier"⁶. After acquiring a symbolic political legitimacy and establishing a broad popular acceptance through mass mobilizing events, the king tempered his use of coercion and relied more on a normative approach to control and co-opt pluralism. In this process, the king was gaining in terms of legitimacy while the opposition and political elite was delegitimized. According to Mednicoff (2007, p. 171) referring to the symbolic political manipulation as the most successful strategy used by the king(s) in Morocco, "the Moroccan case is particular in the way the king's symbolic political manipulation stood between the country's institutional pluralism and the actual centralization of authority".

This paved the way to Mohamed VI who succeeded to his father in 1999 and accessed to the throne without apparent opposition against the monarchical rule. Hassan II has apparently been able to overcome what Huntington (1968) identified as the King's dilemma and to illustrate what Davis (1991, p. 25) refers to as the "effort to promote state formation through the use of ideology and culture rather than coercion". Mohamed VI had to preserve this legacy and maintain the continuity of Alaouite dynasty. To date, he has succeeded in handling this challenge but not without difficulty given the persistent socio-economic pressures and the growing social mobilization and protests. Cultivating his own legitimate narrative, Mohamed VI continued to use the same traditional and religious sources of legitimacy while promoting himself as "king of the poor" (*roi des pauvres*). He also portrayed an image of reformist and more democratic sovereign committed to constitutional monarchy, multi-party pluralism, and human rights. Among his main initiatives, the authorization of Morocco's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the liberalization of the country's *mudawwana* (family code), the launch of the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), and allowing the opposition Islamist party (Party of Justice

and Development) to lead the Moroccan government (Hissouf, 2014). In a speech to the Nation delivered on the 20th anniversary of his accession to throne, Mohamed VI is reinforcing the regime's legitimating narrative⁷:

Twenty years have elapsed since Almighty God entrusted me with the sacred duty of leading the nation. It is a position of immense trust and a heavy responsibility. I made a solemn commitment to you and to the Almighty to work earnestly so as to live up to that trust. As God is my witness, I have not – and I shall not – spare any effort to serve your best interests and your just causes.

(...) I give thanks to Almighty God for bestowing upon us the blessings of unity, cohesion and the mutual *Bei'a* between the Throne and the people, in addition to the bonds of reciprocal affection and loyalty between the King and the citizens, which have become stronger and deeper over the years.

(...) I also give praise and thanks to God for the Moroccan people's consensus on the nation's immutable, sacred values and its major policy choices. Firstly, there is the national, citizen-based monarchy, which is grounded in closeness to the citizens and which takes to heart their concerns as much as their aspirations, and seeks to respond to them. Secondly, there is the democracy and development-based policy, which I have been implementing resolutely and confidently. Thirdly, there are the sweeping reforms we introduced, the reconciliations achieved and the major projects implemented. (Mohamed, 2019)

In sum, the legitimacy formula in Morocco lies to a great extent in a set of ideas and core beliefs infused and diffused through dominant narratives representing the *justification* component of legitimacy. In addition to a concentrated combination of traditional-religious and personal sources of legitimation, the Moroccan regime has also used its own sources of power, through institutionalized procedures and constitutional rules to cultivate its legitimacy.

Institutional legitimacy: normative justification

Ideas alone might not constitute a durable basis of legitimation unless they are strongly institutionalized. According to Fukuyama (2011, p. 464), institutions represent "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior". In this perspective, the Moroccan rulers have succeeded throughout the modern history to "engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society", illustrating Lipset's (1960, p. 77) conception of legitimacy. Morocco offers an interesting case where kings and political elite as individuals have changed over time, but the regime as a dominant system or "*de facto political power*" has

persisted exemplifying the “*Iron Law of Oligarchy*” as defined by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). The existence of well-established and embedded institutions is indicative of a path dependency in the Moroccan political system imposing structural and cognitive restrictions to potential changes. These institutions consist of a formal one represented by the monarchy and an informal one residing in the *Makhzen*⁸. Both institutions have been essential in maintaining the state continuity in Morocco by reinforcing each other’s legitimacy.

Using a socio-institutional approach, Daadaoui (2008) refers to the ritualization of power as a source of legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy. He points to the process of codification and institutionalization of symbolic resources (i.e., “*Sharifian*” lineage⁹, “*Baraka*”¹⁰, the title of “*Amir Al-Mu’mineen*”¹¹, and “*Be’ya*”¹²), conferring to the regime a legitimacy based on religious authority and providing the monarchy with unlimited political power and endurance. Noteworthy, Moroccan monarchy and the *Makhzen* possess and display most of the sources and mechanisms of legitimacy from both a sociological and institutional perspectives. The monarchy presents and represents the three types of Weberian legitimacy (i.e., traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal). Meanwhile, the *Makhzen* illustrates the institutional legitimacy based on three pillars (i.e., regulative, normative and cognitive) and their corresponding mechanisms of pressure or isomorphisms (i.e., coercion, norms, mimetism). Regulative aspects of institutionalism comprises codified rules and laws enforced by state machinery, the normative aspects consist in moral beliefs and norms, obligations or standards of behavior that provide a basis for social meaning and social order, while the cognitive pillar involves the cognitive social constructions and internalized interpretations of the culture, customs and traditions (Scott, 2008).

While explaining the isomorphic patterns and the persistence of a political regime, this institutional framework helps understand the dynamics involved in this process. Obviously, in the case of Morocco, the regime has resorted less to coercion and relied more on normative and cognitive mechanisms through the use and control of norms and symbols. Mednicoff (2007) and Daadaoui (2008) refer to “the symbolic political manipulation” and “rituals of power” as special features and mechanisms of the Moroccan regime and sources of its persistence. In the same vein, Barwig (2010, p. 43) invokes the visible aspects of the *Makhzen* including a panoply of “rituals, ceremonies and symbols used in socio-political discourse that permeate formal institutions and condition citizen behavior”.

In sum, the legitimacy of the state and the regime (represented formally by the monarchy and informally by the *Makhzen*) are mutually bound and interdependent

in Morocco. The durability of monarchy in Morocco is linked with the regime’s ability to portray itself as legitimate (Duke, 2016). Therefore, “by relying on the three sources of legitimacy, the monarchy seems to have achieved a fair degree of hegemony, and a distinct ability to keep conflict within the system and to handle most counter-legitimacies by manipulating them or, if necessary, incorporating them” (Ayubi, 1995, p. 122). In the same vein, Abney (2013) attributes the political *status quo* in Morocco, in the midst of Arab uprisings, to the sources of legitimacy of the king that are not available to the presidents of the North African republics. In this perspective, a main difference between the Moroccan regime and its counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia, appears to be “the ability of the king to use religious legitimacy to justify his power over the country, unlike region’s presidents” (Abney, 2013, p. 64). Thus, legitimacy justified by a set of core beliefs, and based on symbolic resources, and historical institutions, in addition to being codified through the constitution, appears to be one of the important deployed mechanisms and explanatory factors of the continuity and endurance of the Moroccan regime.

