

Intergenerational Value Change in Egypt

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INTRODUCTION

Arab Spring is commonly associated to youth mobilization and their dissatisfaction with respective Arab authoritarian regimes. This empirical study explores such claims by tracing a number of social and political indicators as parameters of generational value change in post-2011 Egypt. It employs a generational perspective in examining such values following Karl Mannheim's definition of generations. Mannheim argued that a political generation is composed of a birth cohort sharing similar values through a multifaceted historical process of socialization. The theoretical framework guiding considerable portion of this study is Ronald Inglehart's "intergenerational value change thesis." Inglehart argues that there is an ongoing transnational value shift towards "postmaterialism," which includes self-expression, quality of life and sense of belonging values with less emphasis on "materialist" values of traditionalism and security concerns. For Inglehart, younger generations are more likely to be postmaterialists given that their formative experiences are shaped through socioeconomic prosperity if compared to older cohorts.

In this study, I aim to address central question of whether youth values differ from those of their older peers relative to the events of 2011 in Egypt. In doing so; this research begins by examining the relevance of postmaterialist argument to the Middle East and Egyptian youth respectively. Next, this study maps out the political values of different cohorts in Egypt. Most of studies of youth in Egypt and the Middle East are yet historical or anecdotal. However, in this paper, I examine secondary data from the World Values Survey and the Arab Barometer collected between 2001 and 2013 in order to evaluate the unique effects of our proposed forecasters.

On the whole, I find very limited support for Inglehart's thesis in explaining the Egyptian case. Although the younger generation shows a greater propensity to be postmaterialist, nevertheless the relative salience of such values is low in Egypt. Hence, I call for reconsidering Inglehart's model in developing nations.

Moreover, I find evidence for cohort value variance in regard to portion of political values. However, part of these differences relate to intra-cohort aging effects. Thus, I cast doubt on the uniqueness of the claim of the uniqueness of the values of the youth cohort and call for refining this assertion. Additionally, I find limited evidence in support of the claim that young Egyptians exhibit more liberal values. Instead, I find considerable support for youth fragmentation in Egypt. Much of the division among this cohort is explained by demographic factors. Overall, this quantitative study provides the basis for future qualitative studies that further investigate proposed criticisms and doubts on the existing claims related to the distinctiveness of the youth cohort in Egypt that participated in the 2011 uprising.

POSTMATERIALISM IN EGYPT

In this section seek to place the postmaterialist values of Egypt's youth into a global and regional context based on Ronald Inglehart's "intergenerational value change thesis."

Inglehart argues that there is an ongoing transnational value shift towards “postmaterialism,” which includes self-expression, quality of life and a sense of belonging values with less emphasis placed on “materialist” values of traditionalism and security concerns. For Inglehart, younger generations are more likely to be postmaterialists given that their formative experiences are shaped through socioeconomic prosperity if compared to older cohorts.

Postmaterialism in a Comparative Perspective

The post-Cold War period coupled with the economic boom in South East Asia led to the revival of the westernized concept of modernization theory. Yet, Inglehart and others noted the need to revisit the classical version of it to match the new global developments. For example, Inglehart believes that Russia and China are likely to democratize because of the long-term effects of socioeconomic growth on individuals’ behaviors, meaning the institutional manifestation of such values will take place.¹ However, he highlighted the internal fallacies within mainstream interpretations of modernization in terms of the perquisites that assume certain levels of “modern” values being necessary for a given society to progress along this path.² On the other hand, he did not adopt the neo-Marxist stances that owed the underdevelopment of the poor countries to the exploitation by the rich capitalist north.

The process of industrialization leads to cultural shifts, yet this change is not uniform but instead path dependent.³ Cultural zones proposed by Samuel Huntington, and later forwarded by Inglehart, provide a stabilizing effect on the worldwide post-materialist value change. Thus, Inglehart doubts modernization forces’ capacity to produce a unified global culture in the near future. Second, the growing trend of anti-secularism is overlooked. Theoretically, processes of industrialization and post-industrialization yield less emphasis on the traditional religious values, yet a growing interest in the meaning and purpose of life provides a counter effect. Third, the path dependency of value change is present within each cultural zone itself, not only cross-cultural. Finally, the mode and magnitude of value change is dependent on various factors, yet the distinction between long and short term value changes is very important. Long-term value changes are likely to occur, with no necessary westernized or “Americanization” shift in world values. Thus, unlike the first phase of modernization theory, the post-industrial version of modernization predicts an increased demand for democracy and less government interference on restrictions of human autonomy.

¹ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know About Modernization,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April Issue, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64821/ronald-inglehart-and-christian-welzel/how-development-leads-to-democracy>, Retrieved October 28, 2014.

² Alex Inkeles and David Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Changes in Six Developing Societies*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974.

³ Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 65, No. 1, February 2000, pp. 48-50.

The Postmaterialism Thesis

By late 1970s, Inglehart developed a technique to understand the ongoing trend of value change across the world. He did not suggest unicultural attributes, but to overcome the challenges connected with the usage of culture as residual variable, he instead focused on the long-term effects of socioeconomic development, which can help overcome the legitimate criticism of the fluctuation and fragmentation of the culturist approaches.⁴ This theory has roots in his silent revolution thesis, whereby he observed a value change towards post-materialism in the Eurobarometer. Subsequently, he considered a larger cultural shift occurring at the end of the Cold War, and by early 2000s, he started to revisit his original thesis by accounting for the short-term effects of inflation and its temporal effects on long-term post-material value standings.⁵

In theory, the central claim of modernization is that economic prosperity leads to value change across the globe in predictable ways.⁶ The heavy reliance on industrialization is to yield occupational specialization, growing levels of education, and increasing economic growth. These effects change the existential living conditions of individuals in any given society. Modernization is a budding course of human development forced by socioeconomic progression; it brings cultural change in terms of gender roles, authority perceptions, sexual norms, religious beliefs, and more participation in the polity's affairs. It likely yields a new form of society that is more emancipative than earlier forms of societal progression.⁷ Such changes according to Inglehart are subject to control by traditional powers, meaning elites or military leaders might seek to prevent these value shifts.

On the other hand, post-materialism is linked to the changing nature of work and economy into post-industrial developments. Daniel Bell noted that the changes in nature of economic transactions in the postwar epoch, where a shift towards service products overtook economies all over the world.⁸ Such a shift has major political, economic and social consequences. More secure existential living conditions drive human value to focus on quality of life, environmentalism and self-expression, or in other words what Inglehart regarded as postmaterialist values. The pre-industrial life is dominated by conflict against nature, thus promoting a greater emphasis on traditional-religious values. Furthermore, with complexities in economic transactions, humans manipulate their

⁴ Samuel Newman, "Constructing Political Culture Theory: The Political Science of Ronald Inglehart," *Politics & Policy*, Volume 30, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 606-609.

⁵ Samuel Newman, *Ibid.*, pp. 599- 604.

⁶ Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 21-24.

⁷ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, Cambridge: University Press, 2005, pp. 2-3.

⁸ Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, New York, Basic Books, 1973, pp. 146-150.

nature. This gives rise to material ideologies that focus on secular-rational interpretations of history. The shift towards post-industrial mode of production gave the rise of more autonomous explanations of history, where more and more people live in mechanic societies, thus it becomes a competition between individuals.⁹

Findings of the World Values Survey (WVS) enhance the hypothesis of “Human Development Sequence,” based on the rise of post-materialism in postwar developed societies. The core theme of broadening human choices by elevating social, material and cognitive constraints on human calculations results in socioeconomic changes, increasing values of self-expression, and promoting a trend of democratization. The socioeconomic modernization process decreases objective capabilities of humans that in turn escalate people’s autonomous choices. Changing global values place more emphasis on individual liberty and allow for human diversity, or in other words “self-expression” values. This nexus of values focuses on civil and political liberties which comprises democracy. It allows people the flexibility to be more autonomous, thus realizing freedom of speech and action. In sum, the rise of self-expression qualifies modernization to be an emancipative process of human development.

