Executive Summary

The challenges Iraq has faced between 2021 and 2022 are numerous but not new: political impasses, violent crackdowns on protests, foreign interference, the economic and social fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, sand and dust storms, electricity shortages, and protracted internal displacement are among the few. While once seen as a way of ushering in solutions to these challenges, the October 2021 parliamentary elections instead left in their wake a wave of political turbulence that surged in the summer of 2022. In June, MPs of the Sadrists Movement, led by populist Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, resigned after failing to build a coalition, despite having won the plurality of seats. The political stalemate came to a head in July. Iraqi protesters stormed and occupied parliament ahead of a session where the Coordination Framework, an Iran-backed alliance of Shiite parties that rival the Sadrists, was set to gather to elect a new prime minister. Violent protests spilled into August and onto the streets of Baghdad and Southern Iraq, leaving 30 dead and scores more injured.

Findings from Arab Barometer’s seventh wave in Iraq predate but to an extent foreshadow the frustration that peaked in the summer of 2022. Citizens perceive corruption to be as high as their trust in political institutions is low. With a plurality seeing the parliamentary elections as significantly flawed, Iraqis bemoan the lack of governmental responsiveness to their grievances. Yet, there is no consensus about what the biggest domestic challenges are, let alone what solutions to them are, or what avenues provide the best course of redress. If there is one theme that runs through citizens’ evaluations of economic and political conditions in Iraq, it is uncertainty. Iraqis appear to be in agreement that there is no silver bullet solution, but whatever reform the system demands, Iraqis increasingly want it immediately rather than incrementally. Affected populations are diverse, but no one is unscathed.

While dissatisfaction is widespread, there is some notable variation among those living in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and those living under the Government of Iraq (GOI). Perceived challenges vary, with those in the GOI preoccupied more by infrastructure-related issues and those in the KRI focused more on economic issues. Although satisfaction with public services, political institutions, and government performance is low in both regions, citizens in the KRI are marginally more satisfied than their counterparts elsewhere in the country.

Domestic uncertainty that is prevalent in the findings on the one hand reflects and on the other hand is mirrored by the shifting faultlines of regional rivalries in Iraq. Iranian favorability is waning, and Iran’s influence is perceived as a critical threat. Nationally, Iraqis have a more positive view of China than the U.S., but the U.S. remains the favored nation in the KRI. And while Iraqis are more likely to view the development of American rather than Chinese economic power as
a threat, the desire to strengthen economic ties with the U.S. nonetheless has increased over time. While counterintuitive, the finding suggests that citizens carefully weigh motivations, benefits, and drawbacks of increased economic interdependence and cooperation.

These are among the key findings from Arab Barometer’s latest nationally representative face-to-face survey conducted in Iraq. Fielding began on 7 December 2021 - almost two months after the Iraqi parliamentary elections - and ended on 18 February 2022, just before the beginning of the war in Ukraine and months before the parliamentary political crisis came to head. Conducted in both Arabic and Kurdish, the multistage clustered sample included 2,460 randomly selected citizens from all governorates save Duhok. The margin of error for the reported results is ±2 percentage points. Iraq is one of 12 countries surveyed as part of Arab Barometer’s seventh wave, which is the largest publicly available survey that captures the opinions of citizens across MENA in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additional information about the surveys can be found at www.arabbarometer.org.
Key Challenges Facing the Country: Corruption and COVID-19 (among others)

There has been no shortage of challenges confronting Iraq in the past year, and Iraqi public opinion reflects this fact through a notable lack of convergence on which challenge constitutes the most pressing one facing the country. With the exception of Libya, which, like Iraq, is an oil-based economy that has experienced protracted conflict over the past decade, this fragmentation of opinion contrasts a trend seen in other countries: pluralities of citizens tend to coalesce on one issue, namely the economy. In Iraq, however, not only is the number one challenge corruption, but also, 26 percent of citizens agree it is the most pressing issue, followed by 18 percent who say it is the spread of COVID-19.

