EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

These are the results of the 7th wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine. Data collection was conducted during the period of 14 and 23 October 2021 in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. All interviews were conducted face to face among a representative sample of the adult population, 18 years and above. The poll covers a variety of issues such as economic conditions, democracy and governance, satisfaction with government and other public institutions, emigration, religious practices, gender, education, media, coronavirus, and international and regional matters.

Findings show that the economic situation and the coronavirus are the top two concerns of the public. When asked about the most important challenges facing Palestine today, the largest percentage selected “the economic situation, such as poverty, unemployment and inflation,” followed by the spread of the coronavirus, financial and administrative corruption, and internal instability and security. It is worth noting that respondents in most of the Arab countries covered by AB 7 selected the economic situation and the coronavirus crisis as the two most important challenges facing their countries. When asked to evaluate the current economic situation in Palestine, the vast majority said it is bad or very bad. When asked to speculate about how the economic situation will be in the next few years, less than a third said it will be much better or somewhat better.

Moreover, the findings show an alarming percentage of people expressing concern about economic inequality: a vast majority says the gap between rich and poor is indeed a problem. Moreover, a clear majority, particularly in the West Bank, thinks that inequality is expanding. Furthermore, findings show that more than half of Gazans and more than a quarter of West Bankers have a problem with securing food for their families. It is worth noting that the majority in all other participating Arab countries viewed economic inequality as a problem with the highest percentage reported in in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia.

Asked what should be the first and second most important issues the government should be focusing on to improve the economic conditions in Palestine, the following were the top three: the creation of more job opportunities, raising wages for existing jobs, and lowering the cost of living. West Bankers and Gazans show similar but
not identical tendencies when it comes to how they define the top priority for government spending in the coming year. Both sides agree that the top priority should be the healthcare system. They also agree on the hierarchy of all other priorities with the exception of the second one: West Bankers select the educational system followed by subsidies while Gazans select subsidies followed by the educational system.

On perception of democracy, the vast majority agrees or strongly agrees that “democratic systems may have problems, yet they are better than other system;” about a quarter disagrees. Agreement with the statement is influenced by age and education. The findings of this AB seventh wave indicate a decrease in agreement with the statement compared to all previous AB waves. Indeed, this is the lowest level ever recorded in Palestine’s AB waves. Support for democracy is higher in four other Arab countries participating in the 7th wave than Palestine, with the highest in Lebanon and Jordan and the lowest in Morocco and Egypt.

A few reasons might be behind the current drop. The findings show a highly significant negative change in public views regarding the impact of democracy on the country's economic performance, security and stability, and style of decision making. For example, for the first time the majority agrees that “under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak,” that democracy is not effective in “maintaining order and stability,” and that democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems. On top of that, a big majority agrees or strongly agree that “as long as a government can solve our country's economic problem, it does not matter what kind of government we have.” A smaller majority agrees that “as long as the government can maintain order and stability in the country, it does not matter whether it is democratic or undemocratic.”

Despite all of the above, in principle, democracy remains the most preferred political system. When asked about the statement closest to their opinion, 57% chose “democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government” while only one fifth chose “under some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable to any other kind of government.” Another fifth chose “for people like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.”

We asked the public about trust in various Palestinian institutions, the government, the president, the courts, the parliament, and civil society organizations. Like all other Arab countries participating in the 7th
wave, only a minority expressed trust in the government. Palestinian findings show significant variations between West Bank and Gaza respondents as respondents tended to indicate the level of trust they had in the institutions in their own areas. A majority of the Palestinians does not trust any of the five public institutions. But the findings show that Gazans tend to have more trust in the institutions in their area than the trust West Bankers place in West Bank institutions, with the exception of the trust in the PA president which is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. These findings indicate a decline in trust in public institutions in both areas compared to our findings in the 5th wave.

We asked the public to assess government responsiveness to what people want. Almost three quarters see the government as not very responsive or not responsive at. The 7th wave of AB shows that the vast majority of the public thinks the Palestinian political system needs major change or should be replaced.

When asked about its satisfaction with the overall performance of the government, the majority of the public tended to show dissatisfaction. But when asked about specific services, the public was mostly split. A little over a half or about a half express satisfaction with the educational system in Palestine, trash collection, the public educational system, and the healthcare system. In large numbers, both West Bankers and Gazans think the government is not doing enough to help address issues like narrowing the gap between rich and poor or keeping prices down.

A plurality of the public thinks that the quality of their life is better than the quality of their parents’ lives. This view is more likely to prevail in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip by a large margin. Similarly, when asked about the quality of their children’s lives in the future, a majority of West Banker and a large minority in the Gaza Strip said it will be better; a little over fifth said it will be the same and one fifth said it will be worse.

The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians think that corruption exists within the PA institutions to a large or a medium extent. The current rate is the highest recorded in all AB waves in Palestine. Nonetheless, Palestine in fact does better than most other Arab countries in the current AB wave, with Lebanon, Tunisia, and Iraq scoring the highest rates.
The poll explored political participation. Only one third of the public say they are interested in politics. But the vast majority say they are not members of an organization or a group or a club and that they do not volunteer their time to do unpaid work for or support a cause they care about. A very small percentage shares in, participates in, or attends online activities to help solve community problems.

Palestinians have a grim view of the liberties they enjoy. We asked the public about its assessment of the extent to which five freedoms are guaranteed in Palestine: to express opinion, to participate in peaceful protests, to criticize in the media things the government does, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion. All but the freedom of religion is seen as not guaranteed and, in all cases, Gazans see these freedoms more guaranteed than West Bankers.

We asked about the environmental challenges facing Palestine. The top first and second environmental problems differ in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip. For West Bankers, trash or waste is the top first and second problem; For Gazans, pollution of drinking water and pollution of the sea and the beaches are the two top first problems.

One quarter say they have thought about emigrating from Palestine to live somewhere else and three quarters say they have not. This finding indicates a slight decline compared to 2018 but it is higher than the demand for emigration in the first and second waves of the Arab Barometer. For obvious reasons related to economic and political conditions, demand for emigration is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. It is also higher among men, the youth, and the more educated. It is worth noting that compared to the findings in other Arab countries participating in the current AB wave, Palestine comes in the middle in demand for emigration with Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia and Lebanon coming on top with much a higher demand.

On religiosity, a majority of Palestinians identify themselves as “somewhat religious,” while a large minority say they are religious, and a small percentage say they are not religious. Compared to other Arab countries in the current AB wave, Palestine comes in the middle, with Mauritania, Sudan, Morocco and Egypt recording higher percentage of religiosity. Among the Palestinians, religiosity is higher in the Gaza Strip, among the old, the less educated, and those with less access to food. This finding indicates an increase in the percentage of those who identify themselves as religious compared to the previous round in 2018. Among the youth, the findings indicate an 8-point increase in
religiosity during the same period. Findings show that a majority, close to two-thirds, disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement that “religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-economic life.” However, a majority agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that “today, religious leaders are as likely to be corrupt as non-religious leaders.”

We also asked about racial discrimination. Asked if racial discrimination is serious problem in Palestine, a clear majority said yes. Larger percentages in Tunisia, Iraq and Jordan gave the same positive answer. However, when asked specifically about the extent of discrimination against dark skinned people in Palestine, a little over a quarter said they are discriminated against to a great or medium extent. When the question whether black people in Palestine face discrimination, one in five said yes.

On gender, the 7th wave indicates that despite the rise in religiosity in Palestinian society, the public is more liberal today than it has been since the first wave in 2006. Almost two thirds agree or strongly agree with the statement that in general, men are better at political leadership than women. This finding, while not highly encouraging, represents a 5-point drop compared to the 5th wave and a 20-point drop compared to the first wave in 2006. Like Palestine, almost all other participating Arab country agreed with the statement with two notable exceptions: Lebanon and Tunisia.

The overwhelming majority disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement that university education for males is more important than university education for females. When asked about the most challenging barrier to entry into the workplace for women, low wages came first followed by lack of childcare options, and that men are given priority for employment. Indeed, we found that a majority agreeing that men and women should be separated or should not be mixed in the workplace. Here too, Gazans are clearly more conservative than West. Finally, a small majority believes that in the past 12 months, abuse or violence against women in the Palestinian community has increased.

On education, five problems have been identified by the public as the top challenges children face at Palestinian public schools. Starting with the most problematic, overcrowding was identified as the first followed by outdated curriculum, lack of skilled teachers and educational staff, lack of or outdated technology in classrooms and
finally, crumbling infrastructure. Among participating Arab countries, Palestine comes first in identifying overcrowding as a top challenge.