Value Change in the Middle East

This paper aims to place Egyptian values within a wider global and regional context, necessitating a comparison of the Egyptian value system to other states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) given the commonalties among these states in terms of culture, economics, and the nature of their respective political systems.

I used data from the 6th wave of the WVS conducted between 2010 and 2014 to compare countries in this region to Inglehart’s earlier work on the same dimensions. I use principal component analysis (PCA) to extract two dimensions reflecting “traditional versus secular-rational” values on the one hand, while the other indicates “survival versus self-expression” on the national level.¹⁰ Table 1.1 presents the factor loadings of these ten items and the description of the two-extracted dimensions in the last wave. However, my PCA loadings were lower than Inglehart’s earlier work due to missing cases in the last data-set.

⁹ Daniel Bell, *Ibid.*, pp. 149.

¹⁰ Questions wording are in appendices A and B.

Table 1.1 Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation: National-Level

	Factor Loadings
Traditional values emphasize the following	
<u>(Secular-rational values emphasize the opposite)¹¹</u>	
God is very important for respondent	.484
It is more important for children to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination (Autonomy Index)	.337
Abortion is never justified	.324
Respondent has a strong national pride	.683
Respondent favors more respect for authority	.504
Survival values emphasize the following	
<u>(Self-expression values emphasize the opposite)¹²</u>	
Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life (4-item postmaterialist index)	.495
Respondent feels not very happy	.326
Homosexuality is never justified	.745
Respondent did not and would not sign a petition	.539
<u>Respondent is careful about trusting other people</u>	<u>.359</u>

Source: World Values Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014)

Figure 1.1 represents the location of MENA countries on Inglehart's dimensions from 2000 till 2014.¹³ The vertical axis represents variation from traditional to secular-rational values towards the positive pole, while the horizontal axis represents variation from survival to self-expression values. The reason for the incomprehensive representation in the below figure, i.e. missing countries, is due to a large number of missing cases in wave 6 (2010-2014); thus, it is not possible to fully produce the respective country scores for all cases. Additionally, questions were modified from one wave to another, so I tried to comply with Inglehart-Welzel original items in the 1997 and 2005 dimensions for comparative reasons. The figure shows Egypt's value system changing from 2001 to 2008 on the self-expression continuum, and slightly towards secular-rational values. A


¹¹ The first factor explains 38.9% of total cross-national variations. By multiplying the extracted factor with (-1), the positive pole is rational-secular values.

¹² The second factor explains 22.6% of the total cross-national variations. By multiplying the extracted factor with (-1), the positive pole is self-expression values.

¹³ The mean value scores used in figure 1.2 were extracted in two ways. Waves (4=2000-2004 and 5=2005-2009) were derived from WVS's website from Inglehart and Welzel's representation of global cultural map, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings>, Retrived March 20, 2015. Wave (6=2010-2014) was extracted from a principle component factor analysis in an earlier work. - See Appendix for question wordings and full mean scores.

plausible explanation for that is the growing discontent with the government's economic and social policies during the Ahmed Nazif second's cabinet (2008-2011) combined with a dramatic increase in GDP growth rates. Thus, a clear movement on the horizontal axis is noted, while a degree of conservatism remains. However, it is important to bear in mind that Egypt's scores remain in the (negative) area on the aggregate dimensions.

Figure 1.1 Mean of MENA Country Scores on Inglehart's Model (2000-2014)



Note: 4=2000-2004, 5=2005-2008 and 6=2010-2014
 Source: World Values Survey Waves 4, 5 and 6 (2000-2014)

In fact, most of the Middle East countries score negatively on both dimensions except for both Lebanon (2010-2014) and Israel (2000-2004). While scores for both Iraq and Tunisia exhibited positive change on the secular-rational dimension in (2010-2014), they still negatively score on the self-expression dimension. An important remark as well, is that Qatar (2010-2014) and Saudi Arabia (2000-2004) score the highest among other Arab states on the self-expression dimension. I argue that it does not necessarily mean a shift towards postmaterialist values. Instead, it reflects a high level of existential security related to the oil-revenues that such states acquire.¹⁴ Arab spring states, such as Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt score higher than other states on the secular-traditional dimension, with less change on the self-expression axis. Hence, the above figure can lead

¹⁴ Michael L. Ross, "Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the Resource Curse," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-08-19/will-oil-drown-arab-spring>, Retrieved May 2, 2015.

us to assume that there is a limited movement towards more expression values in the Middle East.

Value System(s) in Egypt

By the early 2000s, Egypt had been through considerable change in political, economic and social spheres. This wave of transformation had its impact on the Egyptian society. Although many highlighted the post-millennial transformations in Egypt, little work accounted for the changing nature of changing values of the Egyptian society. In the section below, I begin by highlighting the sociopolitical background of Egypt in the post 2000 era and then I account for the aggregate and disaggregate value change in Egypt based on Inglehart's Postmaterialism indices.

Socioeconomic and Political Background

Since the 1978 peace agreement with Israel and the adoption of the *Infitah* (Open-Economy) during Sadat's presidency (1970-1981), the Egyptian society has transformed dramatically given its earlier socialist attachments prioritized by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser (1954-1970).¹⁵ Mubarak – coming from the same institutional background and formerly serving as Sadat's deputy – continued in his predecessor's economic strategies. The composition of successive governments under Mubarak reveals such fact as well. Most of Mubarak's ministers were technocrats or university professors, affiliated with the National Democratic Party (NDP), and he promoted neo-liberal economic policies. Successive governments in Egypt sought to comply with the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural adjustments accords and the regime exhibited a willingness to integrate Egypt's economy into world trade and to follow policies aimed at debt-reduction.


In order for the Mubarak regime to address the large national debt that Egypt had accrued beginning in the 1960s, successive governments since the 1990s took harsh macro-economic measures mainly in the form of cutting public spending and privatization. However, the Egyptian economy entered a stagnation period by the end of the 1990s due to political instability and lack of investment. Thus, since 2004; Ahmed Nazif's cabinet had to rethink its macroeconomic strategy to focus on deregulation in terms of trade regulations, tax systems and investment portfolios in order to attract private and foreign investments.¹⁶ Coupled with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his direct and indirect involvement in both NDP and Nazif's cabinet economic planning, Egypt's GDP growth rate peaked at 7.2% in 2008, representing the highest level in 25 years.¹⁷ Moreover, the World Bank considered the Egyptian economy to be best performers among developing economies in mid-2000 (see figure 1.2).

¹⁵ Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement: Peace Treaties Digital Collection, *United States Institute of Peace*, <http://www.usip.org/publications/peace-agreements-israel-egypt>, Retrieved May 2, 2015

¹⁶ Nadia Farah, *Egypt's Political Economy: Power Relations in Development*, Cairo, The American University in Cairo Press, 2009.

¹⁷ Egypt's Economic Indicators, *Egypt: CIA World Fact Book*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>, Retrieved May 2, 2015.

Figure 1.2 GDP Growth Rate in Egypt (1999-2011)



Source: CIA World Fact book and World Development Indicators

However, the international recognition of the high GDP growth rates did not translate into domestic political stability or satisfaction with income redistribution. Unlike the former economic system that shared benefits with working classes, the wave of privatization under Mubarak exacerbated inequality in Egyptian society. Table 1.2 shows the number of worker strikes from 1999 till 2008. It shows an increase especially during the high economic growth periods of 2007 and 2008, especially in the private sector. This raises the question of whether the periods of economic growth in Egypt reflect nominal or real economic growth and whether it resulted in equal income distribution or higher livings standards for ordinary citizens.