This trend in fragmented opinion sets apart Iraq from other surveyed countries, but the trend is not new within the country itself. Nor is the fact that financial and administrative corruption tops the list of challenges. In Wave V, conducted from 24 December 2018 to 27 January 2019, Iraqis similarly were divided on choosing the biggest challenge facing their country. Still, roughly a third of citizens (32 percent) named corruption the biggest challenge. While that share decreased in 2021-2022, Iraq is still the only country that chooses corruption over the economy as its most pressing challenge.
Decrees of corruption are a familiar refrain in Iraq, as they are elsewhere in the MENA region. In 2022, as in 2018, 93 percent of Iraqi citizens believe that corruption is extensive in national state agencies and institutions. Yet only 32 percent believe that the government is cracking down on corruption, an improvement over 2018 but still less than the 40 percent who said the same in 2013.
Aside from corruption, a second key concern to Iraqis has been the spread of COVID-19, which by the end of February 2022 had claimed the lives of nearly 25,000 Iraqis. Just under half of all Iraqis (47 percent) report that their government’s performance on responding to the outbreak was very good or good. Although the spread of COVID-19 is second to corruption when placed in the context of national challenges, when asked directly about the spread of the virus, over half of all Iraqis (55 percent) report that they were very or somewhat concerned about it. Among those who expressed concern, most (32 percent) explain that it was fueled by fear of a family member succumbing to the disease. And while Iraqi citizens are concerned about their own, they are nevertheless cognizant of the disproportionate impact COVID-19 had on vulnerable populations: 84 percent of Iraqis believe that the pandemic had a disproportionately negative effect on the poor, and 70 percent believe the same about the pandemic’s effect on refugees, the largest group of which are Syrians residing mostly in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
Furthermore, Iraqis stand out from citizens in other surveyed countries in that it is not inflation, loss of income, or scarcity- economic factors broadly defined- that citizens suggest constitutes the largest challenge caused by COVID-19. Instead, the plurality of Iraqi citizens say COVID-19’s most harmful effect was on the disruption of education. Bemoaning this particular consequence of the pandemic not only aligns with reports of 11 million Iraqi students having effectively lost a full year of learning on account of shutdowns, but also to historical primacy placed on education in the country. Prior to decades of conflict, Iraq once had a solid reputation for its high caliber education system and close to
100 percent literacy rate, a fact not only recognized by numerous UNESCO and UNICEF reports, but also a sentiment popularly captured in the prominent Arabic proverb that in the MENA region, "books get written in Egypt, published in Lebanon, and read in Iraq."

Public Services and Government Performance

As with their government's response to COVID-19, most Iraqis look unfavorably on their government's performance overall: just 29 percent are satisfied to a great or medium extent. The service rated highest in the country - trash collection - has only 31 percent of citizens saying they are satisfied with it. Fewer than a third of all citizens say they are satisfied with healthcare and educational systems, the two sectors arguably hardest hit by COVID-19.

Notably, however, there is significant regional variation in degrees of satisfaction with these two public services, both of which are presided over by the regional governments. Citizens living in the KRI are likelier to be completely satisfied or satisfied with both the educational (+11 points) and healthcare (+19 points) systems than their counterparts elsewhere in the country. That said, it is still less than half of citizens in the KRI who are satisfied with the healthcare system and just a third who are satisfied with the educational system.
These evaluations of public services potentially underpin Iraqis’ preferences for how they want their government to allocate spending in the coming fiscal year. A small plurality (28 percent) say the top government spending priority should be the education system, followed by 19 percent who say the healthcare system. But as those living under the GOI are less likely to be satisfied with each the educational and healthcare systems, commensurately, they are more likely than their counterparts in the KRI to want government funding related to these two sectors. In contrast, those in the KRI want their government to focus on subsidies (24 percent) and roads and transportation (22 percent).
Education and healthcare are not the only infrastructural challenges facing Iraq. Instead, 77 percent of Iraqis say they experience electricity outages on a daily basis, which is likely driven by Iran’s cutting of electricity for Iraq’s nonpayment of gas. This high share makes Iraq second only to Lebanon in the pervasiveness of electricity cuts. Furthermore, 34 percent of Iraqis report experiencing water outages on a daily basis, making Iraq second only to Algeria among all other surveyed countries in Arab Barometer’s seventh wave.
As with the biggest challenge facing the country, what is notable about Iraqi citizens’ preferences for government spending is the general lack of consensus on what should be given priority. After the educational and healthcare systems, 17 percent want spending directed at fighting terrorism; 14 percent want the money to be spent on subsidies; and 10 percent or fewer say each improving transportation, national security, or reducing pollution. While desires to have more money allocated to education and health tracks with the public’s dissatisfaction with educational and health-related infrastructure, desires for increased spending on terrorism and subsidies tracks with increasingly negative evaluations of security provision and poor evaluations of limiting inflation.
Even before violent protests erupted in the summer of 2022, evaluations of government performance on providing security and order were already in decline. While nearly half (52 percent) of Iraqis report the government was doing a very good or good job, this latest assessment signifies an 11 point drop since 2018. Evaluations of the government’s efforts to limit inflation have equally declined between 2018 (30 percent saying very good or good) and 2022 (19 percent), while narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor has fluctuated but stayed under 25 percent.
Elections, Institutional Trust, and Reform