We explored media habits of the public. Four out of five Palestinians use the internet on daily basis: three out of five use it throughout the day and an additional fifth use it at least once daily. Palestine is among the top three participating Arab countries in the use of the internet throughout the day; Jordan and Lebanon come first and second respectively. The youth are more likely to use the internet throughout the day. Indeed, a big gap emerges between the young and the old as Palestinians between the ages of 18 and 29 use the internet throughout the day much more than those 30 year or older.

Asked about the primary source of information to follow the breaking news as events unfold, social media came first, with three out of five using it for that purpose while a quarter use television. Face to face conversations, radio, telephone conversation, and newspapers are used for following the breaking news by a very small number of people. These findings indicate a slight rise in the percentage of those who rely on social media platform compared to the previous wave. While young and old Palestinians rely on social media as the main source of information on breaking news, almost 4 out of 5 youth, compared only 5 out of 10 older people, rely on social media for that purpose.

As indicated earlier, the spread of the coronavirus has been selected by the public as the second most important challenge facing the Palestinians today. A majority has indicated that it was very concerned or somewhat concerned about the continued spread of the virus. When asked about the reasons for their concern, the largest percentage indicated that they worry about having a member of their family members getting very ill or die. The second concern focused on lack of public implementation of the government recommendations. Other important concerns included loss of household income, negative impact on the economy, and the inability of the healthcare system to handle the Covid-19 cases.

We asked about the challenges caused by the virus to the respondents. About half of the public chose either the disruption of their kids’ education or loss of income. Other challenges cited included the disruption of social life, increased cost of living, and adverse effects on psycho-emotional state. When evaluating the government's performance in responding to the coronavirus crisis, 3 out of 5 said it was good or very good. A majority of the public
indicated that it has been vaccinated. For those refusing the vaccine, the reasons given varied: one third indicated its lack of conviction in the effectiveness of the vaccine; followed by those who said, “God’s will that decides what happen to me,” and those who indicated concern about the negative side effects.

We asked about peacemaking, normalization, and international political and economic issues. On Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, a slim majority selected the two-state solution, based on the 1967 borders, as the best solution to end the conflict and the occupation. Smaller percentages selected a one-state for Jews and Arabs, or a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. But more than a quarter chose “other” solution. When asked about the normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel, almost all Palestinians said they were opposed or strongly opposed. It is worth noting that majorities in six participating Arab countries favored the two-state solution while small minorities in all participating countries favored the one state solution or the confederation. Almost all participating countries show minor support for normalization with the exception of Sudan and Morocco, whose support exceeded came close to a third, in the case of Morocco, and slightly less than 40% in the case of Sudan.

We asked the public if it has a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the UN and various major international players including the US, China, Russia, and the UK as well as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is the only country in which a majority says it has a favorable or highly favorable opinion. A third has a favorable opinion of China. The US comes last. Turkey is also the only country in which a clear majority wants stronger economic relations followed by China.

We asked the public whether the policies of the Biden administration toward the Middle East and North Africa are better, the same, or worse than those of the Trump administration. The vast majority said they are the same or worse.

We asked the public to assess various possible threats to the national security interests of Palestine. Respondents were provided six possible threats. Here are how the respondents viewed them from the most to the least critical: the Israeli occupation, rise in US economic power, Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s regional influence, Saudi Arabia’s political influence, and the rise of China’s economic power.

We asked the public to evaluate the foreign policies of the leaders of major international and regional powers. Three out of five described
the policies of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as good or very good. The second in line was Putin followed by Xi Jinping, Ali Khamenei, Mohammad Bin Salman, Mohammed bin Zayed, Joseph Biden, and finally Bashar al Assad. The most important difference between the current and the previous AB wave is the drop in the positive evaluation of the Turkish president by 12 percentage points.
INTRODUCTION

These are the results of the 7th wave of the Arab Barometer. So far, this wave has been conducted in 10 Arab countries. Data collection in Palestine was conducted during the period of 14 and 23 October 2021 in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. All interviews were conducted face to face among a representative sample of the adult population, 18 years and above. The sample selection process was multistage in which 120 populated areas or localities were randomly selected. Fifteen interviews were conducted in each locality for a total of 1800 interviews. A computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method was employed to record respondents' answers. In order to encourage respondents to answer truthfully, they are assured of complete anonymity. Respondents do not give their names and no identifying information is collected. The rejection rate stood at 22%, higher than average due to the length of the questionnaire. Margin of error is +/-3%.

The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several important local, Palestinian-Israeli and international developments. The year 2021 began with a presidential decree to hold legislative elections on 22 May and presidential elections on 31 July 2021. The election process, led by the Palestinian Central Election Commission (CEC) went smoothly in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, CEC was unable to begin the process in East Jerusalem. Israel did not allow the election process to begin in that area despite the fact that parliamentary and/or presidential elections did take place in East Jerusalem back in 1996, 2005, and 2006. In late April, the PA decided to postpone the legislative and presidential elections because Israel refused to grant it permission to hold them in East Jerusalem. Most Palestinians suspected that the PA leadership postponed the elections because it was afraid of their outcome.

Early in 2021, the Palestinian territories witnessed a significant rise in number of coronavirus deaths and infections. The coronavirus vaccine was not made available in large numbers by the PA government during the first quarter of that year. A limited vaccination process did however start using a small quantity that was made available to the PA. The process however was marred by accusations of favoritism and lack of transparency.

Internationally, in February 2021, the International Criminal Court issued a statement affirming jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories. Also relevant for the Palestinian territories at that time were
US developments: Joe Biden assumed his position as the new US president during this period and promised to restore Palestinian-American relations and US economic support to the PA.

Also, the pre poll period witnessed the eruption of Palestinian popular confrontations with the Israeli police in May in East Jerusalem in protest against conflict over access to Muslim holy places and the threat of expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah which were followed in the same month by the fourth Hamas-Israel war that was triggered by these confrontations. The Palestinians were also preoccupied with the killing of a political activist, Nizar Banat, by the Palestinian security services. The death of Banat was followed by an eruption of popular protests against the PA, the security services and the PA leadership demanding regime change.

To ease public concerns after the postponement of the parliamentary and presidential elections and the killing of Banat, the PA decided in September 2021 to hold local elections in two phases, one in December, in villages and small towns with population of less than 11,000, and the other in the following spring for the other areas. These local elections gained some importance because they came after all these other developments that contributed to a significant shift in the domestic balance of power in Palestinian politics, significantly reducing the popularity of President Abbas and his Fatah party while boosting the popularity of Hamas, the Islamist opposition in control of the Gaza Strip.

Also, in Palestinian-Israeli relations, a new Israeli government was formed in mid-June 2021. The new government was led by the right-wing leader of Yamina Alliance, Naftali Bennett, and made up of a coalition of various parties, from left to right, united in their opposition to the Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been Israel's prime minister since 2009. In August and again in October, PA president Mahmoud Abbas met with the Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz in Ramallah to talk about Palestinian-Israeli relations and means of improving them while strengthening the PA by implementing various trust-building measures that included the approval of thousands of family unification applications, the transfer of additional funds to the PA, and the issuing of more permits for Palestinian laborers to work in Israel. Also, early September witnessed the escape and recapture of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel.
The current AB7 poll is one of six polls conducted by PSR since May 2006 when the first AB was conducted. Palestine’s AB2 was conducted in December 2010, wave 3 in December 2012, wave 4 in February 2016, wave 5 in November 2018. Palestine did not take part in wave 6, which was conducted in 2020-21 and focused on the coronavirus crisis. In the current 7th wave, Palestine is one of ten Arab countries that have been completed during the latter months of 2021 and the early months of 2022. This report makes comparative references to some of the important findings in these countries.

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MAIN FINDINGS

(1) MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGES:

Asked to identify the most important challenge facing Palestine today, the largest percentage (31%) selected “the economic situation, such as poverty, unemployment and inflation,” followed by the spread of the coronavirus (21%), financial and administrative corruption (19%), internal instability and security (16%), foreign interference (5%), and public services (3%). Economic conditions and the coronavirus are the top two challenges selected by Gazans and West Bankers. But the percentage of Gazans who selected the economic challenge are twice as big as those in the West Bank. For obvious reasons, Gazans place greater emphasis on the economic situation by a very large margin. Both sides, West Bankers and Gazans, place corruption and internal instability and security among the top four most important challenges. In the current AB wave, most other Arab respondents placed greater emphasis on the economic challenge than the Palestinians. For example, 63% of Jordanians and 48% of Lebanese selected this challenge.