Politically, the first decade of 2000s also resulted in a number of important changes. In February 2005, Mubarak announced his intention to amend article 76 of the 1971 constitution which defined the procedures for choosing the president.¹⁸ This reform permitted a multicandidate election for president for the first time. Then in 2007, a set of amendments was passed relating to the same article that solidified the ruling NDP's role in selecting the future president of Egypt.¹⁹

¹⁸ Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunne, and Amr Hamzawy, "Egypt's Controversial Constitutional Amendments," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 2007, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf, Retrieved April 30, 2015.

¹⁹ Amended article 76: The President shall be elected by direct, public, secret ballot. For an applicant to be accepted as a candidate to presidency, he shall be supported by at least 250 elected members of the People's Assembly, the Shura Council and local popular councils on governorate level, provided that those shall include at least 65 members of the People's Assembly, 25 of the Shura Council and ten of every local council in at least 14 governorates [...] The number of members of the People's Assembly, the Shura Council and local popular councils on governorate level supporting candidature shall be raised in pro rata

Table 1.2 Number of Workers' Strikes per Sector (1999-2008)

Year	Government Sector	Public Business Sector	Private Sector	Total
1999	13	10	15	54
2001	3	6	9	40
2002	6	8	5	19
2002	8	3	13	24
2003	6	3	16	25
2004	24	10	9	43
2005	21	13	12	46
2006	17	13	17	47
2007	36	31	43	110
2008	37	17	68	112

Source: *The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt*, Solidarity Center, 2010, pp. 16-17, www.solidaritycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/pubs_egypt_wrl.pdf, retrieved May 2, 2015.

These amendments coupled with the visibility of Mubarak's eldest son, intensified the narratives on the possible line of succession of power in Egypt as taking place within Mubarak's family. It was then termed as the *Altawrith* or "inheritance" project.²⁰ Such development gave a momentum for the rise of social movements to erupt given the restricted nature of the political regime at that time. The *Kefaya* (Enough) movement sought to prevent familial succession and led the way for various forms of opposition to appear. Youth movements were formulated from Kefaya and other protest organizations such as April 6th. These kinds of activities used the internet and social media to organize and recruit their supporters.

Postmaterialism in Egypt

Based on the qualitative assessments presented above that detail the changing socioeconomic and political milieu of Egypt and the political socialization of Egyptian youth, there is reason to believe that Egyptian values may be undergoing a process of change as a reflection of existential progression. In this section I use Inglehart "Materialism/Postmaterialism" four-item and 12-item batteries to trace such value change through the WVS waves of 4, 5 and 6. These indices reflect progression towards postmaterialism at the positive end. Moreover, for greater robustness, Egypt's data were

to any increase in the number of any of these councils. In all cases, support may not be given to more than one candidate.

- 2007 amendments of the 1971 Constitution, *Egypt State Information Center*, <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=204>, retrieved May 2, 2015.

²⁰ Manar Shorbagy, *The Egyptian Movement for Change- Kefaya: Redefining Politics in Egypt*, Public Culture Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, pp. 175-196.

extracted and weighted according to several parameters provided by the CAPMAS.²¹ The Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-item index is composed of repeated questions used in successive WVS waves that are classified on the earlier dimensions.²² Question items follow the subsequent order:

1. Maintaining order in the nation
2. Giving the people more say in important government decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom of speech

With these earlier responses, 6 combinations can be reached. Options (2 and 4) yield postmaterialist values, while items (1 and 3) compose materialist values. The other remaining 4 combinations produce mixed-values yielding an additive scale ranging between -2 and +2, where the latter indicates postmaterialist values.

Table 1.3 Percentages of Postmaterialist/Materialist 4-item Index in Egypt (2001-2012)

Year	Postmaterialist %	Mixed %	Materialist %	(N)	PDI Score Index
2001	5.3	48.7	46.1	2461	-40.8
2008	1.7	53.4	44.9	2523	-43.2
2012	0.9	35.8	63.3	2525	-62.4

Source: WVS waves 4, 5 and 6 (2001-2008-2012)

Projecting such an index on the Egyptian case with data available from the WVS, Table 1.3 represents the distribution of “postmaterialist/materialist” percentages among the three waves on Egypt. The table clearly reflects a decreasing emphasis on the postmaterialist values after 2001. In theory, an increasing prioritization of one type of values is directly linked to a decrease in another set of value type. As can be seen, only 0.9% Egyptians in 2012 hold postmaterialist values, which is fewer than in previous years. Such results contradict expectations of Inglehart’s theory given the high level of economic growth reported in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century in Egypt. Along the same lines, I constructed percentage difference index (PDI)²³ scores to detect aggregate value shifts in Egypt. In the same table, PDI scores are increasing, in particular between 2008 and 2012 to reach -62.4%.

²¹ The Egyptian data were weighted in all following analyses according to the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) <http://www.censusinfo.capmas.gov.eg/>, Gender (Males=50.5%, Females=49.5%), Demography (Urban=44.1%, Rural=55.9%), Age Categories (16-30=39.6%, 31-40=20.9%, 41-50=17.4%, 51-60=12%, 61+=10.1%), and Education Levels (Illiterate/Read=37.6%, Below High School= 17.1%, High School Diploma=33.7%, College Degree=11.6%). In order to neutralize sample effects, sampling sizes have been approximated to N=2525 per wave.

²² Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, “Value Trends in Western Europe and the United States,” *Value Change in Global Perspective*, Michigan, the University of Michigan Press, 1998, pp. 9-10.

²³ PDI= postmaterialist value percentages (minus) materialist value percentages.

The other index used by Inglehart throughout his thesis is the 12-item value index.²⁴ This index is thought to be more reliable and valid as it shows a wide range of variability among respondents to account for the short-term inflation effects.²⁵ In addition to the four-item battery; this index includes another two sets of questions adding up to 12-items as the following:

1. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth
2. Making sure that this country has strong defense forces
3. Seeing that people have more say in how things are decided at work and in their communities
4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful

In this set, options (1 and 2) are designed as materialist values, while options (3 and 4) yield postmaterialist values. The other set of this index includes:

1. Maintain a stable economy
2. Progress towards a less impersonal, more humane society
3. Fight against crime
4. Progress toward a society where ideas are more important than money

Options (1 and 3) in this set are designed to reflect materialist values as well, while options (2 and 4) yield postmaterialist values. The scores from respective categories on postmaterialist/materialism are summed up yielding an additive scale from 0 to +5, where the positive pole reflects postmaterialist values. Table 4 shows that the mean values on the 12-item index in Egypt by wave at three different points of time; 2001, 2008 and 2012. Bearing in mind that a perfect postmaterialist score by individual is achieving score of (+5), scores at its highest during the early 2000s were 1.68 on average. Moreover, results show a growing emphasis as well on pure materialist expressions that emphasize traditional-cultural attachments coupled with the importance of present-day challenges in terms of economic hardships.

Table 1.4 Mean Scores on Postmaterialist/Materialist 12-Item Index by Wave in Egypt

Year	Mean Score	(N)
2001	1.62	2440
2008	1.42	2514
2012	1.08	2525

Source: WVS Waves 4, 5 and 6 (2001-2008-2012)

Youth and Postmaterialism in Egypt

In this section I focus exclusively on youth postmaterialist values in Egypt before and after the 2011 uprising. As it was believed, the 2011 events aimed at achieving

²⁴ Questions wording is in appendix E.

²⁵ Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, "Value Trends in Western Europe and the United States," *Value Change in Global Perspective*, Op. Cit., pp. 22-23.

democracy and political freedoms, thus it can be placed under the category of postmaterialist “self-expression” values. I control for the age category between (16-30) as the weight provided through CPAMAS demographics, then I test two general claims, one is related to effect of age and the other is income on postmaterialist values among Egyptian youth. However, it is worthy to note that overall scores of such values are low in Egypt in general. Moreover, questions used by Inglehart are not sensitive for developing communities. For instance, question such as “having more say in government decisions,” can be regarded as materialist in Egypt in contrast to its classification as postmaterialist indicator at other understandings in other parts of the world.