Constitutional legitimacy: discursive justification

In addition to being institutionalized, the sources of legitimation of the Moroccan political system have been codified in the constitution providing the political power with a constitutional legitimacy. In this perspective, the constitution can be interpreted as “a codification of the narrative of a country” (Woodard, 2015, p. 17). Since its independence, the Moroccan government has initiated a number of constitutional referenda whenever its legitimacy was challenged whether domestically or internationally. To counter criticisms by domestic opposition groups and parties calling for more democracy and civil and human rights, the palace resolves to open up slowly the country’s political system (White, 1997). This strategy translating and facilitating the resilience of the regime has systematically been used by Hassan II with a series of constitutional adaptations (1965, 1970, 1972, 1992, 1996), and has successfully been followed by Mohamed VI.

The first constitution in Morocco was ratified and adopted in 1962. It stipulates the monarchical and hereditary nature of the ruling regime and the combined political and religious role of the king as head of state and commander of the faithful. It also presents the kingdom as a multi-party parliamentary system. The central question in the constitution has been “the degree to which it accords the monarch fundamental governing powers in appointing ministers, setting the policy agenda, and deciding on final laws” (White, 1997, p. 391). King Mohamed V made tentative openings to democracy

and was open to the possibility of a directly elected parliament. King Hassan II, by contrast, was not willing to challenge his power and governed the state with a non-directly elected parliament. As a constitutional monarch and the Arbiter among the state's groups and institutions, the king has prerogatives allowing him to intervene with any political function, and whatever political rights do exist are only his gift. In 1965, after profound political instability, Hasan II suspended the 1962 constitution and assumed all governing powers under the state of emergency during the period known as "years of lead" (Barwig, 2010).

In 1970, the king called for a new constitution, seeking to repair a fractured political system. This constitution still denied the prime minister the right to articulate constitutional changes, leaving this power to the king. Despite widespread opposition, the new constitution was approved with the support of pro-regime parties. In 1972, after two coup attempts against Hasan II, a third referendum on a new constitution, designed to enhance the monarchy's power, was put forward. This constitution has provided the framework for government and for the electoral process for decades. Until the mid-1990s, Hasan II succeeded in maintaining a system that guaranteed him a supportive legislative majority with no directly elected legislative body. The opposition parties, for their part, were unable to unify their positions, as they disagreed among themselves and splits emerged within the parties. By admitting some opponents into the formal political system while excluding others, the regime produced a divided political environment (Barwig, 2010; Pellicer & Wegner, 2015).

The fifth referendum occurred on September 1992, when Hasan II asked for the creation of a Constitutional Council and an Economic Council. The 1992 constitution reaffirmed the palace's right to the final approval of the cabinet and the power to dissolve it. The constitution also emphasized human rights in its preamble, a development that appears to have emerged from external pressures from the European Parliament (Storm, 2007). In 1997, a constitutional reform provided for the first time direct elections of the Chamber of Representatives. Such change is considered an important development in Morocco and an indicator of the gradual political opening that the government of Hasan II pursued in the 1990s. Thus, this reform introduced a new upper chamber with wide-ranging prerogatives and a pro-regime composition to counterbalance the strengthened lower chamber. King Hassan II reached out to the political opposition and appointed the leader of the main opposition party as prime minister in 1998 (Daadaoui, 2008).

In 1999, Mohamed VI accessed to the throne in a smooth transition. Though he positioned himself as a political and social reformer, he did not change the configuration of power and maintained a divided political opposition (Barwig, 2010). He adopted the same strategy than his late father consisting in managing marginal pluralism while maximizing the king's control. Thus, preserving the regime's continuity and perpetuating its endurance pattern. In his first address to the nation, Mohamed VI reinforces the dominant political narrative as he announced:

"We strongly adhere to the system of constitutional monarchy, political pluralism, economic liberalism, regional and decentralized policy, the establishment of the state of rights and law, preserving human rights and individual and collective liberties, protecting security and stability for everyone." (Mohamed VI's speech, 31 July 1999. Cited in Pennell, 2003, p. 183)

Under his reign, some improvements have been made and Parliamentary elections (in 2002, 2007, 2011 and 2016) have been relatively more transparent (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015). More importantly, the declared constitutional reforms brought in 2011 contributed significantly to the diffusion of the protest movements following the Arab uprisings.

In 2011, in order to counter the February 20 movement and popular protests in the streets, Mohamed VI resorted to pre-emptive constitutional reforms. Since then, the king is perceived as a "regime reformer, reaching out to a moderate opposition" (Waterbury, 2018, p. 58). In a royal speech, the sovereign brought discursive changes to the relationship between state and society. For instance, he introduced the principle of a "citizen-king" which made the monarchy appear more of a participant in the political system. The new constitution featured several changes to the relationship between regime and state in Morocco. It nominally empowered the Prime Minister in policy-making providing him the title of "Chief of Government" (Benshems, 2012). Yet, the monarchy retains its large discretionary powers, which could suspend the law-making function of the legislative body of the parliament. Monarchical prerogatives to dissolve the parliament and the government, albeit with the "consent" of the government, limits the principle of separation of powers (Daadaoui, 2016). Indeed, "monarchical control over official religion, justice, security and defense remains unassailable and non-negotiable" (Waterbury, 2018, p. 57). Thus, in a consistent pattern, the Moroccan regime was able to maintain its continuity while preserving the King's prerogatives and ultimate political and religious authority. However, with the continuous popular discontent and social mobilization in the kingdom and throughout the

region, narrative and discursive justifications to legitimize the authority of the political power reveal to be not sufficient. The viability of the regime requires to take into consideration the consent of people as an important component of legitimacy and to examine in the case of contestations the motivating reasons and the sources of deficit of the Moroccan political system.

Legitimacy and performance in the context of morocco: state-society dynamic

Legitimacy cannot be a one-sided and unidirectional (top-down) relation between the state and the society. It requires sound justifications of the sources of legitimation from the regime and more importantly their validation through the consent of people. In case of withdrawal of consent, a regime is simply delegitimized. Earlier, in the sixteenth century, La Boétie (2008, p. 16) stated, “power is resting on popular consent. The remedy [to a tyrannical government] is simply to withdraw that consent”. Hence, legitimacy should involve the evaluation of the state from a public or common good perspective (Easton, 1965). As underlined by Razi (1987, p. 462), “legitimacy resides in the population, it is the latter’s “positive or negative judgement of what is perceived” about the behavior of the regime which must become the object of research”. Also, as pointed by Gilley (2006, p. 49), the citizens of a state should be considered “the relevant subjects of legitimacy” and “the state the relevant object”, leading to the assessment of legitimacy through “various dimensions of “treatment” by citizens, attitudinal and behavioral, rather than claims by rulers or determinations by outside observers”. Therefore, beyond narrative legitimacy, we need to examine the actual performance of the political power and the extent to which it is perceived to serve the general interest. As it has been revealed in many occurrences, “dominant narratives neither shut down political contestation nor fully determine policy outcomes” (Brand, 2014, p. 24). Also, evidence shows that a governing power can be justified in the long run, “as long as the state institution serves the fundamental interest of society” (Zhu, 2011, p. 127). The quote of Milton Friedman in this matter is also pertinent: “one of the great mistakes is to judge policies and programs by their intentions rather than their results”.¹³

Hence, the effectiveness of a political system and its ability to facilitate government performance and to fulfill the necessary requirements of society is a key criterion of legitimacy beside its justified sources of authority. According to our integrated conceptual framework, based on Beetham (1991), a lack of conformity with the embedded beliefs about the valid sources of authority, and/or the incapacity of the political system to resolve

problems of government performance, would lead to legitimacy crisis and eventually to a deligitimization of the regime. This helps to explain notably the social mobilization and protest movements throughout the Arab world leading to the change of some rulers and regimes, and to understand the related situation in the specific context of Morocco. In this section, we will explore the sources of legitimacy deficit in the Moroccan kingdom and examine its performance in terms of governance and democracy.