Although the percentage of those selecting the economic challenge has dropped compared to all previous Palestine’s AB waves, standing at 41% in the 5th wave, it remains the challenge most selected in all waves, with corruption identified as the second challenge in all waves in which this question was asked. The Coronavirus crisis, however, left its impact as one of the most important challenges in this wave, thus
taking away some of the attention normally given to the economic situation.

A more in-depth look at the economic conditions, particularly in the Gaza Strip, show why it is viewed by the public as the top challenge and why the Gaza Strip is much more concerned about it than the West Bank. When asked to evaluate the current economic situation in Palestine, only 30% said it was good or very good; 70% said bad or very bad. This finding indicates a rise in the positive public perception of the state of economic conditions compared the finding of wave 5, in 2018, when it stood at 24%. Major differences emerge between respondents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with 41% of the former describing economic as good or very good while only 13% of the latter indicating the same.
When asked to speculate about how the economic situation will be in the next few years, 29% (26% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) said much better or somewhat better while 41% (45% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) said much worse or somewhat worse; 27% (23% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) said it will be “almost the same.”

The findings show an alarming percentage of people perception of economic inequality. When asked about the extent to which the gap between rich and poor was a problem for Palestine, a vast majority of 77% said it was indeed a problem to a great or a medium extent. Other Arab respondents in this wave were more alarmed than the Palestinians as 92% of Jordanians, 87% of Egyptians, and 81% of Lebanese share the same concern. A majority of respondents from all Arab countries participating in the current wave expressed that concern.

Moreover, a clear majority, particularly in the West Bank, thinks that inequality is expanding. Asked if the gap is wider or narrower now compared to a year ago, the majority (62%; 69% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) said it was wider and 8% said it was narrower; 28% (23% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) said it was the same. While both West Bankers and Gazans see progress toward equality, the former see greater progress toward equality than the latter.
When asked about the factors that contribute to economic inequality, 70% said that “no one in the government is fighting to protect the interests of the poor;” 64% said “some people are born into wealthier families;” and 65% said “some people work harder than others.”

Furthermore, findings show that more than half of Gazans and more than a quarter of West Bankers have a problem with securing food for their families. When asked if they worry that their food would run out before they get money to buy more, 14% said this is often the case with a total of 38% (28% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) saying this was often or sometimes the case while 60% (71% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) said it is never the case.

Comparing the percentage of Palestinians who say they often worry that their food would run out before they get money to buy more with respondents in other Arab countries shows that Palestine is better off than all of them without exception, with Morocco coming next with only 18% and Mauritania doing the worst with 37% expressing worry.

The poverty gap between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is further illustrated when respondents are asked whether the food that they brought did not last and they did not have money to get more, 34% (24% in the West Bank and 50% in the Gaza Strip) said it is often or sometimes the case while 63% (74% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) said it is never true.
Asked what should be the first and second most important issues the government should be focusing on to improve the economic conditions in Palestine, the following were the top three: the creation of more job opportunities (selected by 42% as the first issue and 24% as the second issue), raise wages for existing jobs (selected by 16% as the first and 27% as the second), and lower the cost of living (selected by 13% as the first and 17% as the second).

When asked to highlight the differences between the public and private sectors, important difference emerged between respondents in the West Bank and those in the Gaza Strip. While in total 73% said the public sector offers more work stability, the percentage in the West Bank stood at 82% and in the Gaza Strip at 69%. Similarly, while 67% of Palestinians said the public sector jobs are harder to get, the percentage in the West Bank stood at 76% and in the Gaza Strip at 52%. Two thirds (75% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) said the public sector jobs are preferable to have and 69% (76% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip said the public sector require more wasta. The public was divided on the which sector pays better salaries: 44% (52% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) selected the public sector jobs while 43% (41% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) selected the private sector jobs.

West Bankers and Gazans show similar but not identical tendencies when it comes to how they define the top priority for government spending in the coming year. Both sides agree that the top priority should be the healthcare system, with 36% selecting it. They also agree on the hierarchy of all other priorities with the exception of the second one: West Bankers select the education system (29%) followed by
subsidies (12%) while Gazans select subsidies (27%) followed by the educational system (17%). The next area of spending selected was fighting terrorism (4%) followed by national security (4%) and finally reduction of environmental pollution (3%).
A vast majority of 70% of the public (70% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip) agree or strongly agree that “democratic systems may have problems, yet they are better than other systems;” 25% disagree. Agreement with the statement is higher in four other Arab countries participating in the 7th wave than Palestine, with the highest in Lebanon, standing at 81% and Jordan, at 77%, and the lowest in Morocco, standing at 54% and Egypt, at 65%.

Agreement with the statement is influenced by age and education. More youth seem to lose trust in democracy than older people, 66% for those between the ages of 18 and 29 compared to 71% among those whose age is 30 and above. Most significantly, the correlation indicates that less education means less support for the statement: 65% among those who received secondary education or less and 79% among those who received education higher than secondary.

This wave 7 finding indicates a decrease in the agreement with the statement compared to all previous AB waves. Indeed, this is the lowest level ever recorded in Palestine’s AB. This decline in supporting democracy is found in most other countries in the current wave. The decrease in Palestine is significant because all the previous drops in the percentage of agreement was within the margin of error. The current drop stands at 9 percentage points compared to the 5th wave and 13 points compared to the 1st wave.
Few reasons might be behind the current drop. The findings show a highly significant negative change in public views regarding the impact of democracy on the country's economic performance, security and stability, and style of decision making. These finding can be seen in most other Arab countries. For example, a majority of 63% of the Palestinians, agree with the statement that "under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak." A majority in Iraq (72%), Tunisia (70%), Libya (61%), Jordan (57%), Lebanon (53%) and Sudan (50%) also agree with the statement. As shown in the figure below, this percentage is the highest ever recorded in all Palestine's AB surveys, standing 28 points higher than the percentage recorded in the 5th wave.

Similarly, an increase of 15 percentage points has been recorded in public perception that democracy is not effective in “maintaining order and stability,” rising from 37% in the 5th wave to 52% in the
current wave, the highest ever recorded. Other Arab respondents were much more concerned about this problem with 70% of Iraqis, 66% of Tunisians, and 60% of Libyans and Lebanese express similar sentiments. Finally, a majority of 59%, compared to only 40% in the 5th wave, agree with the statement that democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems. In this example too, the current level is the highest ever recorded.

On top of that, a big majority of 62% (58% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip) agrees or strongly agree that “as long as a government can solve our country’s economic problem, it does not matter what kind of government we have.” Respondents in most of the other Arab countries in this wave share the same views: Iraqis standing on top with 79% followed by Tunisians and Libyans with 77% each, Jordanians with 76%, Mauritans with 73%, Lebanese with 69%, Egyptians with 66%, and Moroccans with 62%. Sudanese, like Palestinians, show the same level of agreement with the statement.

Like in most other Arab countries in this wave, greater educational attainment influences support for this statement among the Palestinians with those having secondary education or less agreeing with it by 64% while those with educational level higher that secondary education agreeing with it by only 57%.
Similarly, a smaller majority of 56% (55% in the West Bank and 58% in the Gaza Strip) agrees that “as long as the government can maintain order and stability in the country, it does not matter whether it is democratic or undemocratic.” Like the previous example, all other respondents in the Arab world in this wave, except one, show greater levels of agreement with this statement. For example, Libya and Iraq shows 75% agreement. Only Morocco shows less agreement (53%) than Palestine. Here too, educational attainment influences attitudes as a 62% of those with secondary education or less agree with the statement compared to only 48% among those with educational levels higher that secondary education.

Moreover, a slim majority of 51% (48% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) agrees that “this country needs a leader who can bend the rules if necessary to get things done.”

Despite all of the above, in principle, democracy remains the most preferred political system. When asked about the statement closest to
their opinion, 57% chose “democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government” while only 20% (16% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip chose “under some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable to any other kind of government.” Another 19% chose “for people like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.” Only Jordanian and Tunisian respondents in this wave agreed with the statement with bigger percentages, 65% and 64% respectively, while all other agreed with smaller percentages, with only a minority of Libyans and Moroccans indicating agreement.

Like in most other participating Arab countries, educational attainment influences the level of support for democracy among the Palestinians: 53% among those with secondary education or less and 63% among those with educational levels above secondary education agree with the statement. The current percentage of agreement with the statement represents a significant increase compared to the 4th wave of Palestine’s AB when the statement was supported by only 42%.