Effect of Age in Comparative Context

Much of the literature on long-term patterns of postmaterialist values in western societies is contingent upon generational replacement. Generational replacements through life socialization effects are central for Inglehart’s thesis. Younger generations (cohorts) replace older ones through an accumulative process of graduation resulting in change in political and social attitudes and behaviors of the publics. In this section, I aim to portray the structure of youth value system in Egypt on both postmaterialist 12-item and 4-item indices developed by Inglehart. Then, compare it to similar patterns among other young generations all over the world to assess the plausibility of Inglehart’s model in explaining youth value change in Egypt.

I use both 12-item and 4-item postmaterialist indices for more comprehensive results. They are constructed respectively on scales from (0 to +5) and (-2 to +2) that are possibly sensitive for short-term inflation fluctuations as well. Here, I test my first claim that the younger generations in Egypt are more likely to hold postmaterialist values in forms of desire to have more say in politics and active participation in their respective communities, since their formative socialization experiences took place during periods of economic prosperity in comparison to older cohorts.

Hypothesis 1: Younger generations are more likely to express postmaterialist values in comparison to their older peers in Egypt.

First, Table 1.5 tests the relationship between postmaterialist values and age in Egypt through successive waves. Age as a continuous variable tends to be highest on its positive pole, and materialist/postmaterialist indices are positively arranged as explained before. Cases were weighted based on data from the 2006 CAPMAS census in Egypt. The results show the same pattern of decreasing emphasis on postmaterialism among all Egyptians from 2001 to 2008. However, postmaterialist values increase when age decreases, which matches our original assumption as well as Inglehart’s thesis on generational change. Still the magnitude of such an association is relatively low across all waves in Egypt. The association between age and postmaterialism is at its greatest in 2001 when the Pearson coefficient scored $r = -0.153$ in the 4-item battery and $r = -0.145$ in the 12-item battery at 99% confidence level. And trends continue to decline in subsequent waves as well.

Table 1.5 Correlation between Materialist/Postmaterialist indices and Age


Survey Year	Pearson Coefficient	
Age	4-Item Index	12-Item Index
2001	-0.153**	-0.145**
2008	-0.026*	-0.049*
2012	-0.039	-0.017

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Source: WVS 4, 5, and 6 (2001-2008-2012)

Figure 1.3 show the mean scores of age categories on the Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item dimension in Egypt is declining since 2001 through 2012. Arithmetic mean scores of the younger cohort (16-30) score highest on the continuum among the three different waves. Such a result further emphasizes the earlier correlation between age and the proposed dimensions. However, the trend in the table matches the original trend on decreasing emphasis on postmaterialist values especially after the 2011 events. Although younger cohort (16-30) scores highest on the continuum, which explains their differential values in relation to other cohorts, the reasons for the decline of postmaterialist values remains unresolved. It could be a result of short-term inflation effects that marked the post-2011 epoch. As previously noted, sectoral demands were at their highest following the uprising. Moreover, Egypt’s internal and external debts increased following the 2011 uprising and the quality of public services declined. Thus, many Egyptians including the youth may have come to see direct economic conditions crucial for life conditions.

Figure 1.3 Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item means scores by Age Categories in Egypt



Source: WVS 4, 5 and 6 (2001, 2008 and 2012)

Another method is to compare Egyptian youth mean value scores is to examine them in comparison with international means. In 2001, world youth (16-30) mean score value was 1.93, while Egyptian youth scored 1.8. This result indicates that at the turn of the

millennium Egyptian youth were more open to participating more in the political process and rethinking traditional norms compared with youth around the world. Similarly, in 2008, the Egyptian youth value mean score was 1.46, while the international mean was 1.55. Thus, the Egyptian youth was still near to the average international scores. However, in 2012, the international mean score was 2.03, whereas the Egyptian youth score was 1.08. That indicates a drastic decrease on the emphasis on postmaterialist values of self-expression and secularism contrary to what was expected in the aftermath of the 2011 events and related political mobilization. I argue this finding represents a key explanation for the polarization that Egypt is facing in the aftermath of the uprising.

Income Effect

In this section, I test Inglehart's main causal mechanism related to the generational shift towards postmaterialist values, which is the effect of income. As level of income increases, existential constraints on human minds decreases resulting in changing values related to gender, sexuality and more deliberative democratic practices. Thus, my main hypothesis in this section:

Hypothesis 2: Higher income young Egyptians are likely to match higher levels of postmaterialist value preferences.

I use data from the WVS on waves 4 and 5 that were conducted in Egypt in 2001 and 2008 respectively to construct an OLS regression model only for youth (16-30). Cases were weighted according to the 2006 CAPMAS demographic outputs as mentioned before. Data from 6th WVS wave in 2012 in Egypt were excluded as income and place of residency variables were not reported by the collecting agency. The dependent variable is the 12-item materialist/postmaterialist index that tends to the positive pole, while the main independent variable is a scaled-income that was reported in local currency from less than 500 Egyptian pounds to more than 12501(EGP LE) per month. Thus, I expect to find positive correlation between both variables. I use other controls that were reported in binary forms, education refers to college degree holders, gender refers to females, while place of residency refers to urban residents.²⁶

Results from table 1.6 on the factors affecting postmaterialism among Egyptian youth between 2001 and 2008; shows that income is of great explanatory power on our postmaterialist parameter in 2008, as it explains the 0.37 increase in such values if income increases at 90% confidence level, while in 2001 it was statistically insignificant. This has to do with the high level of economic growth reported between 2005 and 2008, thus those who have more income are likely to be postmaterialist. In a related vein, high education level is robust across models, explaining 0.425 in 2001 and 0.417 in 2008 the increase in such values at 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. Only males are more supportive of such values in 2001 which likely has to do with the higher level of social security among males at the turn of the millennium compared with females.

²⁶ Place of residency variable in the WVS was derived from size of town variable, in which more than 20,000 inhabitants are placed in the urban category.

Table 1.6 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Postmaterialism among Youth in Egypt

	2001	2008
	Model 1	Model 1
Income	-0.008 (0.017)	0.37 * (0.017)
College Degree	0.425** (0.152)	0.417*** (0.115)
Gender (=female)	-0.209** (0.075)	0.091 (0.069)
Urban	-0.007 (0.074)	-0.017 (0.083)
Intercept	1.905*** (0.101)	1.221*** (0.085)
R2	0.017	0.026
N	912	900

Note: standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Source: WVS (2001 and 2008) on Egypt

In sum, I reach the following conclusions on the postmaterialist intergenerational value change thesis. First, Inglehart's scholarship on growing accumulative long-term trend of postmaterialist value change was primarily designed and tested in western countries. Although he revisited many of the universal conceptions of modernization, it cannot be argued that it holds comprehensively for other parts of the world as shown in earlier discussions. Hence, I call for refining the index while accepting its principal causal mechanism.

Second, mean scores for Egyptian youth values and other MENA-states are below the international average mean on the materialist/postmaterialist indices. Furthermore this trend is going in different directions in Egypt compared with other countries due to a number of different factors. Internationally, one can assume that the 2008 financial crisis caused much of this decreasing emphasis on postmaterialist values. However, the overall international score on postmaterialist values are far from the scores of Egyptian youth in post-2011, contrary to what have been theorized by many Middle East scholars of democracy. This finding is crucial to account that international postmaterialist patterns do not hold for Egyptian youth in the post-2011. In fact, Egypt's scores have been decreasing steadily from 2001. Therefore, I can say that the structure of Egyptian youth values is different from other international youths as it still places greater emphasis on materialist priorities of survival, existential security and traditional-cultural dominance based on Inglehart's measures.