Legitimacy crisis: social mobilization and protest movements

The “Arab spring” with its successive waves can be considered a clear manifestation of a widespread legitimacy crisis in the Arab world. It led through mass-popular protests to the overthrow of many political leaders and to some regime changes in many Arab countries (notably, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Soudan, and Algeria). Meanwhile, Morocco has been considered as an “exception” given that the legitimacy of the king as the head of state has not been called into question openly. In a comparative study, Thyen and Gerschewski (2018, p. 42) argue that “the case of Egypt is a clear-cut legitimacy crisis of the incumbent government, while the protests in Morocco are treated as a non-crisis case”. Actually, a succinct examination of the past and undergoing protest movements in the country helps us to understand the specific state-society dynamic in Morocco and to identify the sources of deficit of its political system.

Morocco has historically been the country of the makhzen/siba dichotomy par excellence¹⁴ (Ayubi, 1995). Its political culture is characterized by its fragmented nature¹⁵. Also, according to Hudson (1977, p. 221), “given the discontinuities in orientation within the Moroccan political culture, problems for both government and the opposition are unusually difficult”, and “instability is a tradition in Morocco”. Undeniably, the Moroccan regime went through many crises and periods of instability. As pointed by Pennell (2003, p. 170), “much of the crisis resulted from factors that no Moroccan government could control, notably the dependency on external markets and the lack of capital”.

Since the independence, there were recurrent social upheavals and mass protests in Morocco. It early started with demonstrations organized by students in 1964 to protest against the lack of education and the poor economic conditions. As a response, the government started borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the mid-60s in order to maintain the regime’s legitimacy based on “the ability to feed the population” (Pennell, 2003, p. 169). In the early 70s,

there were repeated demonstrations and strikes culminating in two consecutive coup attempts in 1971 and 1972. These aborted attempts contributed paradoxically to the activation and validation of one of the symbolic sources of legitimacy of the king (i.e., *Baraka*). In the mid-70s, during a period of economic austerity aggravated by adjustment policies constraints imposed by international organizations (i.e., IMF and World Bank), riots occurred in big cities (i.e., Casablanca and Fes). Besides activating the coercive apparatus of national security to establish order and preserve his authority, the king called for a peaceful march towards the Sahara advancing territorial integrity and mobilizing half a million people while rallying the opposition parties to this cause. This mass mobilizing event has been used by the regime as a “legitimacy building device” (Hudson, 1977, p. 228).

Social contests continued throughout the 80s and 90s decades to reach their apogee in 2011 with the social movement known as “February 20” and corresponding to the first wave of the Arab uprisings. This movement brought together young activists of all political edges before being joined by other political and human rights forces, calling for a free and democratic Morocco, independently of all political organizations and parties (Benchemsi, 2014). While the activists in most Arab countries were calling openly for a regime change with the slogan “the people want to bring down the regime”, the call of the Moroccan protesters was “The people want to bring down corruption and despotism”. Moroccans’ demands were articulated mainly in terms of social justice, before taking political orientations urging for constitutional changes. In a tactical move, the Moroccan regime responded with a new constitution in 2011 including articles guaranteeing public freedoms and the right to protest and provisions supposed to strengthen the position of civil society. These constitutional amendments had the intended result of breaking the protests’ momentum (Benshems, 2012), and “the King’s concessionary policies convinced society that demands were being met and therefore led to the perception that the February 20 Movement was no longer needed” (Badran, 2019). However, this movement has been deployed in other forms of mobilization and collective actions and the number of social protests has increased in the country (Berrada, 2019; Essatte, 2018)¹⁶.

Since 2015, the country has seen large-scale social protests, known as *Hirak* (notably in the Rif, Jerada, and Zagora), demanding social and economic reforms to improve people’s living conditions and denouncing regional marginalization and inequalities. Thus, most of these protests focus on grievances related to social services, such as education and health-care provisions,

electricity supply and potable water. The dynamics of social mobilization in urban and rural areas highlight the role of a new middle class leading political activism, through local networks, in addition to civil society actors advocating the rights of the marginalized communities and raising political awareness. In the same time, they reveal the incapacity of the elected representative institutions to accommodate citizens’ expectations and the failure of public policies and government’s development projects to improve the socio-economic situation and reduce inequalities. This underlines a deep distrust in the formal political process and an erosion of the role of political parties as reliable mediators between state and society (Masbah, 2018), and explains the shift of the protests from social demands to political claims (Essatte, 2018). It also clarifies the increase in social protest movements in Morocco and the decline in terms of political engagement and adherence to political parties, especially among youth (Berrada, 2019). According to the Arab Barometer (2017, p. 6), “parliament and political parties are the least trusted political institutions: 67 percent of Moroccans do not trust the parliament. Only 10 percent of Moroccans trust political parties, compared to 86 percent who trust them either not much or not at all”.

In the same vein, Thyen and Gerschewski (2018, p. 49) show empirically that “dissatisfaction with the regime institutions [in Morocco] was a major motivation to participate in the protests”, while the “traditional-religious entitlement claims of the monarchy were not the decisive mobilizing factor”. In this study investigating the motivation to participate in 2011 uprisings in Egypt and Morocco, the authors highlight the “different regime-society relations in the two countries” (p.50). They correlate the participation to protests with the regime representation in terms of ideology in Egypt and with the perceived political performance in Morocco. Hence, this study helps us to practically identify the sources of legitimacy weakness in the Moroccan case consisting in pronounced deficits in terms of its political system’s performance. However, the question raises of how to measure such performance.

The empirical evaluation of the legitimacy-performance relationship is complicated. It requires evaluative and instrumental tools and a multi-level analysis. There are definitely multiple political, economic and social factors affecting state legitimacy and performance. The results of a cross-national research investigating the sources of legitimacy and exploring statistically the explanation power of 23 selected performance indicators, show that all variables are “far less important than good governance”, followed

with democratic rights (Gilley, 2006, pp. 57–58). Therefore, we will focus on governance and democracy as indicators of performance and powerful determinants of legitimacy while complementing with macro-structural indicators and micro-level explanations based on the citizens' perception using secondary data (e.g., Arab barometer, Arab Transformations survey, International institutions data, and reports).

Governance and performance deficits: sources of dissatisfaction

As pertinently underlined by Razi (1987, pp. 465–66), “factors related to public policy such as economic development, bureaucratic rationalization, and functional specialization represent meaningful subsets of performance, in contrast to legitimacy norms and concepts such as identity, nationalism, tradition, and religion”.

Noteworthy, Morocco's GDP per capita of US\$350 was similar to that of Malaysia in 1950. In 2018, it reached US\$11,079 in Malaysia while it was lagging behind with only \$3,349 in Morocco¹⁷. Malaysia succeeded by combining economic growth with social development through a clear vision (2020), set in the early 1990s, identifying nine strategic goals. To achieve these goals, the Malaysian government adopted vigorous programs seeking to empower people and enhance social welfare by correcting imbalances in racial and ethnic inequities and by raising levels of education and health care (Naguib & Smucker, 2009, p. 111). This example underscores the importance of good governance and responsiveness and their impact on economic growth and social development.