Finally, we asked about reforms and whether they should be introduced all at once or gradually. A majority of 53% want reform to come “little by little while 41% want it to come “all at once.” In contrast to the majority of Gazans (58%) who want reforms to come all at once, a majority of West Bankers (64%) want reforms to be introduced little by little. In the Gaza Strip, only 36% want reforms to be introduced little by little; in the West Bank, only 29% want reforms to be introduced all at once. In both areas, 5% want no reforms at all. A majority support for gradual reforms is also found in four other participating Arab countries, with Jordan coming first with 70%,
followed by Tunisia, Mauritania, and Sudan (61%, 58%, and 57% respectively).
(3) TRUST and GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE:

We asked the public about trust in various Palestinian institutions, the government, the president, the courts, the parliament, and civil society organizations. Findings show significant variations between West Bank and Gaza respondents as respondents tended to indicate the level of trust they had in the institutions in their own areas. In the West Bank, the government is headed by prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, a senior member of Fatah. The Shtayyeh ‘S government represents the Palestinian Authority under President Abbas, who is also the head of Fatah While the Shtayyeh government has some control over the Gaza Strip, that area is mostly controlled by Hamas, particularly in all matters related to security and law enforcement. In some cases, the question asked in the poll specifically sought to examine trust in government was specifically designed to distinguish between trust in two bodies effectively in control of the two areas. Given the fact that these institutions are controlled by different political factions, it makes no sense to combine the responses of the two areas. This conclusion however does not apply to the trust in the PA president, as the PA has only one president, Mahmoud Abbas.

As the figure below shows, a majority of the Palestinians does not trust any of the five public institutions. But the findings show that Gazans tend to have more trust in the institutions in their area than the trust West Bankers place in West Bank institutions, with the exception of the trust in the PA president which is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. Palestinians in the West Bank have little trust, ranging between 15% and 29% in public institutions while Gazans have a higher level of trust, ranging between 30% and 46% in their own. Both areas have little trust in the PA president, 21% in the Gaza Strip and 27% in the West Bank.
These findings indicate a decline in trust in public institutions in both areas compared to our findings in the 5th wave. For example, trust in government declined from 27% to 23% in the West Bank and from 42% to 35% in the Gaza Strip. Similar decline can be seen when looking at three other public institutions, the justice system, the parliament, and the NGOs.

It should be pointed out that the findings show that the trend of average Palestinian, West Bank-Gaza Strip, trust in government continues the decline that has been documented in previous waves of Palestine's AB, from 68% in the 1st wave to an average of 27% in the 7th.
We asked the public to assess government responsiveness to what people want. Almost three quarters (73%) see the government as not very responsive or not responsive at all while 25% (19% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) think it is largely or very responsive.

Trust in government and public perception of its responsiveness have a great impact on public demand for regime change. The 7th wave of AB shows that the vast majority of the public (70%) thinks the Palestinian political system needs major change or should be replaced while only 28% (24% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) think it needs minor change or works fine as it is. When cross tabulated with demand for regime change, 80% of those who see the government as unresponsiveness demanded major or total regime change while only 42% of those who see the government as responsive demanded the same. Similarly, 78% of those who do not trust the government demanded major or total regime change while only 50% of those who trust the government demanded the same.

We also asked about interpersonal or societal trust. Palestinians tend to show little interpersonal trust as the vast majority (86%) believe that “one must be very careful in dealing with other people” while only 10% say that “most people can be trusted.” These findings are almost identical with those found in the 5th wave when 85% said that “most people are not trustworthy.” The low level of societal trust in found in
all other participating Arab countries, with Lebanon showing the lowest at 4% followed by Tunisia, Iraq, and Jordan (7%, 8%, and 8% respectively), while Mauritania, Sudan, Morocco, and Egypt showing the highest (37%, 22%, 22%, 19%, and 13% respectively).

When asked about its satisfaction with the overall performance of the government the majority of the public tended to show dissatisfaction. But when asked about specific services, the public was mostly split. A majority of 58% expressed dissatisfaction and 41% expressed satisfaction with the overall performance of the government. But a little over a half or about a half express satisfaction with the educational system in Palestine (51%), trash collection (50%), the public educational system (49%), and the healthcare system (49%). However, only 39% expressed satisfaction with the quality of the streets in Palestine while 60% expressed dissatisfaction.

It is worth mentioning that satisfaction with the educational system has seen a significant decline in the 7th wave compared to the findings of the 5th wave, when almost two thirds indicated satisfaction.

When asked if they agree or disagree with the view that says “citizens must support the government decisions even if they disagree with them, two thirds disagreed and on third agreed. The percentage of agreement is higher in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank, 41% and 27% respectively.

We asked the public to evaluate the performance of the government in three areas: narrowing the gap between rich and poor, providing security and order, and keeping prices down. In all three cases, Gazans gave higher marks to the government performance than West Bankers. Positive evaluation, seeing it good or very good, was highest
on security and order (47%; 36% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip), followed by reducing the gap (21%; 17% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) and keeping prices down (20%; 17% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip). As the figure below shows, almost two-thirds of Gazans describe the performance of the government in the Gaza Strip, under Hamas' control, as good or very good in the area of security and order. The lowest positive evaluation went to the West Bank government for its efforts to keep prices down.

Yet, when we asked respondents to think about the quality of their lives while thinking of the long-term perspective, both in the past and the future, West Bank residents were almost twice as positive as Gazans. The largest percentage (40%) think that the quality of their life is better than the quality of their parents' lives. This view is more likely to prevail in the West Bank (51%) than in the Gaza Strip (23%). A quarter thinks it is the same and 29% think it is worse. More Gazans than West Banker (40% and 21% respectively) are likely to think it is worse. Similarly, when asked about the quality of their children's lives in the future, 55% (62% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip) said it will be better; 22% said it will be the same and 20% said it will be worse.

Asked about the most effective means of influencing government decisions, the largest percentage (21%) selected online activism followed by organizing demonstrations (19%; 24% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip). Other means selected included getting people interested and creating a group, coming third with 15%; writing to governmental officials came next with 14%; working through political parties (6%), and work through family connections with
government officials (5%). It is worth mentioning that 12% of the public (7% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip) thought that none of the above are effective. When the question was about the least effective, with the same responses offered, the highest percentage (23%) went to writing to governmental officials followed by organizing a protest demonstration (17%), and online activism (15%).

More than two-thirds (70%) say they have not been asked to provide a permit or a certificate of good behavior from the security services in order to obtain a passport or an ID card; 26% say they have been asked to do so.

Asked about electricity outages, only 4% of West Bankers and 95% of Gazans say they experience them on daily basis. The majority of West Bankers (59%) experience such outages only a few times a year while less than 1% of Gazans have a similar experience. We also asked about water outages. In this case, the responses did not reflect the actual delivery of water from the source, as most homes have water tanks installed on the roof that keep water running even when no water is delivered to the homes. Therefore, despite the fact that water delivery is a severe problem for Gazans and West Bankers alike, only 41% (36% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) say they experience outages on daily or weekly basis.
The vast majority of Palestinians (86%) think that corruption exists within the PA institutions to a large or a medium extent and only 11% think it exists to a small extent or not at all. This is the highest percentage recorded in all AB waves in Palestine, with a 3-point increase compared to the 5th wave. Compared to other participating Arab countries in the current AB wave, Palestine is second in the perception of corruption after Morocco, in which 72% of the respondents think corruption exists in state institutions and national agencies. The highest reported percentages, exceeding 90% are reported by respondents in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Iraq.

A majority of 52% thinks the government is working to crackdown on corruption only to a small extent or not at all while 40% think it is working on that to a large or medium extent. This is the lowest percentage recorded in all AB waves in Palestine, with a 4-point decline compared to the 5th wave.
When asked how widespread corruption is among government officials, a majority of 58% said almost all or most officials are corrupt while 39% said not a lot of officials or hardly anyone is corrupt or involved in corruption. Gazans tend to be a little different than West Bankers in thinking that officials are corrupt as only 55% think that compared to 60% in the West Bank.

We gave two examples to the respondents and asked them to label each as either “only corrupt,” “only amoral,” or “both corrupt and amoral.” A government official giving a government job to a relative is seen as both corrupt and amoral by 46% of the public while 26% see it as “only corrupt,” and 16% see it as “only amoral.” Only 12% see this example as neither corrupt nor amoral. By contrast, a business manager providing a job in his private company for a relative is seen as both corrupt and amoral by only 25%, with 18% seeing it as “only corrupt” and 17% as “only amoral.” The largest percentage (35%) see it as neither corrupt nor amoral.
5) ENGAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE PREFERANCES:

One third of the public (29% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) say they are interested in politics while 67% say they are not interested. It is also higher among males compared to females (41% and 25% respectively) and among the youth compared to the older generation (35% and 27% respectively). Among the participating Arab countries in this AB wave, Palestine comes on top in reported interest in politics followed by Tunisia and Mauritania, at 31% and 28% respectively. Egyptians, Jordanians, and Lebanese show the lowest rates of interest: 7%, 17%, and 22% respectively.