Third, overall scores of MENA countries are quite low on both the traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression dimensions. This raises issues of cultural singularity and persistence of cultural traditions in this underdeveloped part of the world. While scores of Western Europe, North America and South East Asia are relatively high, this further emphasizes my original criticism on the inadequacy of such dimensions to be

tested in the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, both Inglehart's models (bivariate dimension and postmaterialist indices) are not sensitive for testing the Egyptian youth value system. This outcome could be the result of the measurement's Eurocentric roots, question wording, or data collection techniques. Alternatively, it might be due to the having not realized the process of modernization as of now. These results require further investigation of the material values theory among Egyptian youth, who differ in important ways from older generations.

YOUTH POLITICAL VALUES

The study of political generations in the Arab world since the 1970s have examined the youth cohort to determine future pathways of respective Arab states. Mark Tessler noted that before on his studies on Algerian and Moroccan youth in early 2000s, in which the values of youth differ from their older counterparts whose formative years were deeply entrenched with the independence struggle, in comparison to younger citizens who grew up in the post-independence periods of 1970s and the 1980s.²⁷ Those in MENA who were brought up after the 1970s are also thought to be more expressionist and democratic compared with older citizens in their respective countries.²⁸

A similar pattern should hold in Egypt, given the historic mobilization took place in 2011 and its implications on the Egyptian political system. However, I theorize that post-2011 conditions should reveal a lack of political organization and high fragmentation among the youth cohort. In the following sections, I explore the generational differences in respect to political orientations in Egypt during the 2000s.

Interest in Politics

Measuring political and behavioral attitudes is a deep-rooted tradition when it comes to assessing youth's political involvement, participation, and the reasons for their social exclusion in countries in the global North.²⁹ Generally, youth are perceived to be disinterested in politics and public affairs.³⁰ Previous explanations owe such findings to the shared belief of irrelevance of politics to youngsters. For example, some find that youth see no direct attachment for politics to their direct material interests. Other studies focus on the complexity of the political phenomenon to young people to comprehend.

²⁷ Mark Tessler, "Morocco's Next Political Generation," *The Journal of North African Studies*, Vol.5, No .1, 2000, pp. 8-12. And see also: Mark Tessler, "Political Generations in Developing Countries: Evidence and Insights from Algeria 2004," *Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011, pp. 75-80.

²⁸ "Development in the Arab World," in M. Tessler (editor), *A New Look at the Middle East*, Milwaukee, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1971, p. 13-15.

²⁹ A. Richardson, *Talking About Commitment, The Views of Young People on Citizenship and Volunteering*, London, Social and Community Planning Research, 1990

³⁰ A. Furnham, and B Gunter, "Young people's political knowledge," *Educational Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1987, pp. 91-104

Meanwhile, another claim is that as part of their rebellious nature, young people show steadily low level of confidence in governments and politicians. Yet, much of the research that challenges perceptions of deliberative alienated youth and focuses more on their voluntary philanthropy activities.³¹

In the same vein, following the 2011 events in Egypt, studies on Egyptian youth involvement, accounted for the safe spaces “parallel spheres” that Egyptian young men and women acted in to avoid authoritarian contexts.³² Prior to the politicization of Egyptian society as a result of post-transition conditions, youth vocally expressed their opinions through cyber space, social media platforms, and organized themselves through non-profit organizations. Scholars believe that such low-politics engagements led to the historic mobilization of January 2011. In this section, however, we tend to discard the common perception that Egyptian youth are detached from public affairs, and account for the cohort differences in regards to political interest. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3: Over the past decade, young Egyptians have become more interested in politics and public affairs.

In order to test such claim, I use an item asked across WVS waves that asks a respondent to rate his or her degree of interest in politics on a scale from 1 to 4.³³ I reversed the item, thus more interest in politics representing a higher degree of interest in politics. Moreover, I use data from the WVS over a period of 11 years in Egypt comparing generational differences and intra-generational cohort change as well. I use a bivariate correlation matrix between the interest in politics variable and age categories, where age cohorts were rounded by the CAPMAS weights mentioned above.

For better visualization, the frequency distribution was converted into percentages as shown in Table 2.1. It shows the levels of those who demonstrate high or some interest in politics divided by age categories. Results show that total percentages of interest in politics have fluctuating over the past decade in Egypt to reach its maximum after the 2011 events reaching 69.1% of total sample in 2012. Respondents of (16-30), demonstrated the lowest level of interest in politics in 2001. However, their scores increased dramatically in 2012, when they became at the age of (31-40) to score 71.7% interest in public affairs. Although Egyptian society has exhibited high levels of politicization in general, and the differences between cohorts are not blunt, yet those who are between 16 and 30 are among the most politicized sections of the society with 68.2% at 2012. Existing life-cycle theories argue that interest in public affairs is a function of age, yet the high level of youth politicization is remarkable and differs from other parts of the world. This finding affirms our initial assumptions on the politicization of Egyptian youth during 2000s and in the post-2011 era. It shows how the 2011 events politicized all

³¹ R. Kimberlee, “Politically apathetic youth: a new generation?,” *Renewal*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1998, pp. 87–90.

³² Sherine El-Taraboulsi, “Spaces of Citizenship: Youth Civic Engagement and Pathways to the January 25 Revolution,” *Youth Activism and Public Space in Egypt*, Cairo, John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, the American University in Cairo, 2011, pp. 10-13.

³³ Question wording is in Appendix G

cohorts, but especially youth who became far more interested in the fate of politics in their country.

Table 2.1 Interest in Politics by Age Categories

	2001	2008	2012
	%	%	%
	Interested in Politics	Interested in Politics	Interested in Politics
16-30	38.1	34.9	68.2
31-40	39.7	27.7	71.7
41-50	45	31.3	73.3
51-60	42.8	60.8	66.9
61+	50.6	28.6	64.5
Total	41.2%	32.7%	69.1%

Source: WVS (2001-2008-2012)

Table 2.2 details the change in political interest over time by age cohort, showing that in 2012 Egypt's younger generation was highly interested in politics compared with their older peers. Meanwhile, since 2001 interest in politics among Egyptian youth have changed dramatically, going from -3.2 to 44, resulting in a change of 40.8 percent during this time. This result reflects the higher propensity of intra-generational value change over the past decade in Egypt. One important lesson to be drawn from these findings is that regardless of age cohort, interest in is a function of certain external stimuli such as the events surrounding the 2011 uprising. However, there is no guarantee that this will continue to be the case in the near future.

Table 2.2 Change in Values of Political Interest

	2001-2008	2008-2012
Age Categories	Value Change ³⁴	Value Change
16-30	-3.2	+33.3
31-40	-12.5	+44
41-50	-13.7	+42
51-60	+18	+61
61+	-22	+35.9

Source: WVS 4, 5, and 6 (2001, 2008 and 2012)

³⁴ Value Change= T2-T1

Political Trust

Political trust as concept is different from trust in governing institutions; the latter implies an evaluating perception of the performance of ruling institutions, while the former entails confidence in policy outcomes. Political trust is a conviction that the political system – as whole or part – would return beneficial outputs, even in the case of it being untended.³⁵ This sentiment is one of the most important pillars of political stability for a regime. Political trust reflects tangible attitudes rather than mere reactions towards certain policies. Moreover, it provides a window for any given political system to maneuver if faced different hardships with the credit of trust portrayed by its citizens. Following the literature on “political trust,” there are two main themes that can explain such sentiments.

One is rational choice theory that views trust from the perspective of a cost-benefit analysis of political actors’ choices.³⁶ Although this perspective does not exclude a role of values and norms in shaping public’s behavior, it does not regard values or norms as primary controlling factor in explaining political trust. Rational choice theories focus on governmental actions and behavior, where the controlling independent factor is the ability of respective regimes to provide good policies and the public perception of officials as good or bad people.³⁷ On the other hand, cultural theories argue that short-term material calculations have little explanatory power in predicting the outcomes of political trust. Although the public reacts to different external stimuli, there remains an interceding mechanism that ascribes meanings and values.³⁸ Thus, these interceding orientations make the actors react differently to the same set of events based on number of factors. On the other hand, culturalists do not entirely overlook institutional effects; however, they believe changes in values and norms are largely independent from such outcomes. Values affect people’s behavior and have considerable explanatory power in predicating political trust in a given society.³⁹

Research on political trust as part of democratic culture has not been thoroughly tested in the Egyptian case, which is part of a more general trend of overlooking such implications in the developing world. Political trust may be expected to be higher in authoritarian contexts as a given government presents itself as the state guardian, protector of peoples’ needs and most importantly using sentiments of nationalism especially in the developing

³⁵ S. Patterson, J. Wahlke and G. Boynton, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems" in Alan Kornberg (editor), *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, New York, McKay, 1970, p. 273.