Morocco ranks 83 out of 129 countries in Governance, while it ranks 73 in Economic Transformation, and 93 in Political Transformation (BTI, 2018). The country displays a relative good performance in economic growth¹⁸ (e.g., worldwide ranks: 57, 55, 43 in GDP/PPP, FDI and Inflation rate, respectively) (CIA, 2019; IMF, 2019). Meanwhile, Morocco's performance in human capital is far from being satisfactory, ranking 123, 143, and 73 out of 189 countries in Human Development Index, unemployment rate, and corruption perceptions, respectively (Transparency International, 2018; UNDP, 2018). In addition, the Gini coefficient for Morocco reflects high levels of income inequality, and regional inequalities and disparities are striking¹⁹. Morocco's employment rate of 42.8% is low compared to the average 60% in other emerging countries. More specifically, Morocco's economy shows a weak capacity to employ its young people between the ages of 25 and 35. Illiteracy rates and disparities in access to secondary education remain high. Both education quality and

learning outcomes lag far behind other countries with similar or lower income levels. Despite the progress made in quantitative enrolment, the Moroccan education system continues to lag considerably in terms of performance. In the meantime, the kingdom is considered by WHO (2015) as one of the 57 countries whose supply of health services is inadequate. In terms of happiness, Morocco ranks 84th out of the 155 countries covered by the World Happiness Report (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2017). Also, the middle-class threshold is comparatively higher in Morocco due to public service shortcomings resulting in additional costs for citizens consisting in: urban planning (high cost of land), education policy (high cost of private schooling for children), transport policy (poor quality public transport), and health policy (poor quality of the public health system) (Chauffour, 2018, pp. 22–39, 220–248). These indicators help to understand and justify the social mobilization and protestation movements calling for decent jobs, social protection, education and health services, and the elimination of corruption. They also point to serious deficits related to governance. As declared by Moroccan Central Bank Governor, “the performance of the Moroccan economy is not enough to meet the increasing social aspirations” Guerraoui (2019). Morocco needs to overcome the low “middle-income trap” levels confining states in low performance that leads to low legitimacy²⁰. Therefore, it has to improve its governance.

The concept of governance has been widely disseminated, since the 1990s, by Western organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD through a governance reform seeking “the promotion of universal values such as freedom and democracy in the political realm, and effectiveness and responsiveness in the administrative realm” (Pal, 2019, p. 47). Hence, “good governance” has become an instrument of public affairs and an indicator of political development as well as a mechanism to enhance the legitimacy of the public sphere. It moved to the forefront of public policy debates by international donors encouraging their client states to reconfigure public institutions and build systems that are responsive and accountable to citizens. The emphasis is put on the improvement of public services through adequate systems of public administration (including budgeting, human resource management, decentralization, service delivery, IT, financial management). In this perspective, Weber (1978) has earlier emphasized the fundamental role played by the bureaucracy, as a formal origination with its specific structural characteristics and principles (i.e., meritocracy, predictability, and transparency), to promote both economic growth and social well-being. Hence, the improvement of governance and economic performance necessitates a public administration reform.

The dysfunctions attributed to the Moroccan public administration have amply been diagnosed and solutions have been proposed without much positive impact on the ground. In 1998, a Strategic Committee of the Administrative reform was created, under the supervision of the Prime Minister, with the mission to modernize the public services. Also, with the support of the UNDP, a National Program of Governance (NPG) was elaborated seeking the rationalization of administrative structures, the valorization of human resources through the improvement of the training and remuneration systems, and the improvement of relations between the Administration and the users of public services (Ben Osmane, 2004). Due to a lack of follow up, the program did not achieve the expected results. Since 2002, the Moroccan government has embarked on a comprehensive Public Administration Reform program (PARP) with assistance from the World Bank, which incorporated governance-related conditions within its development loans policy, requiring governments receiving loans to demonstrate effective performance and pursue deep reforms. At the heart of this program was the modernization of the HRM system, particularly using tools to assess skills and performance. Through this program, Morocco's administrative tradition was aspiring to move from strict and rigid legal compliance to a search for better performance and more effective public service (World Bank, 2010). Once again, the reforms have failed to achieve their objectives. Given the critical socio-economic conjuncture, the Moroccan government initiated in collaboration with the World Bank a new Country Partnership Framework (CPF) covering the fiscal years 2019 to 2024. This program aims to enhance "social cohesion by improving the conditions for growth and job creation and reducing social and territorial disparities while focusing on refining education and health sector outcomes, establishing innovative social protection programs, and promoting Governance and Citizen Engagement, which represent a pivotal foundation in implementing the CPF" (World Bank, 2019b). In the same vein, under internal and external pressures, Mohammed VI introduced a series of political reforms codified in the 2011 Constitution²¹. The new Constitution lays the foundation for a more open and democratic society. It strengthens the country's governance framework through a greater separation and better balance of powers among the King, the government, and the Parliament, and lays the foundation for advanced regionalization and decentralization as a democratic and decentralized system of governance. However, as underlined by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2005, p. 199), in the case of Morocco, "*form frequently deviates from function in governance*", given that the existing rules (de jure) need to be effectively implemented (de facto).

The governance status in Morocco can succinctly be assessed using the Worldwide Governance Indicators Group measuring six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010; World Bank, 2019a)²².

Table 1 shows, in the case of Morocco, relatively higher scores for government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), and corruption control (CC), with percentile rankings near 50%, while Scores were lower for voice and accountability (VA), and political stability (PS) ranking close to 30%. Also, scores over a decade (2007–2017) show a decline in three indicators (PS, GE, RQ), a stagnation of two (V&A, RL) and a noticeable increase in one indicator (CC). These results infer that the institutional and administrative reforms were not effective and did not improve the government performance in terms of the six measured dimensions of governance. This explains the discontent and protests of Moroccans against the government policies and its overall performance. However, in comparison to other countries, notably Jordan (being a monarchical regime), Egypt, Tunisia and Libya (having witnessed Arab uprisings), the Moroccan regime appears to perform relatively better in some components of governance. However, compared to Tunisia, Morocco is clearly lagging behind in the areas of political participation and freedom of the press showing unsatisfactory results. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that while Tunisia has made clear gains in terms of voice and accountability, its political stability has deteriorated but not to the levels reached by Egypt and Libya. Therefore, as pointed by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2005, p. 207), Morocco "*may not be the best possible system of governance; however, it definitely is not the*

Table 1. Worldwide governance indicators percentile rank (0 to 100).

Indicators	Year	Morocco	Egypt	Tunisia	Libya	Jordan
Voice and Accountability	2007	28	15	9	2	29
	2012	29	25	43	23	26
	2017	29	13	53	9	26
Political Stability	2007	28	27	47	71	35
	2012	33	7	22	7	29
	2017	31	9	14	3	28
Government Effectiveness	2007	51	43	68	9	61
	2012	53	23	55	4	56
	2017	48	29	51	2	57
Regulatory Quality	2007	49	43	54	15	61
	2012	50	33	46	3	56
	2017	45	17	36	1	57
Rule of law	2007	46	48	55	19	61
	2012	49	40	51	12	63
	2017	49	32	56	2	61
Control of Corruption	2007	45	24	49	15	64
	2012	40	33	56	3	60
	2017	53	34	53	2	63

Source: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>

worst system". In the following sections, we will try to elucidate furthermore the regime's endurance and legitimacy.