But the vast majority (91%) of Palestinians are not a member of an organization or a group or a club while only 9% (6% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip) say they are. Similarly, 82% say they do not volunteer their time to do unpaid work for or support a cause they care about while 18% say they do. For those who volunteer, charity work, selected by 32% of them, is the dominant area of activity. Other areas include health (11%), education (10%), women’s empowerment (9%), political development (7%), children and youth (6%), economic development (5%), and environment (4%).

Findings show that 7% (4% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip) share in, participate in, or attend online activities to help solve community problems and that the issue that attracts most attention is the Palestine question (20%) followed by the Coronavirus pandemic (18%), human rights (11%), women’s empowerment (9%), economic situation (7%), public service (5%), and elections or transfer of power (4%). One third of those who participate in these activities hopes to raise awareness of the problem or issue; another third seeks to demand change or find a solution to the problem, 12% hope to make known their stance or opinion, 10% seek to organize or learn about an in-person event, and 9% want to learn more about a problem. We also asked about in-person participation in protests. The vast majority (87%) did not participate while 12% participated at least once. Participation is higher in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank (20% and 8% respectively). Almost half of the public (48%) say they often reuse plastic or glass bottles to put water in the fridge while another 26% say they do that sometimes; 26% say then never do that. The majority of those who reuse the plastic bottles (53%) say they do that because it saves cost while 27% do it because it is convenient; 10% do it to save the environment.
We asked the public about its assessment of the extent to which five freedoms are guaranteed in Palestine: to express opinion, to participate in peaceful protests, to criticize in the media things the government does, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion. All but the freedom of religion is seen as not guaranteed and, in all cases, Gazans see these freedoms more guaranteed than West Bankers. A majority of 64% (60% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip) thinks freedom of religion is guaranteed to a great or a medium extent. For all others, the percentage that sees them guaranteed to a great or medium extent ranges between 25% and 35%.

Among other participating countries in this AB wave, a majority of respondents in only three Arab countries, Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon, reported that freedom to express opinion is guaranteed. Palestine came at the bottom with 31% followed by Egypt and Jordan, at 36% each. Tunisia, Lebanon, and Morocco reported the highest percentages of guarantees for freedom to participate in peaceful protest while Palestine came close to the bottom with only 27% with Egypt and Jordan reporting lower percentages of 12% and 25% respectively. Palestine came at the bottom, with 27%, in reporting guaranteed freedom of media to criticize the things government does, with Tunisia, Morocco, and Lebanon on top. Also, Palestine came at the bottom, with 36%, in reporting guaranteed freedom of the press. Here too, Tunisia, Morocco, and Lebanon came on top, at 67%, 59%, and 59% respectively. But Palestine does better than Libya, Mauritania, and Iraq in reporting guarantees of freedom of religion. A vast majority exceeding 70% report such guarantees in Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco.
As shown in the figure below, in the West Bank, these percentages range between 19% for the freedom of the media to criticize the government, to 21% for the freedom to participate in peaceful protests, 22% for the freedom to express opinion, and 27% for the freedom of press. In the Gaza Strip, which gives a more positive assessment in all five areas, the percentages range between 35% for the freedom to participate in peaceful protests and to freedom of the media, to 43% for the freedom to express opinions, and 45% for the freedom of the press.

As indicated above, less than a third of all Palestinians think freedom of expression, or freedom to express opinions, is guaranteed to a great or a medium extent. This is the lowest percentage obtained compared to all previous AB waves, as can be seen in the following figure.

In emergencies, 45% (38% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) think it is always or sometimes justifiable for the government to limit freedom of speech and 52% (45% in the West Bank and 63% in the
Gaza Strip) think it is always or sometimes justifiable to censor the media.

Asked about their biggest role model, the majority (52%) said “a family member.” About a fifth (19%) said a religious figure while 5% said a political or government figure, 3% said a military figure, and 2% said a commentator, columnist, or a publicist on public affairs.

We asked about the environmental challenges facing Palestine. The top first and second environmental problems differ in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip. For West Bankers, trash or waste is the top first and second problem (29% and 29% respectively) followed by lack of water resources (19% as the top first problem and 12% as the top second problem) and pollution of drinking water (16% as the top first and 17% as the top second). For Gazans, pollution of drinking water and pollution of the sea and the beaches are the two top first problems (29% and 27% respectively) followed by trash and waste (10%). The top second problem selected is the pollution of the sea (22%), the pollution of the drinking water (21%), and trash and waste (12%). Seventy two percent consider the lack of environmental awareness among citizens and 67% consider the lack of environmental initiatives or spending by the government as two factors that contribute to a large extent or to a medium extent to the environmental challenges facing Palestine.

Among other participating Arab countries, Egypt and Tunisia, at 42% and 37% respectively, reported the highest percentage of drinking water pollution. Lack of water resources was reported highest in Mauritania and Jordan, at 25% and 21% respectively. Trash or waste
management was reported highest in Sudan, at 25%. Air quality was reported highest in Egypt, at 15%.
6) MIGRATION & IMMIGRATION

One quarter say they have thought about emigrating from Palestine to live somewhere else and 75% say they have not. This finding indicates a slight decline compared to 2019 but it is higher than the demand for emigration in the first and second waves of the Arab Barometer in 2006 and 2010 respectively. Among the participating countries in this wave, Palestine is the seventh in the demand for emigration, with Jordan, Sudan, and Tunisia on top with 48%, 46% and 45% respectively. Three countries show lower levels of demand for emigration: Egypt, Mauritania, and Libya, at 13%, 18%, and 30% respectively.

A majority of the those thinking about emigration (56%) gave economic reasons for doing so, with only 14% gave political reasons. Nine percent indicated that they want to emigrate in search for better education, 8% for security reasons, 5% to join other family members, 4% due to concerns about corruption, and 2% due to religious reasons. For obvious reasons related to economic conditions, demand for emigration is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 33% and 20% respectively. It is worth mentioning that 64% of Gazans who think about emigration gave economic reasons for doing so compared to only 48% among those thinking about emigration from the West Bank. Demand for emigration is also higher among men than women, among the youth compared to the old (39% and 21% respectively), and among the more educated than the less educated (21% and 31% respectively).
From among those who have thought about emigrating, 30% (18% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) say they have considered leaving Palestine even if they did not have the required papers and the rest say they have not.

When asked about the country to which they seek to emigrate, Turkey was chosen the most, by 22%, by those who think about emigration. The country next in line is the US (13%), Germany (12%), Canada (11%), United Arab Emirates (7%), Qatar (4%), Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UK (3% each), Jordan, Egypt, Italy and France (2% each). Seven percent selected other West European countries.

The vast majority (88%) say that their families do not receive any remittances from any immediate or extended family members living
abroad while 11% say they do either on monthly basis (3%), few times a year (5%), or once a year (3%). In the Gaza Strip, the percentage of those whose families receive remittances rises to 19% while in the West Bank the percentage drops to 6%.
7) RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, IDENTITY, and RACE

As we have done in all previous waves of AB, the poll asked about religiosity and the role of religion in public sphere. A majority of 52% of Palestinians (55% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) identify themselves as “somewhat religious,” while 44% (41% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) say they are religious; 4% say they are not religious. Among the participating Arab countries, Palestine comes in the middle in term of religiosity. Four countries report to be more religious than Palestine: Mauritania, Sudan, Morocco, and Egypt. All other participating countries report to be less religious.

As the chart below shows, religiosity among the Palestinians is higher in the Gaza Strip, among the old, the less educated, and those with less access to food.

These findings indicate an increase of six percentage points of those who identify themselves as religious compared to the previous round in 2018, when it stood at 38%. Among the youth, the findings indicate an 8-point increase in religiosity during the same period. It should be pointed out however that the 2018 levels of religiosity were particularly low; indeed, the lowest in all AB Palestine waves coming as it did in the aftermath of the rise of religious extremism in the form of Da’esh or ISIS. The current findings reflect a return to the findings that prevailed between the second and the fourth waves.
We examined the role and place of religion in public sphere. Findings show that a majority of 64% disagree or strongly disagree and 34% agree or strongly agree with the statement that “religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-economic life.” In 2018, 38% agreed with this statement and 62% disagreed. Surprisingly, the percentage of those who disagree or strongly disagree with the statement is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip (66% and 62% respectively). Compared to other participating Arab countries, Palestine is the least likely to agree with separation between religion and socio-political life. A vast majority of 70% or more in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Iraq, along with a majority in Egypt and Sudan, agree with the separation. As the figure below shows, the last four waves of Palestine's AB show that the percentage of disagreement with this statement has been on the rise and constituting the majority.