³⁶ Robert Jackman, and Ross Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 40, 1996.

³⁷ Richard Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*, Boston, Little Brown, 1978, pp. 240-41.

³⁸ Ronald Inglehart, "Changing Values, Economic Development and Political Change," *International Social Science Journal*, No. 145, 1995, pp. 379- 384.

³⁹ Lucian Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. vii-viii.

world.⁴⁰ Numerous examples of populist regimes exist in the Arab world; Egypt under Nasser provides a clear example for such sentiments and connotations. On the other hand, studies of civic and participatory culture suggest lower levels of political trust, as a measure of keeping elected officials under the public's power restraining them from power abuse and corruption.⁴¹

Taking these factors into account, it is important to examine how political trust varies across generations in Egypt. Much of the research done in the developed states, show that political trust is a reaction towards governmental outputs rather than accumulated events. Moreover, I expect the young to exhibit lower levels of political trust than their older counterparts. Part of the explanation is that younger Egyptians who took part in the events of 2011 feel that the political system let them down and is unresponsive to their ongoing hardships. Meanwhile, the elderly who were influenced by national sentiments of the post-independence regimes are expected to have greater levels of trust regardless of the relative failures of the Mubarak regime and its dissolution. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 4: Younger Egyptians are expected to show lower levels of political trust than older cohorts.

Hypothesis 5: Egyptians with lower levels of income are expected to have less political trust than those with higher levels of income.

To test these hypotheses, I constructed a political trust index (PTI) using data from the Arab Barometer survey of 2011. PTI represents the main dependent variable in OLS regression showing the effect of age and income on such parameter. It is constructed through an additive scale ranging from -1.5 to 1.5 constructed from 4 items as shown in figure 2.1. The items included vary from supporting government decisions unconditionally, government is aware of citizens' needs, political leaders care about public opinion, and that government takes citizens' opinions into account.⁴² These items correlated on reliability scale test at $\alpha = 0.753$, where $p\text{-value} < 0.01$.

⁴⁰ Jack Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, 1974, pp. 978-979.

⁴¹ Jeffrey Paige, "Political Orientation and Riot Participation," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 36, 1971, p. 976.

⁴² Question Wording is in appendix H

Figure 2.1 Political Trust Index Items from the Arab Barometer 2011

Citizens must support the government's decisions even if they disagree with them	Reversed
Government employees are aware of citizens' needs	Reversed
Political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens	Reversed
The government takes the opinions of citizens seriously	Reversed

Note: Arab Barometer Wave II

Also, I examine the interaction between low income receiving individuals below 300 (EGP LE) a month and the youth cohort defined as those are less than 35 years old, and I expect to find lowest level of political trust among them

Table 2.3 OLS Regression for Factors affecting PTI in Egypt at 2011

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Age	0.024*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.006)		
Income	0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)	
Younger Generation				0.700*** (0.207)
Young and Low Income				-0.852*** (0.312)
Education	0.027 (0.054)	0.037 (0.042)	-0.024 (0.052)	-0.021 (0.053)
Urban	0.082 (0.200)	0.055 (0.158)	0.126 (0.202)	0.150 (0.198)
Gender (female)	0.031 (0.217)	0.202 (0.152)	0.000 (0.219)	0.082 (0.219)
Intercept	9.413*** (0.391)	9.684*** (0.322)	10.511*** (0.217)	10.346*** (0.265)
R2	0.023	0.013	0.007	0.022
N	708	1159	708	708

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Source: AB Wave II

The independent variables included in the model are age and income which are both continuous measures. Additionally, I include number of controls such as gender, place of residency and education level ranging from illiterate to postgraduate degree. In the

models presented below, I insert independent variables and check for interactions while accounting for the various controls.

Results from the OLS regression in table 2.3 reveal that only age accounts for political trust as expected, however, the size of the effect is limited. For example, in model increase in PTI is a function of an increase of 0.021 years for each one unit increase in levels of political trust. This result means as well that levels of political trust are low among all Egyptians in general. Other controls did not yield statistically significant correlations. As for the interaction between those of who are below 35 years old and of low income was statically insignificant. Thus, in this section, I argue that overall level of political trust is low and age provides little evidence on its salience. However, we should not overlook the effect of age in explaining low political trust.

2.3 Political Efficacy

The concept of political efficacy has been shown to have major explanatory power in predicting political behavior and participation mechanisms. Efficacy is the feeling that socio-political change is possible and that one can play a vital role in this evolutionary process.⁴³ High levels of political efficacy implies empowered citizens who feel that they can influence outcomes and decisions of respective political systems.⁴⁴ It is argued that those who are more confident in their ability to affect the political system are likely to support democratic system. Since the 1950s, scholars such as David Easton, has incorporated the concept of political efficacy into the studies of political support.⁴⁵ Easton and others theorized that feelings of political efficacy during the socialization process represent a key driver of active participatory citizens in democratic systems.

One major pillar for political efficacy is the concept of “self-efficacy” where it is defined as one’s judgment of his/her competences to organize sequences of action to yield certain types of enactments.⁴⁶ Thus, self-efficacy affects one’s choices, efforts and emotions related to the performance of a certain tasks. In his social cognitive theory, Bandura argues that self-confident citizens have the belief that they can produce certain effects through political actions.⁴⁷ He also distinguishes between collective and personal efficacy, with the latter or as termed “internal efficacy” that can be influenced by adulthood experiences. Thus, early democratic experiences are expected to have ever-

⁴³ A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. Miller, *the Voter Decides*, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954, p. 187.

⁴⁴ M. E. Morrell, “Survey and experimental evidence for a reliable and valid measure of internal political efficacy,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 67, 2003, pp. 593-596.

⁴⁵ David Easton and J. Dennis, “The Child’s Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, 1967, pp. 25-68.

⁴⁶ A. Bandura, “Perceived self-efficacy in cognitive development and functioning. *Educational Psychologist*,” Vol. 28, No. 2, 1993, pp. 117-148.

⁴⁷ A. Bandura, *Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1986, p. 483.

lasting effects on one's perception of his ability to influence and change his society in post-adolescence periods.⁴⁸

In the case of Egypt's younger generation under study here, I aim to explore their political efficacy attitudes especially in the post-2011 era based on number of factors. Little empirical research has been done to clarify such diffuse concept, including whether young Egyptians are politically confident in their abilities or not. I expect to find younger generation more confident than their older peers especially in the post-2011, but it may be that in other circumstances such an assumption might prove invalid. However, such attitudes might reflect responses to short-term events instead of longer-term beliefs.

Hypothesis 6: Younger Egyptians are more likely to be confident in their political leverage abilities.

Accordingly, I predict political efficacy attitudes by age to measure its correlation and figure out the primary drivers behind such attitudes among young Egyptians. Political efficacy represents the dependent variable. It comes from an item in Arab Barometer surveys on Egypt at 2011 and 2013, which asks a respondent if he or she feels that politics is sometimes too complicated to understand.⁴⁹ I convert the original scale of this item from (1 to 4) to (-1.5 to +1.5) then multiply the later by -1, thus the final version indicates greater belief in one's abilities to understand politics. Age is the main predictor factor and is included as a continuous variable. I also run a model restricted to respondents who are less than 35 years in age. I also use similar controls, namely income, education, gender and place of residency.