Government performance and state legitimacy: institutional dualism

Governance is defined as "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised" (World Bank, 2019a). In this perspective, as noted by Hanberger (2003, p. 259), "a regime's own history restricts the freedom of choice for policy making. Choices made when an institution or regime is being formed will have continuing influence over the policy far into the future". Moreover, Beetham (1991, p. 36) reasserts the fact that "rules and institutions of power embody legitimating ideas or justificatory principles within them developed through a lengthy process of historical evolution".

This historical institutional approach applies to the case of Morocco. Noticeably, despite many initiatives promoting institutional reforms and good governance, the Moroccan regime remains caught between the driving forces of modern and democratic changes and the pervasive power of traditional and authoritarian rules (Naguib, 2017). Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2005, p. 200) use the term Institutional dualism to refer to this "tension between intended new performance-enhancing institutions and unwanted old and deeply embedded practices". The Moroccan political system offers a good illustration of such institutional dualism and imbroglio where coexist change and persistence in institutions.

As pointed by Ayubi (1995, p. 121), the symbolic and normative legitimacy of the Alaouite dynasty, resulting in a political system placing the king at the center of power dynamics and above all other branches of government with some sporadic changes and adaptations, has historically generated a "strong nation" but "weak apparatus".²³ However, during the colonial period, mechanisms were deployed to reduce the Sultan's power and empower administrative institutions. According to Coms-Schilling (1989), "for centuries, the monarchy had been replete with meaning but weak in apparatus; the French colonial government had been replete with apparatus but weak in meaning. Post-colonial Morocco combined them" (Cited in Ayubi, 1995, p. 121). Therefore, as noticed by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2005, p. 207), "an underlying danger in Morocco is that too much change in makhzen institutions might destabilize the country". Unlike the Gulf monarchies, with abundant oil resources and rent allocations, the Achilles' heel of the Moroccan regime has always been its economic and financial conditions.

Noticeably, finance was so important to the Moroccan state that the word for "treasury" makhzen, was applied to the government as a whole (Pennell, 2003, p. 111). That explains the difficulty to reform such deeply rooted institution and the challenges to improve government efficiency and promote good governance.

In the throne's speech addressing the nation, Mohamed (2019) emphasized the importance to be "placed on improving basic social service delivery and enhancing the performance of public institutions", and referred to the need for "a change in the mindsets of those in charge". The improvement of governance in Morocco implies an enhancement of institutional efficiency that requires cognitive and normative changes. The king stressed the need to revisit the development model that proved to be "inadequate in terms of helping [the country] meet the growing needs of a segment of the population, reduce social inequalities and tackle regional disparities". Therefore, following up on royal guidance, "the government is currently working to develop a new Development model for the country based on enhanced education and vocational training programs and bolder policies to boost job creation and promote inclusive growth through a modernized social protection system" (World Bank, 2019b).

The king's deployed mechanisms to resolve governance issues are indicative of a strategy of legitimization of the Moroccan political system separating between the government and the regime. According to Gilley (2006, p. 52), "in authoritarian states, there is an overlap of government and state legitimacy". However, the Moroccan case reveals the capacity of the monarchy to hold an absolute power while attributing the failures to satisfy general interest requirements to government inefficiency.

By acknowledging and addressing, in his speech, "the shortcomings revealed by past experience", and showing a concern about "blatant inequalities, frustrating behavior, rent seeking or time and energy wasting", while calling for social and economic reforms to improve "the citizens' living conditions", the king is magisterially distancing himself from the failure of the government to satisfy general interest requirements. As noticed by Beetham (1991, pp. 145–146), "most constitutions are designed to allow for the replacement of governments or leaders who have lost public confidence to enable alternative policies to be pursued by a different administration enjoying renewed authority and avoid to attach the discredit associated with failure to the constitutional rules themselves". In the case of Morocco, the replacement of governments is a means to delegitimize the politicians and legitimize the political power held by the palace. Noteworthy, over the past half century, the Moroccan

political system has been led by 3 consecutive kings, and 31 alternating governments with 16 prime ministers, and it counts 34 political parties. The current government is a six-party coalition with a clear lack of cohesion and limited power.

In sum, the Moroccan regime confirms and illustrates the assumptions of Beetham (1991, pp. 34, 201) that “the powerful would seek to secure and maintain the legitimacy of their power”, and that “the legitimization of the leadership and its policies and the radical delegitimation of opponents are systematically connected”. It also translates the king’s dilemma as stated by Huntington (1968, p. 177):

On the one hand, centralization of power in the monarchy was necessary to promote social, cultural, and economic reform. On the other hand, this centralization made difficult or impossible the expansion of the power of the traditional polity and the assimilation into it of the new groups produced by modernization. The participation of these groups in politics seemingly could come only at the price of the monarchy. This is a problem of some concern to the monarch: Must he be the victim of his own achievements? Can he escape the dilemma of success vs. survival? More broadly put, are there any means which may provide for a less rather than a more disruptive transition from the centralizing authority needed for policy innovation to the expansible power needed for group assimilation.

According to Tocqueville (2002), legitimacy is associated with the “will of the people” and involves a “popular sovereignty” where governments are supported and driven by an active citizenry. In contrast to popular sovereignty, defined as an “abstract power”, Schmitt (2005) argues that it is the very existence of a sovereign, a singular final authority in a moment of crisis, which grants legitimacy to a nation. In this perspective, power must fall to a singular and physical sovereign “who decides on the exception”, given that “the people” cannot exercise practical authority and take specific actions in a moment of crisis (Woodard, 2015, pp. 21–24).

In the same vein, Beetham (1991, p. 129) claims that, “the principle of popular sovereignty does not constitute the only legitimating principle. In constitutional monarchies, the belief in traditionalism and heredity lives on, reinforcing a range of powers accorded to the monarch, from largely ceremonial ones in countries like Holland, Norway or the UK, to a much more executive role in the states of Jordan or Morocco”. Therefore, as long as the beliefs in the sources of authority have not been eroded, the regime’s legitimacy will be maintained. This helps understand the endurance of the Moroccan regime and its legitimized authority. According to the index of state

legitimacy, considering the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry and the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population’s confidence in its government and institutions, Morocco went gradually from 8.0 in 2006, to 7.4 in 2009 to 6.88 in 2018²⁴ (The Fund for Peace, 2018). This index, though not high initially, shows that the state legitimacy has improved in Morocco while it worsened in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan. This lead us to the consideration of legitimacy in relation to democracy in a monarchical regime.