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But a majority of 55% say they disagree or strongly disagree, and 43% say they agree or strongly agree, with the statement that “Palestine is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state.” Disagreement is higher in the West Bank, standing at 56%, compared to 53% in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 53% disagree or strongly disagree and 43% agree or strongly agree, with the statement that “religious clerics should have influence over the decisions of government.”

Moreover, a majority of 63% agree or strongly agree and 34% disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that “today, religious leaders are as likely to be corrupt as non-religious leaders.” The percentage of those who agree with the statement is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip (69% and 53% respectively). The view that religious leaders are as likely to be corrupt as non-religious leaders is shared by almost all participating Arab countries, with Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq at the top, with 66%, 66%, and 65% respectively; only Mauritania disagree.

A slim majority of 52% believes that the laws of the country should be 
entirely or mostly (38% say entirely and 14% say mostly) based on the Sharia and 10% think they should be entirely or mostly based on the will of the people; 38% think the laws should be equally based on Sharia and the will of the people. In the West Bank the percentage of those who think the laws should be entirely or mostly based on the Sharia is higher than in the Gaza Strip, 59% and 42% respectively. The largest percentage of Gazans (44%) compared to only third of West Bankers (34%) think they should be equally based on Sharia and the will of the people. Among participating Arab countries who think laws
should be entirely based on Sharia, Palestine comes second with Mauritania on top with 57% and Lebanon at the bottom with only 6%.

A majority of 53% (57% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) believe that students should learn about many different religions, not just their own, in public schools; 46% (42% in the West Bank and 50% in the Gaza Strip) believe that students should learn about only their own religion in public schools; only 1% believe that students should not learn about religion at all in public schools.

We also asked about identity and the sense of belonging. The vast majority of the public (86%; 92% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip) feels extremely offended when they hear someone who is from a Western country say something disrespectful of Palestine. Another 11% (6% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip) say they feel somewhat offended. Similarly, 87% (90% in the West Bank and 87% in the Gaza Strip) say they feel extremely offended if they hear someone from a different Arab country say something disrespectful of Palestine and another 10% (6% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) say they feel somewhat offended.

We asked about socio-economic and racial discrimination in Palestine. The largest percentage (38%) identified an economically defined group as the one which discrimination against makes it difficult for it to work its way out of the lower class. The group that came next is the refugees, indicated by 6%; another 6% said this rule applies to everyone equally while 17% said there is no group in Palestine to which this rule applies. Similarly, when the question was about the difficulty in access to services or resources, the largest percentage (35%) identified an economically defined group as the one that would most likely find it difficult to gain such access followed by an aged defined group (6%), and refugees (5%); 6% said the rule applies to everyone and 21% said it applies to no group.

In defining the manner in which the groups subject to discrimination is treated, the largest percentage (47%. 57% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) said it is treated worse than the other groups by the government while 36% said it is treated by the government in the same manner as others are treated and 13% said they are treated by the government better than others. When asked about the treatment received by members of the group that is discriminated against from other members of society outside the group, 36% said the same treatment as the others while 35% said worse than the others and 21% said better than the others.
We also asked about racial discrimination. Asked if racial discrimination is a serious problem in Palestine, 59% (63% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) said yes; 40% (36% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip) said no. Three participating Arab countries reported discrimination as a problem with higher percentages than Palestine. These are Tunisia (80%), Iraq (67%), and Jordan (63%). Only 8% of Egyptians reported racial discrimination as a problem in their country.

When asked specifically about the extent of discrimination against dark skinned people in Palestine, 27% said they are discriminated against to a great or medium extent while 71% said they are discriminated against to a small extent or none at all. When the question whether black people in Palestine face discrimination, 23% said yes to a great or medium extent and 75% said yes to a small extent or none at all. When the respondents were asked if they ever had someone use a racist or discriminatory phrase against them, 14% said yes, many times (5%) or once or twice (8%) while 85% said never. Based on the above, the figure below indicates that while a large majority sees racial discrimination as a serious problem in the Palestinian society, only a quarter or so believe blacks or dark-skinned people are discriminated against and a smaller percentage report having heard discriminatory phrases against them.

As a result, the figure below indicates that while a large majority sees racial discrimination as a serious problem in Palestine, only a quarter or so believe blacks or dark-skinned people are discriminated against and a smaller percentage report having heard discriminatory phrases against them.

As asked about the extent to which black skinned people are well represented in TV dramas and other programs, 67% said they are to a great or limited extent and 24% said to a small extent or not at all. When asked if they would prefer to see a greater number of black-
skinned people on TV dramas or other programs, 58% said they would and 11% said they would not; 27% said it does not matter one way or the other.
GENDER NORMS & ATTITUDES

The 7th wave of Palestine's AB indicates that despite the rise in religiosity in Palestinian society, the public is more liberal today regarding gender issues than it has been since the first wave in 2006. A majority of 65% of the public agrees or strongly agrees, and 35% disagree or strongly disagree, with the statement that in general, men are better at political leadership than women. While exposing a high level of conservatism, this finding represents a 5-point drop compared to the 5th wave and a 21-point drop compared to the first wave in 2006. It is also consistent with the positions of most other Arab participants in the current wave, with Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, showing greater conservatism than Palestine and Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania showing a lesser degree of conservatism.

Among the Palestinians, the percentage of agreement with the statement is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 71% and 59% respectively. While age and education do not seem to have a significant impact on attitudes, gender does: 68% of men, compared to 60% of women, agree that men make better political leaders.

A vast majority of 85% disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement that university education for males is more important than university education for females; 13% agree. The percentage of agreement in higher in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank, 20% and 8% respectively. As the figure below indicates, this percentage of agreement with the statement is the lowest since 2006.
On family matters, the majority (58%) disagree and 42% agree with the statement that man should have a final say. In the Gaza strip 52%, compared to 37% in the West Bank, agree. A large majority of 76% (81% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip) agree or strongly agree with the statement that a man and a women should have equal say in decisions concerning the family; 22% disagree. A majority of 66% agree or strongly agree that a woman who marries a foreigner should be able to pass on her citizenship to her children; 31% disagree.

When asked about the most challenging barrier to entry into the workplace for women, 25% said low wages, 24% said lack of childcare options, 19% said men are given priority for employment, 14% said women and men working alongside each other, and 14% said it is considered socially unacceptable. When asked about the most challenging barrier to entry into the workplace for men, 49% said lack of available jobs; 33% said low wages.
As the figure below indicates, the poll findings also show the conservative side of the respondents. When asked who should be primarily responsible for helping children study around the house, a majority of 54% said the household heads are equally responsible while 40% said the female head of the household; only 3% said the male head of the household. But when the question was about budgeting and spending for household needs, 49% said the male head of the household, 40% said the household heads are equally responsible; 9% said the female head of the household. As clearly shown in the figure below, Gazans are significantly more conservative on these two matters than West Bankers.

These findings present the Palestinians as more conservative than many other participating Arab countries. For example, five countries, Tunisia, Iraq, Mauritania, Jordan, and Lebanon show greater support than Palestine for the view that the household heads are equally responsible for helping children study. Similarly, only Egypt shows a greater percentage of support than Palestine for the view that the female head of the household should be responsible. With regard to the question about budgeting and spending for household needs, more Tunisians, Jordanians, Lebanese, Libyans, and Iraqis support the view that household heads are equally responsible. Palestine came fifth in favoring that the male head of the household should be responsible for budgeting and spending for the household needs.
Moreover, although, as indicated above, only 13% believe gender mixing in the workplace is one of the most challenging barriers to women entry into the workplace, this particular challenge is more serious than it seems. A majority of 54% agrees that men and women should be separated or should not be mixed in the workplace; 45% disagree. Here too, Gazans are clearly more conservative than West Bankers as 65% of the former compared to 47% of the latter agree with gender separation. As the figure below shows, support for gender separation is affected by education and gender but not age. The more educated and women are less likely to support it. When asked about the reason for their support of separation, the majority (53%), selected a religious justification, referencing a prophet saying, while another 26% say gender mixing brings greater risk of harassment for women.

![Support for gender separation by selected variables](image)

When it comes to gender separation, Palestine is the most conservative among the participating Arab countries followed by Libya, Jordan, and Sudan. Lebanon, Egypt, and Tunisia are the most liberal. Palestine, along with Jordan, are the two countries where the main reason for supporting separation seems to be religious, invoking a religious hadith, or saying of the prophet.