⁴⁸ R. Niemi, S. Craig, and F. Mattei, "Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 national election study" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991, pp. 1407-1410.

⁴⁹ Question wording is appendix I

Table 2.4 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Political Efficacy in Egypt at 2011 and 2013

	2011		2013	
	Full Sample	Below 35	Full Sample	Below 35
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-0.003 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)	
Income	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.012 (0.017)	0.017 (0.020)	0.029* (0.017)	0.045** (0.020)
Urban	0.100 (0.063)	0.092 (0.077)	0.058 (0.061)	0.038 (0.074)
Gender (female)	-0.209*** (0.068)	-0.170* (0.087)	-0.019 (0.065)	-0.076 (0.081)
Intercept	2.054*** (0.124)	1.814*** (0.078)	1.738*** (0.138)	1.744*** (0.093)
R2	0.020	0.015	0.006	0.015
N	708	439	759	464

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Source: AB Waves II and III

Table 2.4 shows regression results for factors that affect attitudes toward political efficacy in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. Our hypothesis that such attitudes are linked with age cannot be confirmed as such correlation is very weak and insignificant. Among the control variables, being female in 2011 decreases confidence in political abilities by 0.170 at 99% confidence level among the younger generation. This finding suggests that after 2011 that women were marginalized from politics with the rise of Islamist parties as result of the political vacuum following the fall of Mubarak regime. Moreover, education is robust in 2013 in explaining confidence attitudes and such effect I believe is attributed to the effect of urbanism as well.

Democratic Values

In their seminal book *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba argue that stable democracies result when there is an equilibrium between acts of democratic institutions and public expectations.⁵⁰ This influential school of thought remains dominant in the study of democratic attitudes and democratic stability in the developed world. Consequently, many political scientists have proposed models for testing this enduring

⁵⁰ Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963.

hypothesis.⁵¹ This assumption holds that democracies tend to stabilize, when citizens' demand for democracy equates with institutional supplies of it. Scholars of political culture also hold that high levels of support of democracy result in institutional breakthroughs and that such support is an integral ingredient for sustaining democracy.⁵²

However, this model of democratic supply and demand receives little empirical support when empirically tested in cross-national studies based on successive waves of the WVS.⁵³ Moreover, the same trend is present when analyzing democratic support in the Arab world, where high support for democracy did not result in democratization or institutional change directly. Results from the first and second waves of the Arab Barometer support these global findings as demonstrated through the works of both Mark Tessler and Amaney Jamal.⁵⁴

In this section, I test Lingling Qi and Doh Shin's hypothesis that democratic demand is a two-dimensional concept that comprises support for and dissatisfaction with democracy.⁵⁵ In this view skepticism towards democratic political system is not a threat for democracy in principle. On the contrary, it can be used to improve democratic systems. However, in Egypt the democratic opening did not last for enough time to consider dissatisfaction with it as a means for its modification. Rather, it is more likely that such an indicator serves to provide a comprehensive picture of democratic attitudes among young Egyptians.

To detect the generational differences regarding for democratic support, I run regression against two factors: authoritarian support and satisfaction with political system. As for authoritarian support, I use an additive scale of pro-authoritarian attitudes composing two variables from the Arab Barometer survey in 2011 conducted in Egypt. This scale included questions on the inadequacy of democracy to protect civil liberties, and having rulers in power with no elections.⁵⁶ Both items were associated on reliability check at $\alpha=0.529$ at 2011 and $\alpha=0.538$ at 2013, at $p<0.05$. The coding was reversed for the item on support for a political system with no elections, to indicate higher level of support for authoritarian attitudes as being more positive. The reason for choosing these kinds of measures is availability across the data sets for reasons of comparability.

⁵¹ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, Op. Cit.

⁵² M. Bratton and R. Mattes, "Support for democracy in Africa: intrinsic or instrumental?," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2002, pp. 447-459.

⁵³ Christian Welzel and H. Klingemann, "Evidencing and explaining democratic congruence: the perspective of substantive democracy," *World Values Research*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2008, pp. 57-59.

⁵⁴ Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler, "The Democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab World (2008)," *Public Opinion in the Middle East*, Op. Cit., pp. 108-124.

⁵⁵ Lingling Qi and Doh Chull Shin, "How mass political attitudes affect democratization: Exploring the facilitating role critical democrats play in the process?," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2011), pp. 247-250.

⁵⁶ Questions wording in appendix J

For satisfaction with political system measure, I use two-items. The two-items used in this scale deal with confidence of Egyptians in their government and confidence with the armed forces, which was governing Egypt when the survey was conducted.⁵⁷ The items correlated on the reliability scale at $\alpha=0.503$ in 2011, $p<0.01$, where the positive pole on the additive scale indicates greater satisfaction with the political system. The reason for choosing such items includes both their availability over waves and also because both the military and government are considered to be direct measures of regime satisfaction in the existing literature. However, a different measure is used for 2013, when the government was independent from the military.

Democratic Support

In this section, I seek to test Lingling Qi and Doh Shin's argument on the reasons underlying democratic support. Thus, I assume that lower levels of regime satisfaction and authoritarian attitudes are directly related to increases demand on democracy, and then test such argument on Egyptian youth between in 2011.

Hypothesis 7: Less authoritarian attitudes are positively correlated with greater demand for democracy.

Hypothesis 8: Lower levels of regime satisfaction are correlated with greater demand for democracy.

For regression, I constructed an additive index of democratic support using the Arab Barometer dataset on Egypt from 2011, including questions on democratic performances in relation to economy, maintaining order, inclusivity and if democracy is the most preferred political system by respondents.⁵⁸ Items correlated at $\alpha=0.919$ at 2011 $p<0.1$. Items were reversed, meaning positive pole indicates greater support for democracy. I use similar set of demographic controls used in earlier sections.

⁵⁷ Questions wording are in appendix K

⁵⁸ Questions wording in appendix L

Table 2.5 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Democratic Support in Egypt in 2011

	Full Sample <i>Model 1</i>	Full Sample <i>Model 2</i>	Below 35 <i>Model 3</i>	Below 35 <i>Model 4</i>
Age	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.011)		
Pro-Authoritarian	0.395*** (0.097)		0.420*** (0.122)	
Regime Satisfaction	-0.326*** (0.084)			-0.202* (0.117)
Income	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Education	-0.010 (0.052)	-0.037 (0.064)	-0.037 (0.060)	-0.035 (0.062)
Urban	0.456** (0.194)	0.460* (0.242)	0.498** (0.238)	0.404 (0.247)
Gender (female)	-0.163 (0.214)	0.232 (0.273)	0.368 (0.270)	0.237 (0.279)
Intercept	8.306*** (0.728)	7.173*** (0.630)	5.811*** (0.432)	8.515*** (0.898)
R2	0.060	0.012	0.040	0.020
N	653	415	412	404

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Source: AB Wave II

Table 2.5 shows factors affecting popular democratic demand among Egyptian youth in post-2011 era. The results are informative given the high level of political instability the country was experiencing appear reflected in its values. The findings reveal that democratic support is not a function of age across all models. Counterintuitively, pro-authoritarian attitudes explain much of the support for democracy both in full samples and among the youth. This striking finding stresses that democratic norms in Egypt differ from those in western societies. Moreover, it reveals that during the period in which the survey was conducted in June 2011, younger Egyptians failed to organize themselves or to ally with conventional powers in the society that had non-democratic roots.

Meanwhile, regime satisfaction correlated negatively in 2011 with support for democracy, which matches our original assumption. Additionally, those living in urban areas tend to be more supportive of democracy than those living in rural areas.

Overall, this section has provided a number of insights into the attitudes of the youth cohort in Egypt. First, from 2011 events till the present time, there is a high degree of politicization of all segments of the Egyptian society. Most importantly, from 2001 to 2008, the younger generation has been under process of political socialization increased their interest in public affairs, which in hindsight helps explain the 2011 uprising. However post-uprising political attitudes are linked mainly to intra-cohort changes instead of generational replacement.