In theory, Iraq’s electoral system might have provided an avenue for such grievances with government performance and public services to be addressed. Yet, Iraqi parliamentary elections on 10 October 2021 set yet another record for low voter turnout since 2003: just 43 percent of citizens cast their ballots. Once demanded by scores of activists who participated in the Tishreen revolution, the elections were viewed by many as another avenue of corruption rather than a solution to it. Familiar faces and coalitions dominated the electoral arena in 2021, casting doubt on whether substantive policy changes would ensue.

These doubts proved to be more-than-well-founded: months after the parliamentary elections, a government had yet to be formed, let alone function to address grievances. And Arab Barometer findings reiterate that the plurality of Iraqis (42 percent) report believing that their elections were neither free nor fair, a belief that is slightly amplified among youth 18-29 years old. Furthermore, asked what action would be the most effective and least effective way to influence a national government decision, in both instances, the plurality of Iraqis report it is to organize a protest. Again, in Iraq, like in other surveyed countries, this finding potentially indicates uncertainty on the best way to affect change.
But it is not just elections where confidence of Iraqi citizens appears to be shaken. With the exception of the armed forces, in which 83 percent of Iraqis express a great deal or quite a lot of trust, less than half of all citizens have trust in other public institutions. Two months after the parliamentary elections, just 19 percent of Iraqis report having trust in the parliament. Trust in the national government (26 percent), the local government (33 percent), and the legal system (40 percent) is higher but nonetheless only enjoy the confidence of a minority of the population. While there is regional variation on both trust in the armed
forces and in the parliament, citizens living in the KRI and under the GOI otherwise have nearly the same, low degree of trust in the national government, local government, and legal system. A similar pattern, where dissatisfaction is present but muted in the KRI, is also prevalent in evaluations of the regional government.

With the current electoral system seen as part of the problem rather than the solution, the majority of Iraqis (62 percent) - the highest share of any surveyed
country in Arab Barometer’s seventh wave—believe that their domestic system should be replaced. Only 20 percent say that government is very or largely responsive to citizens’ needs, and accordingly, the desire for incremental reform has waned over time. In 2022, Iraqis are equally split: 45 percent say that political reform should be introduced little by little, and 45 percent say it should be overhauled all at once. Notably, since 2018, the share saying reform should be incremental has plummeted 20 points.
The Economy

That Iraqis rank the economy lower on the list of challenges confronting their country is not tantamount to citizens’ satisfaction with the economic conditions in their country. To the contrary, just 26 percent of citizens say the current situation is good, and an equally anemic 29 percent think that the economic situation will improve in the next 2 to 3 years. While evaluations of the current economic condition represent a small, 5 percent uptick since 2018, future optimism continues to plummet, as it has for nearly the past decade.
Though Iraq’s economic problems are numerous, one of the most alarming ones among them is food insecurity. A significant majority (60 percent) of citizens report having been concerned at the prospect of running out of food, and more than half of all citizens (57 percent) indicate they often or sometimes ran out of food before having money to buy more, making Iraq the fourth highest in the share of food insecure adults in surveyed countries. Iraq additionally stands out in that women are significantly more likely than men to report being food insecure.
Citizens also say that economic inequality is on the rise: more than three-quarters (76 percent) suggest that the gap between the rich and the poor is a problem in their country, and about half of all citizens (52 percent) say the gap has widened over the past year. When asked about the factors that contribute to economic inequality, nearly equal shares suggest that lacking an advocate in government (75 percent) and exertion of hard, individual effort (74 percent) contribute to a great or medium extent. A smaller share, but nonetheless a majority (67 percent), also agree that being born into wealthy families—that is, a path dependence established by passed down generational wealth—contributes to the economic divide.
While the numerous challenges facing Iraq are refracted in fragmented opinions on what is the biggest one, in stark contrast, Iraqis are rather unified in how they want their government to address economic problems: 58 percent want their government to create jobs. Not only is the share of Iraqis who chose this one option higher than the share of citizens in any other surveyed countries, but also, Iraq is the one country where the majority of citizens resoundingly coalesce around one of the numerous options for government intervention. In Iraq in particular, those in urban areas tend to privilege job creation more than those living in rural areas.
When asked which type of job the government should focus on creating, the majority of Iraqis (57 percent) say efforts should be focused on the public sector. While an equally high share (75 percent) of Iraqi citizens recognize that public jobs are each more difficult to get and require more wasṭa, or connections, 72 percent say such jobs offer better security, and 62 percent say they offer better salaries. This perhaps accounts for why 4 out of 5 Iraqis say a public sector job is the preferable one to have.
Gender