Finally, a majority of 53% believe that in the past 12 months, abuse of, or violence against, women in the Palestinian community has increased; only 13% think it has decreased, and 26% think it has stayed the same. As the figure below shows, West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to report an increase in abuse or violence against women, 58% and 46% respectively. Compared to other participating Arab countries, Palestine comes second after Tunisia in reporting greater
level of violence against women. Mauritania, Morocco, and Libya (at 14%, 23% and 24% respectively) are the least likely to report greater level of violence against women.

Abuse or violence against women during the past 12 months has:

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9) EDUCATION

Five problems have been identified by the public as the top first and second challenges children face at Palestinian public schools: overcrowding (34% identified it as the top first challenge and 24% as the second challenge), outdated curriculum (15% identified it as the first challenge and 16% as the second challenge), lack of skilled teachers and educational staff (12% identified it as the first challenge and 12% as the second challenge), lack of or outdated technology in classrooms (10% identified it as the first challenge and 12% as the second challenge), and crumbling infrastructure (8% identified it as the top first challenge and 13% as the second challenge). As the figure below indicate, overcrowding is the topmost difficult challenge in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but Gazans are more concerned about it than West Bankers. West Bankers are more concerned than Gazans about “outdated curriculum” and Gazans are more concerned than West Bankers about lack of outdated technology in classrooms.

Compared to the findings in other participating Arab countries, Palestine show the highest level of concern about overcrowding, with Egypt next at 30% and Tunisia the lowest at 8%.

When asked to identify the one thing that the Ministry of Education could do to make public education better in Palestine, the largest percentage (38%) said “reduce the number of students in each class,” 19% wanted better trained teachers, 15% wanted to introduce or
improve technology in the classroom, 14% wanted to update the school curriculum, and 8% wanted to repair or rebuild schools.
10) MEDIA

The vast majority of the Palestinians (81%) use the internet on daily basis: a majority of 60% uses the internet throughout the day and an additional 21% use it at least once daily. Moreover, 5% use it several times a week or once a week. Only 13% do not use the internet. The percentage of those who used the internet on daily basis was 74% in late 2018 and only 9% in 2006. It is worth comparing the Palestinian use of the internet throughout the day with the other participating Arab countries. Only two countries showed greater use: Jordan and Lebanon, at 80% and 71% respectively. The lowest use was found in Egypt, at 22%.

The youth are more likely to use the internet throughout the day. Indeed, a big gap emerges between the young and the old as Palestinians between the ages of 18 and 29 use the internet throughout the day much more than those 30 year or older: 82% to 52% respectively.

For those who use the internet, a little over a quarter (26%) spend 6 to 10 hours per day in a typical day on social media platforms while 46%
spend 3 to 5 hours on these platforms; 28% spends somewhere between zero to 2 hours. In this regard, as the figure below shows, no important differences exist between West Bankers and Gazans on the access to social media.

Moreover, among those who use the internet, 41% (49% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) say they use social media at least once daily to find out about political events taking place in Palestine; 22% do so several times a week, 13% once a week, and 11% less than once a week; only 12% say they never use social media to find out about political events in Palestine. However, when asked how often they use social media to express their opinion about political issues, the largest percentage (43%, 49% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) said never while 55% said they do so between at least once daily and less than once a week: 12% at least once daily, 16% several times a week, 11% once a week, and 16% less than once a week.

As the figure below shows that among the Palestinians the most popular social media platform is Facebook, selected by 91%, followed by WhatsApp (75%), YouTube (47%), Instagram (38%), TikTok (23%), Snapchat (16%), Twitter and Telegram (16% each), Viber (4%), and Clubhouse (1%). It is worth noting that Facebook and WhatsApp are the two most popular platforms actively used by participating Arab respondents in this AB7 wave; Viber, Clubhouse, and Signal are the least used.
Asked about the primary source of information to follow the breaking news as events unfold, 60% said social media, 26% television, 6% face to face conversations, 4% radio, 3% telephone conversation, and less than one percent said newspapers. These findings indicate a slight rise in the percentage of those who rely on social media platform, which stood at 57% in the 5th wave. As the figure below indicates, the percentage of those who rely on social media for breaking news is the same in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip. Palestinian reliance on social media for breaking news is the highest among the participating Arab respondents in the current AB wave with the next country in line Jordan with only 45%. The lowest Arab county relying on social media for breaking news is Mauritania, with 22%. By contrast, Palestine is lowest in relying on television, with Egypt showing the highest rate of 55%. Almost all other Arab countries show no reliance on newspapers in following breaking news.
While young and old Palestinians rely on social media as the main source of information on breaking news, almost 4 out of 5 youth, compared only 5 out of 10 old people, rely on social media. The old is more likely to rely on TV and radio much more than the youth.

Asked how often they watch Arabic language comedy or political satire shows, the largest percentage (44%) said never, 40% said sometimes and 15% said often.

We asked the public about the extent to which they follow the news regarding four issues: the conflict in Syria, the Abraham Accords, the US sanctions against Iran, and the treatment of Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in China. The largest percentage of those who follow the news to a great deal or to a fair amount does so with regard to the conflict in Syria (31%), followed by those who follow the news of China's Muslim minorities (30%), followed by those who follow the news regarding the US sanctions against Iran (13%), and finally those who follow the news regarding the Abraham Accords (10%). As the figure below indicates, West Bankers and Gazans alike prioritize following the news about Syria, followed by the Muslim minority in China, US sanctions on Iran and lastly the Abraham Accords. The figure also shows that West Bankers follow the news about the first two topics more often than Gazans.
It is worth noting that like in Palestine, following the news about the conflict in Syria is the issue most followed in other participating Arab countries and the Abraham Accords the least followed. The highest level of following the news about the Abraham Accords is found in the two countries that have signed their own normalization agreements with Israel, Morocco and Sudan, 27% and 21% respectively. Following the news about the Uighurs is highest in Sudan, Mauritania and Jordan, 36%, 34%, and 32% respectively and the lowest in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Iraq, 13%, 22%, and 24% respectively.
11) COVID19:

As indicated earlier, the spread of the Corona virus has been selected by the public as the second most important challenge facing the Palestinians today, with 21% (23% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip) selecting it. A majority of the public (52%) indicated that it was very concerned or somewhat concerned about the continued spread of the virus in the next six months. Gazans indicated more concern than West Bankers (68% to 41% respectively). A comparison with participating respondents from other Arab countries shows greater concerns in most other countries, with Lebanon on top with 80% expressing it. But respondents from Tunisia and Jordan showed less concern than the Palestinians.

When asked about the reasons for their concern, 41% of the public indicated that they worry about having a member of their family members getting very ill or die. The second concern focused on lack of public implementation of the government recommendations, with 17% of the public selecting it. Other important concerns included loss of household income (13%), negative impact on the economy (12%), and the inability of the healthcare system to handle the Covid-19 cases.

For those who did not express concern, the reasons varied, but the largest percentage (30%) expressed the view that the threat posed by the virus was exaggerated. A similar percentage (29%) thought that it was the fact that the vaccine was now available. Other factors were cited: 10% believed that people have done a good job following the government recommendations; 9% believed that the healthcare infrastructure can handle the coronavirus cases; and 6% thought the government’s response has been adequate in containing the spread of the virus.

We asked about the challenges caused by the virus to the respondents. About half of the public chose either the disruption of their kids’ education (25%) or loss of income (24%). Other challenges cited included the disruption of social life (16%), increased cost of living (13%), adverse effects on psycho-emotional state (8%), having contracted or coping with long term side effects of Covid-19 (7%), decreased availability of basic goods (3%).
When evaluating the government’s performance in responding to the coronavirus crisis, 61% said it was good or very good. It is worth noting that participating respondents in only two other Arab countries gave greater positive evaluation of their government’s performance in responding to the crisis, Egypt and Tunisia. The worst performance was given to their government by the Lebanese respondents.

Reflecting on the weaknesses of the healthcare system in Palestine, four have been highlighted by the public: One third said the country did not have enough hospitals, 24% complained of scarcity of supplies, 20% said it was the lack of skilled medical professionals, and 10% said it was the high costs of care or the lack of medical insurance.