Democracy and legitimacy: a localized perspective

Based on the democracy index (2018), the kingdom of Morocco is considered a hybrid regime, ranking number 100 of 167 countries, judged for the fairness of the electoral process, civil liberties, government functioning, political participation, and political culture (The Economist Intelligence report, 2019). As underlined by Haider and McLoughlin (2016, pp. 5–6), “legitimacy does not derive solely from effectively functioning institutions. Such institutions must also resonate with societies in order for them to be considered legitimate and to become embedded in society”. In this regard, Daadaoui (2008, pp. viii) argues that “the prevalence of the Moroccan monarchy’s cultural and social hegemony through its religious authority and use of rituals of power contributes to the stability and resilience of the monarchical authoritarian regime in Morocco”. The findings of his empirical research, including 60 elite interviews and 300 field surveys, highlight the effects of religious legitimacy and the ritualization of the political process in hindering the opposition forces’ ability to challenge monarchical status in the public sphere.²⁵ They also illustrate the penetration of the state into society such that citizens accept the state’s right to rule and its position as the highest political authority.

Also, in order to understand the state legitimacy in Morocco, as highlighted by Hissouf (2014, p. 49), the kingdom should be approached as “an open modern country as well as a traditional Muslim society. Such conception of the Moroccan society is forgotten when concepts like democracy, human rights, and freedom are applied to an Arab Islamic society. The meanings of these universal concepts change when the political and religious symbols of authority in the Moroccan context are included”. Islam represents definitely a solid building block and crucial source of legitimation in the Moroccan context. The monarchy’s religious authority, as stated by Daadaoui (2011), has limited the ability of

Islamist and non-Islamist opposition groups to contest its legitimacy. This contrasts with the Iranian monarchy overthrown by the Islamic revolution. The Islamic movement in Morocco was incapable of organizing a revolution on the Iranian scale given that the monarch could fight the Islamists on their own ground by emphasizing his own Islamic credentials as the Commander of the Faithful. This allows the king not to fall as the Shah had done (Pennell, 2003, p. 175).

From this perspective, Khanani (2014) examines, in a fieldwork study involving over 100 interlocutors, how politically active Muslims in Morocco articulate and enact democracy grounded in the Muslim tradition. Democracy appears to be conceived both in terms of procedural terms, being associated to a series of institutions (e.g., free and fair elections, investing legislative power in elected officials, freedom of speech), and substantive terms (e.g., fighting unemployment and illiteracy). Moroccan Muslim activists (enrolled in political parties) connect democracy to the Muslim tradition, under the concept of *Shura* (consultation) and refer to values such dignity, sovereignty and freedom as fundamental principles. Meanwhile, claiming a pragmatic approach, leaders of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), at the head of the current government, acknowledge that the state in Morocco is “based on ‘sharifian lineage’ as a source for legitimacy, not as a source of power” (Daadaoui, 2016, p. 113). In this perspective, the PJD accepts the religious capital of the regime as a key component of the Moroccan system.

According to Abbott and Teti (2017), based on the Arab Transformations survey carried out in 2014, in six MENA countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia), public opinion has a “much more holistic and substantive conception of democracy than international policy makers” (p.3). The data shows that the “Western-style liberal” version of democracy and its procedural conception (e.g., elections, civil and political rights) are not seen as the most appropriate form of government by the majority of surveyed people (p.9). Social justice and economic rights and concerns are their primary focus. Hence, the Western “democracy promotion” is viewed with deep skepticism by an important component of independent civil society (p.7). Meanwhile, regarding the “form of government citizens want and the extent to which religious leaders and precepts should be integral to it”, there was “no single or even dominant view on what the relationship between religion and politics should be” (p.9). However, a majority of citizens (71%) in Morocco agree that Islam is compatible with democracy, and more than half (60.3%) think that

democracy is a suitable form of government. However, when considered as the only suitable political system in its procedural form, the support falls to a quarter (25%) and only 6% among the surveyed people in Morocco see core defining features of democracy (i.e., freedom of speech and changing government through elections) as essential. Interestingly, democracy is perceived in its substantive form by Arab citizens in general and Moroccan people in particular.

Meanwhile, the Arab Transformations public opinion survey shows that most Arab citizens are deeply dissatisfied with the performance of their governments and lack trust in them. However, the underscored concerns are mainly about corruption, social justice and economic situation and less about political rights. Arab citizens appear to be more concerned about social justice, economic inclusion and the quality of public services than about the liberal and free-market version of democracy promoted by the West (Teti & Abbott, 2017). Also, only a small minority of citizens perceive authoritarianism as one of the two main challenges facing their respective countries²⁶. In Morocco, the majority nominated the corruption of politicians and/or civil servants as the key driver of uprisings while only just over 1 in 10 mention an authoritarian government or internal stability and security as important challenges (Sapsford et al., 2016).

More recently, The Arab Barometer (2019), in its fifth wave, points to a generational gap in Morocco. While the older generation of Moroccans retains confidence in the country’s institutions and remains religious, younger Moroccans show lower levels of trust and more frustration towards the lack of available economic and political opportunities, and seem to be turning away from religion²⁷. Also, economic issues and the quality of public services remain the main challenges facing Moroccan citizens, while the weight allocated to corruption in state institutions has declined²⁸. This reflects the resilience of the regime and its apparent efforts in fighting corruption through some undertaken initiatives. Still, perceptions about corruption in state institutions among Moroccan youths are high (81%) and relatively few believe that the government is taking significant steps to tackle the problems (36%).

Another important dimension of a country’s legitimacy consists in the influence of aid and the impact of external intervention on socio-political cohesion, given that state institutions advocated by external actors often correspond with Western practices. As underlined by Haider and McLaughlin (2016, p. 6), such institutions “may not fit with local context and historical processes and may not be socially, politically or culturally

appropriate. In such cases, the institutions are unlikely to be perceived as legitimate and to contribute to positive state-society relations". Also, when considering the External Intervention Indicator, assessing the influence and impact of external actors in the functioning of a state, particularly at security and economic realms, Morocco seems to be less subject to such interventions compared to Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, respectively.²⁹

The most pressing and daunting problems facing the Moroccan government and affecting its citizens consist in youth unemployment and quality of education. Morocco's youth feel a sense of hopelessness, and many young people seek opportunities abroad to join the roughly 4.5 million Moroccans officially residing in other countries. The kingdom effectively takes the lead in terms of migration. According to the human *flight and brain drain indicator*, Morocco has by far the highest score in the region (The Fund for Peace, 2018).³⁰ This result is supported by the Arab Transformations Survey led in 2014 showing that the percentage of people considering living abroad is the highest in Morocco comparatively to other Arab countries (Abbott & Teti, 2017).³¹ The key drivers for migration are economic considerations (65%) followed by education (18%) in the case of Morocco. While security (0.93%) and political reasons (1.19%) are not perceived as real concerns—like in countries such as Libya and Iraq—(Sapsford et al., 2016). Based on the recent survey of the The Arab Barometer (2019, p. 10), "*Moroccans are significantly more likely to want to emigrate than they were in 2016*".³² Such results are indicative of internal malaise and discontent, but it also refers to alternative ways Moroccans are adopting to improve their economic and social conditions and activate agency by leaving the country for better opportunities. Such intensification of migration raises concerns about the country's development and highlights the importance of devising economic policies meant to deliver growth and social cohesion and development.³³

In sum, the Moroccan state is navigating in a very turbulent and challenging environment. It has shown a stunning capacity to manage internally and externally driven pressures while maintaining its continuity. However, with generational gap and the decreasing level of trust and increasing degree of frustration and discontent among Moroccan youths, the regime should reconsider its policies and legitimacy formula and make real and adaptive changes. It should be more responsive to citizens' needs and seize the historic opportunity of the Arab uprisings to create a more open and accountable state, strengthen economic growth, and significantly develop its human and social capital. In the meantime, As pertinently stated by Nobel prize winner