While Iraqis agree that jobs are what is most needed to improve economic conditions, they nonetheless perceive multiple barriers to workforce entry. Labor market participation in Iraq is much lower among women than men, yet not all barriers to entry are perceived to have gender-related dimensions. For example, nearly half of all Iraqis (48 percent) suggest that the lack of skills for available jobs poses an equal barrier for men than women. And a similar share (50 percent) says that women and men working alongside each other does not pose a barrier for either gender. Meanwhile, slightly more Iraqis (39 percent) say that lack of transportation is a bigger barrier for women, while a similar share (34 percent) say this barrier is equally problematic for both men and women.

Asked about the biggest impediment to workplace entry for each women and men, Iraqi citizens are more divided on what this barrier is for women and more united on what it is for men: the overwhelming majority (58 percent) say that lack of available jobs is the biggest barrier for men. Meanwhile, a small plurality (28 percent) says the lack of childcare is the biggest barrier for women. The lack of consensus on the latter potentially suggests uncertainty in the public consciousness about what keeps women from getting jobs.
In contrast to the uncertainty prevalent in what keeps women out of the workforce, majorities in Iraq still perceive women as unequal partners in both public and private roles. Just over two-thirds of Iraqis (69 percent) strongly agree or agree that men are better at political leadership than women (despite the country having gender quotas for parliamentary seats), and an equally high share (65 percent) say that men should have final say in all decisions concerning the household. Both of the measures have decreased since the first time they were asked, but only incrementally.
Instead, while changes over time are small, differences between Iraqi men and women on both of these measures are notable. There are 10-point gender gaps in both beliefs that men are better at political leadership (64 percent of women vs. 74 percent of men) and that men should have final say in the household (59 percent of women vs. 70 percent of men).

These gender gaps persist in data that is much more worrisome: reports of violence against women. Called a global "shadow pandemic" in the COVID-19 era, Iraq is one of four surveyed countries where majorities report an increase in
this abuse. While 52 percent of all Iraqis say that violence against women has increased in the past year, and the share of women reporting this increase (57 percent) is 9 points higher than the share of men (48 percent) reporting the same.

Environment

Awareness for environmental challenges is increasing in Iraq, potentially owing both to how much such challenges affect daily life and how much they are in-
tertiwined with the policies of neighboring countries like Turkey and Iran, which variously affect Iraq's energy and water supply. When asked about the most pressing environmental issue facing their country, the plurality of Iraqis cite the pollution of drinking water (35 percent), followed by waste management (17 percent), and air quality (10 percent). While majorities of Iraqis say each a lack of citizens' awareness and lack of government initiatives contribute to these challenges, the share pointing to citizens' lack of awareness (85 percent) is considerably higher than the share pointing to government inaction (68 percent).

Despite this imbalance, Iraqis do want their government to do more to address climate change. About half (49 percent) want the government to do more to address this problem, and only a small minority (15 percent) want the government to be doing less. And while the younger generation is often perceived to be spearheading environmental efforts, in Iraq, as with the majority of other surveyed countries in wave seven, there are no significant differences in desires for government intervention by age.
Iraqis’ beliefs that lack of awareness among fellow citizens contributes to environmental challenges appears to be partially founded. A significant minority of Iraqis (39 percent) say they reuse bottles to put water in the fridge, a form of recycling. But the rationale for this behavior is mostly economically driven: of those who do recycle, the majority (55 percent) say they do so for cost saving purposes, followed by 19 percent who say they do so out of convenience, and finally 18 percent who do so to protect the environment.
International Relations

Arguably, of all countries included in Arab Barometer’s seventh wave, Iraq is the country whose domestic political landscape is impossible to understand fully without consideration for the role of its regional neighbors, and at least one in particular: Iran. Repudiation of the regional power’s influence and reach into the country culminated in government paralysis, when the Iran-backed block failed to win a majority but effectively prevented a government from being formed.