A majority of the public (59%) indicated (in October 2021) that it has been vaccinated. The percentage was higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip (64% and 50% respectively). Among those who were not vaccinated, 42% said that it is very likely or somewhat likely they would get vaccinated once the vaccine is made available to them. A majority of 57% said it is somewhat unlikely or very unlikely that they would be vaccinated once the vaccine has been made available to them. The reasons given for refusing to be vaccinated varied: one third indicated its lack of conviction in the effectiveness of the vaccine; 29% expressed the view that it is “God’s will that decides what happen to me,” and a little over a quarter (26%) indicated concern about the negative side effects. One tenth argued that the pandemic was ending and therefore there was no need to get the vaccine. As the figure below shows, the top reason given by West Bankers was the concern about the vaccine’s effectiveness while the top reason given by Gazans was the concern about the vaccine’s side effects.
Surprisingly, more West Bankers (32%) than Gazans (25%) said “it is God’s will that decides what will happen to me.”

In comparison with other participating respondents in the Arab world, the highest percentage of those who argued that the vaccine is ineffective was found in Mauritania followed by Jordan, selected respectively by 56% and 43% of the unvaccinated. The lowest percentage was found in Egypt (17%). The highest concern about the side effects was found in Egypt (55%) and the lowest in Libya (14%). The highest percentage of those who argued that god's will is to be done was found in Tunisia (36%) and the lowest in Mauritania (7%).
We asked the public about the solution it prefers for ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A majority of 52% selected the two-state, Palestine next to Israel based on the 1967 borders, 8% said a one state for Jews and Arabs, 6% said a Palestinian-Israeli confederation, and 28% selected “other” solutions. Fifty percent of those who selected “other” solutions, indicated their preference for “historic Palestine,” meaning all Palestine should belong to the Palestinians. About a third of those who selected “other” preferred “an independent state” and 7% preferred “ending the occupation.” On the same subject, we also asked whether the public favor or oppose the normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel. The vast majority (94%) were opposed or strongly opposed while only 7% were in favor. It is worth noting that majorities in six participating Arab countries favored the two-state solution while small minorities in all participating countries favored the one state solution or the confederation. Almost all participating countries show minor support for normalization with the exception of Sudan and Morocco, whose support exceeded came close to a third, in the case of Morocco, and slightly less than 40% in the case of Sudan.

We asked the public if it has a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the UN and various major international players including the US, China, Russia, and the UK as well as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. As the figure below shows, Turkey is the only country in which a majority says it has a favorable or highly favorable opinion. A third has a favorable opinion of China followed by Russia (27%), Saudi Arabic (24%), the UN (19%), the UK (18%), and the US coming last with only 15% approval. The most likely driver of attitudes regarding these countries is probably public perception of their position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Clearly most Palestinians are dissatisfied with all of them, with the exception of Turkey. In this context, the unfavorable opinion of the US and the UK is obvious. The dissatisfaction with Saudi Arabia is probably linked to public perception that it had been behind the recent Arab normalization agreements with Israel while the dissatisfaction with the UN is probably linked to the inability of that organization to take any effective measures to end the Israeli occupation.
Palestinians indicate the lowest rates of favorability compared to other participating Arab counties toward the following actors: the UN, the UK, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the US. For example, all other participating Arab respondents gave the US much higher ratings, with Moroccan favorability standing at 69% while Mauritians, Jordanians, and Sudanese gave it a favorability standing at 50% or more. Also, the Palestinians gave China the lowest favorability rating while Moroccans, Mauritians, and Sudanese gave it 60% or more, and Iraqis, Lebanese, Jordanians, and Tunisians gave it 50% or more favorability.

We asked specific questions related to economic relations, investment and trade, preferences with various countries: the US, China, Russia, UK, and Turkey and Iran. In one question, we asked about the country most preferred to have stronger economic relations with. As the figure below indicates, Turkey came first with 61% wanting stronger relations followed by China with only 29% selecting it, Saudi Arabia (24%), Russia (22%), the US (21%), the UK and Iran (19% each). In comparison with other participating respondents from other Arab countries, Palestine came second, after Jordan, in preferring Turkey, and last in preferring the UK, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. In another question we asked about the preferred countries to win a contract in bidding to build infrastructural projects in Palestine. The question indicating that the bidding companies came from the following five countries: the US, China, Russia, UK, and Turkey. As the figure below shows, Turkey comes on top again. Compared to other participating Arab countries, Palestine gives the US the lowest marks and Turkey the highest marks.
In another two questions referencing the same five countries used in the infrastructural bidding contract example, we asked about the country that has the highest quality and the country that has the lowest quality in building infrastructural projects. Turkey does very well here too, coming second after Germany while China, the US, and the UK follow with much lower marks. China is also selected as the country whose building would have the lowest quality. Here too, in comparison with respondents from other participating countries, Palestine gives the US the lowest mark and gives Turkey the highest marks.
We asked the public whether the policies of the Biden administration toward the Middle East and North Africa are better, the same, or worse than those of the Trump administration. The vast majority (71%) said they are the same or worse (56% said it has the same policies, followed by 31% who said the Biden administration policies are worse) and 16% said they are better. But when We asked about the extent to which respondents favored or opposed the withdrawal of American military troops from Afghanistan, a vast majority (80%) said they favored or strongly favored the American troop withdrawal while 11% said they were opposed. When asked what the number one priority for the Biden administration in the MENA region should be, the largest percentage (36%) selected Palestine, followed by economic development (16%), stability and security (14%), human rights (12%), education (9%), infrastructure (4%), and terrorism (3%).

We asked the public to assess various possible threats to the national security interests of Palestine. Respondents were provided six possible threats involving Israel, the US, China, Iran, and the Saudi Arabia. The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is seen as a critical threat by 86%, important but not critical by 7%, and not important by 4%. The rise of the US economic power is seen as the next critical threat by a majority of 53%; 24% say it is important but not critical, and 19% say it is not an important threat. Iran's nuclear program has been defined as a critical threat by 48%, another 22% view it as an important but not critical threat, and 23% view it as not important. Iran's political influence in the region is seen a critical threat by 37% of the public; an additional 24% say the threat is important but not critical; and 19% say it is not important. Saudi Arabia’s political influence in the region comes next with 32% seeing it as a critical threat; a quarter view it as an important but not critical; and on third view it as not important. Finally, the rise of China's economic power is seen as a critical threat by 26%; 29% say it is important but not critical, and 36% say it is not important.

The following figure compares the responses of West Bankers and Gazans regarding the “critical” threats. While the two sides organize the hierarchy of these threats in the same exact manner, differences do exist. In all six cases, Gazans see the threats as less critical compared to the manner in which West Bankers see these threats even when it comes to the Israeli occupation. Only 70% of Gazans, compared to 86% of the West Bankers, view the Israeli occupation as
“critical.” Clearly, the fact that the Gaza Strip is no longer directly occupied by the Israeli army and has no Israeli settlers on its soil explain the gap between the views of the residents of the two areas.

We asked the public to evaluate the foreign policies of the leaders of major international and regional powers. The majority (61%) described the policies of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as good or very good. The second most liked policies are those of the Russian President Putin, with 19% positive rating, followed by those of the Chinese president Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, with (16% each). The evaluation of the policies of the Saudi Crown Prince, MBS, the Emirati Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed came next with 13% and 12% respectively. The policies of the United States President Joseph Biden and those of the Syrian President Bashar al Assad came next, with 11% each. The following figure shows the differences in public evaluation between the 5th and the 7th waves. The most important difference between the two waves is the drop in positive evaluation of the Turkish president by 12 percentage points. Also, it is worth highlighting that the former US President Donald Trump positive rating stood at 6% in 2018 while the current US President received 11%, a five-point increase. The evaluation of the Russian President's policies did not change.
Asked about the two steps that would most allow the situation in Syria to improve, the largest percentage (28%) chose, as a first step, “cease attacks against civilians and civilian facilities, such as hospitals;” 22% chose “free and fair elections for all Syrians, including those in the diaspora;” 15% chose “safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes;” 13% chose “release of detainees, abductees, and missing persons;” 10% chose “Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition;” and 6% chose “UN member states to prevent and suppress terrorist acts.” As a second step, 25% selected the cessation of attacks on civilians, 20% selected the safe and voluntary return, 18% selected the release of detainees and another 18% selected free and fair elections, 11% selected a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, and 7% selected UN member states to prevent and suppress terrorist acts.
ABOUT ARAB BAROMETER

Arab Barometer is a nonpartisan research network that provides insight into the social, political, and economic attitudes and values of ordinary citizens across the Arab world.

We have been conducting rigorous, and nationally representative public opinion surveys on probability samples of the adult populations across the Arab world since 2006 across 15 countries.

We are the longest-standing and the largest repository of publicly available data on the views of men and women in the MENA region. Our findings give a voice to the needs and concerns of Arab publics.