Ostrom (2017, p. 5), "efforts to design self-governing systems, rather than making adaptive changes within what has been passed along from past generations, involves human beings in tasks that are beyond their knowledge and skills". Therefore, rather than being designed outwardly and imported or imposed by external and international pressures, political reforms and governing modes should emerge from within and keep changing to respond to internal needs and demands of Moroccan people. Especially in a context where citizens prefer more likely evolutionary transitions rather than revolutionary ones as the results of the Arab transformations survey show.³⁴

Conclusion: "transitional continuity"

Disruptions of order provide necessary stimuli to the study of legitimacy. The Arab uprisings phenomena offer certainly a strong stimulus to explore this salient and complex topic at the light of the ongoing events and social mobilization occurring in the Arab world. Legitimacy is often linked with state stability.³⁵ According to Beetham (1991, p. 33), stability refers to "a system's ability to withstand shock and failure because a solid level of support from its subordinates can be guaranteed". Therefore, the role of people and not only the regime in the legitimacy equation is crucial. The absence of support and the withdrawal of consent from citizens can lead to the deligitimation of a political system and its collapse. Hence, legitimacy needs to be approached as a social practice and a political process. It involves the interaction between the ruler and the ruled within a specific context and at a specified time. It also underlies the centrality of political actors as they provide justifications to their authority through a dominant narrative and the role of civil society in providing or withdrawing consent. Furthermore, legitimacy crisis helps identifying the sources of deficits of a political system whether in terms of poor performance or erosion of the embedded beliefs. Arab uprisings as a social and political phenomenon is indicative of both deficits within most of the Arab regimes. Hudson (1977, p. 24) pointed to the "meager legitimacy resources" of most Arab countries struggling with identity problems, social changes, radical ideologies and incompletely integrated political culture. Authoritarian leaders in the region were able to maintain their rule, despite the dilution of their legitimacy formulas, through the basic tactics of fear and intimidation and well-established domestic security apparatus. But, such formula is not sustainable at the long run as no regime can survive by coercion only. Among the multiple examples corroborating this fact, the one of Iran. As judiciously underlined by Razi (1987, p. 460), "the inability of the Shah to acquire adequate legitimacy in terms of its existing foundations or

to develop an alternative legitimacy formula in terms of which his dictatorship could be justified brought down not only his regime but also the monarchical system”.

In contrast, the monarchical regime in Morocco, while handling the king's dilemma, has been able to maintain its authority through a historical institutionalization of its power and a political exploitation of the systemic and symbolic building blocks of legitimacy. According to Duke (2016), the durability of the Moroccan political power can be attributed to its capacity to “manufacture consent”. Meanwhile, as highlighted by Mednicoff (2007, p. 100), “the history of the regime in Morocco shows permanence and the persistence of a Moroccan political formula”. This formula can be depicted by a “transitional continuity” displaying a process of change while maintaining a consistent pattern over time. Interestingly, after studying the history of Morocco since 1830 until recently, Pennell (2001) stresses continuity in this kingdom within a context of change. He underlines the political continuities in the Moroccan ruling elite before, during and after Moroccan colonization. Also, commenting on Mohamed VI throne's speech, Khairallah (2019) points to “one word that keeps coming: continuity”. While calling for reforms and a new development model, the king is stating, “this is not about a break with the past. Rather, we want to add a new building block to our development agenda, as part of a continuing process” (Mohamed, 2019).

Hence, comparatively with other countries, notably Tunisia, which proved effectively to be dynamic and has undertaken a challenging and uncertain path to a democratic transition, Morocco has opted for the *status quo*. If this strategy has been successful in the past allowing the regime to survive, it might be detrimental for the future hindering the country's socioeconomic development. Actually, the resistance to reforms and the continuation of pre-established systems and practices is a syndrome referred to as “status quo bias” (Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991). In this perspective, there is indeed matter to question, as does Waterbury (2018), if Morocco is “moving forward or in a loop” in spite of some leaps. Noteworthy, to the protest movements in 2011 calling for more freedom, human rights, job opportunities, welfare, and dignity, the regime responded promptly by drafting a new constitution containing several principles of good governance and the rule of law. As observed by Chauffour (2018, p. 326), “the country has been presented with a historic opportunity to create a more open state, strengthen economic growth, and significantly develop its human and social capital. The emergence of the new social contract envisioned in the 2011 constitution could pave the way for the type of historic transformation that has occurred in other regions of the world in recent decades”. For that, the new constitution needs to be effectively implemented and the rule of

law strengthened not only *de jure* but *the facto*. Legitimacy requires that the words be uttered as one delegitimizing factor of the Arab regimes is “their consistent failure to match words with effective deeds” (Hudson, 1977, p. 27). In sum, Arab uprisings and social mobilization present a historic opportunity for the Moroccan and other Arab regimes to engage in a dynamic relation with the society, to be responsive and undertake real changes and significant policy transformations to regain and maintain a necessary legitimacy.

Notes

1. Such regimes are referred to as *Mukhabarat* states with well-established national security apparatus (Hudson, 2014).
2. As an example of a misleading interpretation of the legal-rational legitimacy, based upon a belief in rule, the claim of authority of a political order on the basis of a conformity to the law and procedural correctness, while “in the process it becomes detached from any substantive beliefs or principles in relation to which the legal rules and procedures can be justified” (Beetham, 199, p.24).
3. Moroccan monarchy refuted the logical expectations of many well-informed observers and development specialists, -regarding the survival of post-colonial monarchies and predicting its collapse and demise since the 60s-, by lasting until now (Mednicoff, 2007, p. 5).
4. The monarchical state exists in Morocco since 789 with the first dynasty of Idrissides, followed by Almoravid, Almohad, Wattassid, Saadian and Alaouite dynasties. Over 100 sultans and kings ruled the country. According to Ayubi (1995), a political community has existed for over 800 years, in Morocco, even if the borders of the state remain fluid for centuries and the capital city changed depending on the changing weight of various regions and various networks of external relations (Fes, Marrakech, Meknes, Rabat).
5. Morocco is also known as the “sharifian kingdom”. “Sharifism” or sharifian descent, considered descendants of the prophet Mohamed, has been established as the basis of political power in Morocco and its source of legitimacy since the early sixteenth century (Pennell, 2003, p. 79).
6. Its corresponding day (November 6) is still celebrated as an annual national holiday (*Green march day*), along with *Oued ed-Dahhab day* on August 14 (commemorating the day leaders in one province of Western Sahara acknowledged Moroccan dominion in 1979).
7. “Full Text of King Mohamed VI Speech on Throne Day”. Retrieved from: <https://www.morocco-worldnews.com/2019/07/279367/king-Mohamed-vi-throne-day-speech-tetouan/amp/>.
8. *Makhzen*, literally meaning the “warehouse” or “Treasury” (i.e., the state), is crucial in understanding the Moroccan regime. The term has different connotations ingrained in the Moroccan culture. It refers to the “central administration together with the Sultan's governmental suite”. It is associated with traditional