But long before such tensions boiled over, Iraqi public opinion of Iran was quite low. Just 24 percent had a very or somewhat favorable view of the country, and the favorability of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s among Iraqis is equally low, with only 28 percent reporting his policies toward MENA are very good or good. Iran’s unfavorability among self-identified Shiia muslims (67 percent) in Iraq is higher than Saudi Arabia’s unfavorability among self-identified Sunni muslims (25 percent). Furthermore, less than a third of all citizens (31 percent) said economic relations with Iran should become stronger, a share on par with opinion in 2018 (33 percent) but considerably lower than it was in 2013 (47 percent). Across all three measures (overall favorability, evaluation of leaders, and strengthening economic ties), Iraqis rank Iran last in favorability among the included group of foreign countries.
In a similar vein, Iraqis are unified in their perception of the threats posed by Iran to their national security: 77 percent perceive Iran's nuclear program to be a critical threat, and 75 percent believe the same about Iranian influence in the region. Iran's proxies, namely the Lebanese Hezbollah, are also seen as an unwelcomed presence, with just 16 percent strongly agreeing or agreeing that the armed group's involvement in regional politics is good.
The perceived threats Iran poses to national security are second only to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 79 of Iraqis say that the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories poses a critical threat to national security. Commensurately, just 14 percent say they strongly favor or favor normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel, though notably, there is some regional variation within Iraq. While still low, favorability for normalization among Iraqis residing in the KRI (27 percent) is double what is among those living under the Government of Iraq (GOI, 13 percent).
While Iran bottoms out the list of most favored nations, China tops it in Iraq. Just over half of all Iraqis (54 percent) have a very or somewhat favorable view of China, and 48 percent suggest that Chinese President Xi Jinping's policies have been very good or good for the MENA region. On both measures, Iraqis have a higher favorability of China and of its leader than they do of American President Joseph Biden (35 percent favorability) and of the United States, which is viewed favorable by just over a third (35 percent) of citizens. These evaluations, however, partially vary according to reigon: those in the KRI tend to have a much more favorable view of the U.S. than those living under the GOI (+37 points). Views of China, however, vary less, with 58 percent of Iraqis in the KRI and 53 percent of Iraqis living in the GOI saying they view the country very or somewhat favorably.
While higher evaluations of China than the U.S. in Iraq fit a more regional pattern in the latest Arab Barometer surveyed countries, trends in Iraq on economic relations suggest subtle, yet important nuance. Just over half of all Iraqis (53 percent) want economic relations with China to become stronger, while just under half (46 percent) want the same for relations with the U.S. But while the share of those who hold this view about China has held steady since 2018, there’s a significant, 11-point uptick over the same time period among Iraqis who want stronger relations with the U.S.
What potentially explains such findings? Intra-country variation accounts for some of it. The U.S.’s historically stronger alliance with the Kurds in Iraq is reflected in the 11-point difference in desire for stronger economic relations among those in the KRI than those living under the GOI.

Messaging is potentially another factor. If politics is perception, then China’s Belt and Road Initiative appears to be enjoying slightly more success in marketing its stated goal of developing infrastructure. Iraq received U.S.$10.5 billion from China in 2021, making Iraq one of the largest recipients of contracts. Iraqis are more divided over Chinese motivations for providing foreign aid than they are about American aims: 37 percent, a slight plurality, say China’s main motive is to gain influence, while 34 percent say it is for economic development. Meanwhile, citizens are more unified on what they perceive American motivation: 52 percent, just about half, say the U.S. aims to gain influence, while only 16 percent say American motivation is economic development. These perceptions of motivations may also explain why 53 percent of Iraqis view the development of American economic power as a critical threat to their national security interests, while only 28 percent say the same about Chinese economic power.
These numbers alone, however, do not explain why there is a rise in the desire to strengthen economic ties with the U.S. Instead, citizens are making additional
reputational assessments. Given a hypothetical scenario about foreign countries vying for a domestic infrastructure contract, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis believe China would build the least expensive one, but also build the one that had the lowest quality. Meanwhile, pluralities perceive that the U.S. would be most likely to build the most expensive project and take bribes, but also pay the best salary. Germany (and its reputation for stellar engineering) is thought to be the one that would build the highest quality project. As such, when asked which country should get the contract, the Iraqi public is torn between the U.S., Germany, and China. These findings suggest that Iraqi citizens are acutely aware of tradeoffs in economic relationships with different external powers, and approach them with caution.
ABOUT ARAB BAROMETER

Arab Barometer is a nonpartisan research network that provides insight into the social, political, and economic attitudes and values of ordinary citizens across the Arab world.

We have been conducting rigorous, and nationally representative public opinion surveys on probability samples of the adult populations across the Arab world since 2006 across 15 countries.

We are the longest-standing and the largest repository of publicly available data on the views of men and women in the MENA region. Our findings give a voice to the needs and concerns of Arab publics.