- authority, informal rules, shadow power, bureaucracy, and elite related to government in Morocco (Naguib, 2017).
9. Arabian origin related to Prophet Mohamed via his daughter Fatima and his cousin 'Ali. This lineage conveys an honored religious status.
 10. Possession of a divine blessing. This argument was specifically used to explain King Hassan II's surviving to two dramatic military coups in the 1970s.
 11. The Islamic term *amir al Mu'mineen* (commander of the faithful) was introduced by Hassan II in the Constitution (Article 20) along with declaring the person of the king "sacred and inviolable" (Article 23). Such codification translates a strategy of elevating the socio-religious status of the king and neutralizing the opposition.
 12. Refers to an oath of loyalty consisting in a ceremony of allegiance translating a typical social contract bounding the king and his subjects.
 13. <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/29902-one-of-the-great-mistakes-is-to-judge-policies-and>.
 14. B'lad al-makhzen, literally means terrain belonging to the Treasury (i.e., the state) from which taxes were extracted, while b'lad al-siba (loose country) refers to unruly terrain inhabited by other tribes that were not subject to the state's authority (Ayubi, 1995, p. 117). (Siba also means insolence or dissidence).
 15. Rulers had traditionally to deal with the pronounced separation between b'lad al-makhzen and b'lad al-siba, the national identity (given the differences between Arabs and Berbers and among Berbers), the tribal culture of dissidence and varieties of Islam (orthodox to mystical) (Hudson, 1977, p. 220).
 16. The number of sit-ins and mobilizations went from 8000 in 2008 to more than 18000 protests in 2018 while the number of civil society organizations currently exceeds 160000 organizations (Berrada, 2019).
 17. <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/country/morocco>; <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/country/malaysia>.
 18. According to IMF report (2019), "economic activity weakened in 2018, reaching 3 percent, due to lower growth in the agricultural and tertiary sectors. The unemployment rate remains close to 10 percent and particularly high among the youth". Meanwhile, "net FDI increased substantially to 2.5 percent of GDP, and the risks to financial stability are limited". Overall, "Morocco's medium-term prospects remain favorable. However, this outlook remains subject to significant domestic and external risks".
 19. Eighty percent of poverty in Morocco continues to be in rural areas, and in 2014, the urban poverty rate was 1.6% as opposed to 9.5% in rural areas. Over 19% of Moroccans living in rural areas are vulnerable and at risk of falling back into poverty (Chauffour, 2018, p. 38).
 20. Noteworthy, Mitchell (2013) shows that even in one of the highest income level in the world, a state like Qatar undertook to cultivate its legitimacy beyond resources allocation and economic performance, by investing in the normative dimensions and justifications of its political power through the creation of a unified sense of Qatari nationalism and citizenship, rewriting Qatar's historical and cultural heritage, and coordinating the ideological message of Islam with the political narrative of the state. Interestingly, the adopted Qatari national motto: "God, the Nation, the Emir" reminds us the one of Morocco.
 21. 2011 constitution includes more than 21 chapters focusing directly on issues of good governance underlining its importance. The Constitution strengthens the principles of good governance, human rights, and protection of individual freedoms. It reaffirms a number of fundamental economic, civil, and political freedoms, and extends the rights already contained in 1996 constitution. The new Constitution introduces institutional changes in order to strengthen the separation, balance, and collaboration among the authorities and enhance institutional responsibility and accountability. It also increase citizen participation in the management of local affairs and public services. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011.pdf.
 22. Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
 23. Moulay Ismail is considered as the real founder of Alaouite dynasty. He took control in 1672 and remained sultan for more than half a century. He used sharifian descent as one of his own main sources of legitimacy and encouraged the sharifian cult by establishing close relations with Sufi shaykhs who were of sharifian descent. This sultan gained his legitimacy by restoring central control over a once fractured country, building a great capital, organizing a powerful army (composed of the black soldiers of the Abid al-Bukhari, giving sultan the monopoly of force independently of local loyalties, at the image of the Janissary army of the Ottoman Empire), developing commerce and securing order. Under his reign, "The people saw such security and prosperity and peace that were undreamed of". (Pennell, pp.99–105). Thus, Moulay Ismail was able to cultivate both criteria of legitimation by combining normative legitimacy and good performance.
 24. This index varies between 10 and 1. The lowest the score, the highest is the state legitimacy and vice-versa. <https://bit.ly/2yoOXb7>.
 25. According to the survey, 74% of the respondents believe the king as the commander of the faithful to be a religious and traditional symbol. Similar wide support is also shown with regard to the other symbols; 72% viewed king's *baraka* as religious and traditional, while 77% expressed that the king's prophetic lineage is religious and traditional in its essence. Finally, 56% of respondents consider *bay'a* as religious and traditional symbols of authority. Interestingly, 30% viewed *bay'a* as a particular relationship tying them directly to the king (Daadaoui, 2008, p. 201).
 26. According to Arab Transformations survey as reported by Teti and Abbott (2017), the most important challenges and drivers of the uprisings consist for Moroccans in the corruption (57.1%), followed by economic reasons (40.3%), lack of basic services (25.9%), authoritarian government (19.9%), and political freedom (16.5%). The weight of these drivers vary across Arab countries.

- In Tunisia and Libya, corruption comes first as well (61.3% and 63.8%), followed by economic situation (47.8) in Tunisia and authoritarian government and basic services (34%) in Libya. In Egypt and Jordan, the economic situation represents the most important driver (55.7% and 64%) followed by corruption (41%, 47%). Political freedom seems not to be on the top of priorities compared to improving economic conditions and fighting corruption.
27. Two-thirds of those 60 and older describe themselves as religious compared with one-in – four of those ages between 18 and 29.
 28. Among Moroccan citizens surveyed, a plurality point to economic issues (26%) as the main challenge, followed by the quality of public services (23%) and corruption (9%), while 32% cite other problems such as drugs and marginalization (The Arab Barometer, 2019).
 29. According to the latest trends from the FSI (The Fund for Peace, 2018), Libya scores 10.0, Egypt: 7.6, Jordan: 7.1, Tunisia: 6.1, Morocco: 5.7, while Iraq and Lebanon: 9.4. <https://bit.ly/2yoOXb7>.
 30. According to the Human flight and brain drain index, Morocco scores 8.0 compared to 6.3 in Libya, 6.0 in Tunisia and Algeria, 5.2 in Egypt, 4 in Jordan (The Fund for Peace, 2018).
 31. The percentage is 43 in Morocco, 42 in Tunisia, 41 in Libya, 34 in Jordan, 22 in Egypt (Arab Transformations Survey, 2014).
 32. The survey shows a 17-point increase since 2016.
 33. Moroccans living abroad (MRE) through remittances still contribute to the country's economy. According to the World Bank report (2018), Morocco received \$7.4 billion from its diaspora, equal to 6.2% of the country's Gross Domestic Product. <https://bit.ly/2GywuO2>.
 34. According to the Arab transformations survey, the majority of Moroccan people surveyed think that political reforms should be introduced gradually rather than all at once (59.7 agree and 29.5 strongly agree).
 35. Epistemologically, the corresponding word to "state" in Arabic is "dawla" which has an opposite meaning to the Latin word. While the State refers to stability, the term *dawla* implies circulation and in its verbal form means 'to turn, rotate or alternate'. Gradually the word came to mean dynasty and then, very recently, 'state'.
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