Unlike the common wisdom that Egyptian youth feel more confident in their political abilities, the data show that age does not have significant explanatory power on these variables after 2011. However, higher levels of education and masculinity increase perceived levels of political efficacy.

Finally, the determinants of democratic attitudes in share relatively few commonalities with findings from other countries. However, it matches Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler's earlier work on the democratic attitudes in the region. The key variable that influences democratic demand among Egyptian youth is urbanity. Most likely, this result has to do with the cosmopolitan nature of living in big cities compared with a traditional rural area. Moreover, support for authoritarianism explains much for democratic support, and it matches earlier findings in the region that democratic aspirations in this part of the world is not for liberal concepts that exist in the West. Instead, it is yet another reflection of the polarized nature of Egyptian youth in 2011.

CONCLUSION

This study challenges claims about the nature of youth in the Middle East as liberal and secular. Instead, it finds that those who agitated the 2011 uprisings were actually angry youth facing structural hardships as indicated by several scholars such as John Esposito. This study aims to explore youth values in Egypt in relation to both its international and regional milieu.

Youth activists have played a major role in the rise of different protest movements over the past decade, ranging from toppling down authoritarian regimes in East Europe to the Arab spring to occupy movements in the western developed part of the world. Since the 1970s, Inglehart argued that there has been a sweeping generational value change towards postmaterialist values of self-expression and quality of life with economic security playing a lesser role. Hence, values of gender and sexual equality, in addition to the rise of environmentalism, were expected to take hold all over the world.

Egypt, as part of the Middle East, falls among the lowest scoring countries on Inglehart's dimensions of postmaterialism, although there are some deviant cases like Tunisia, Iraq, and Lebanon. This part of the world supports Inglehart's claims about persistence of cultural traits to some extent. Projecting such thesis on the Egyptian case, however, I find little support. Other than being one of the lowest scoring countries in the world and the region on preferring such values, Egyptian emphasis on postmaterialist values have been moving backward since early 2000s. This trend has to do, in part, with the economic stagnation the country has faced following the 2011 uprising, but also has shed light on the uneven distribution of income within the country during the economic growth that occurred throughout the mid-2000s. This finding call for further investigation of long-term versus short-term effects of economic progression on value change in developing states such as Egypt.

Egyptian youth place more emphasis on postmaterialism in relation to older cohorts, meaning there some evidence for existing cohort differences. High income and education levels explain the propensity for such values among Egyptian youth. Other evidence for cohort differences are found when analyzing basic political and social attitudes such as political efficacy and gender tolerance, however much of these results are due to intra-cohort changes, rather than generational replacement.

During the past four years in Egypt, attitudes have been changing. Thus, future surveys need to be conducted to determine whether there are profound generational value differences hold up over longitudinal analysis. Although these results show little support for Inglehart's thesis, one cannot disregard it. Results of the regression analysis presented above have showed that such values are a function of high education, income and gender rather than the rise of a unified, post-materialist cohort.

Instead, this study has shown that the youth cohort is divided by political and demographic factors. Urbanity is the strongest predictor that explains support for progressive (liberal) attitudes in Egypt. Living in an urban area makes a young Egyptian more likely to support for democracy, and it means less support for authoritarianism. Additionally, being male makes a respondent more likely to support democracy, as does greater confidence in one's political efficacy. Moreover, support for postmaterialist values, except for the case for gender equality that is disproportionately supported by females. Education plays an important role in making youth more likely to support postmaterialist values, at least in the years following the 2011 uprising. These findings cast further doubt on the homogenous nature of Egyptian youth and their related liberal nature, as many scholars of the Middle East have argued before. Hence, features of post-2011 political polarization and organization might be explained by these findings on the fragmented nature of Egyptian youth.

Arab Spring and Value Change

Scholars and commentators have been emphasizing the liberal and tolerant nature of current Egyptian youth who led the popular mobilization against Mubarak in 2011, which resulted in his downfall. These findings cast doubt regarding the progressive nature of current Egyptian youth. However, these findings suggest that the youth cohort may be less liberal and less secular than previously thought by foreign commentators. Combined with the factors affecting political activism and political efficacy values, I find argue that the average Egyptian who has been politically active over the last years are more likely to be urban, highly education, and interested in politics.

Pro-authoritarian attitudes explain much of the support for democracy among Egyptian youth in the period after the 2011 uprisings. This result means that the western conception of democracy is not fully shared by young Egyptians. This echoes Jamal and Tessler's conception of illiberal democracy spreading in MENA. Empirical evidence from the Arab Barometer has shown that for many Arabs democracy is supported for procedural rather than normative considerations.

Thus, I argue that young Egyptians who were active in social media and led protests on the eve of 25th of January 2011 reflect the type of liberal and politically active young people as Juan Cole and Esposito argued before. However, the youth who quickly came to the scene soon afterwards held a different set of values. These youths held traditionalist values. As a result, religion proved to explain much of the variance in relation to democracy and gender equality. One example is the election of Muslim Brotherhood members in both for parliament and the presidency. However, this study does not account for the role of Islamist youth in particular in post-Tahrir arrangements. This should be the subject of future research.

Appendix A
Traditional versus Secular-Rational Values
World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014)

- 1- How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means “very important” and 1 means “not at all important.”

- 2- Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five, where 1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned
 - Independence
 - Determination and perseverance
 - Religious faith
 - Obedience

- 3- Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: “Abortion” on a scale from 1-10. 10 means always justifiable

- 4- How proud are you to be (Nationality), on a scale from 1-4, 1 means very proud

- 5- I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? (Greater respect for authority) on scale from 1-3, where 3 is bad.

Appendix B
Survival versus Self-Expression Values
World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014)

- 1- Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-Item Index:
If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Two choices; first and second)
 - Maintaining order in the nation (M)
 - Give people more say (PM)
 - Fighting rising prices (M)
 - Protecting freedom of speech (PM)

- 2- Taking all things together, would you say you are happy? Scale on 1-4, 1 means very happy.

- 3- Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: "Homosexuality" on a scale from 1-10. 10 means always justifiable


- 4- Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it "Signing Petition," 1= did, 2= might do, 3=would never do

- 5- Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 1=most people can be trusted, 2=need to be very careful

Appendix C

World Cultural Map at 2000

Source: Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, Cambridge: University Press, 2005, p. 63.



Appendix D

Table: Mean Scores of Countries on Dimensions of Cultural Variations Sorted by Highest Loads on Survival/ Self-Expression Values

World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014)			
Country	Survival /Self- Expression	Traditional /Secular- Rational	N
Sweden	2.0291	0.542	1022
Netherlands	1.6132	0.4113	1610
Australia	1.4983	-0.0694	1389
New Zealand	1.4093	-0.0021	459
Germany	1.0534	0.5435	1761
Japan	0.9758	0.926	1395
Slovenia	0.9472	0.6313	762
Spain	0.9058	0.3345	976
United States	0.833	-0.1699	2032
Uruguay	0.6676	0.0024	705
Singapore	0.5529	0.0896	1962
Estonia	0.3183	1.1317	1223
Chile	0.3014	0.0405	852
Taiwan	0.2869	0.952	1080
Mexico	0.271	-0.9201	1933
South Korea	0.2649	0.7647	1138
Belarus	0.1911	0.5854	1300
China	0.1707	0.9127	1452
Uzbekistan	0.1505	-0.8609	1334
Poland	0.1256	-0.0567	786
Cyprus	-0.0076	0.0677	915
Philippines	-0.0314	-0.5622	1177
Colombia	-0.0366	-0.9486	1442
Peru	-0.0777	-0.3507	1039
Qatar	-0.1254	-1.2734	1046
Russia	-0.1436	0.7208	1751
Lebanon	-0.1869	0.3061	1059
Ecuador	-0.2278	-0.815	1192
Kazakhstan	-0.234	0.2967	1494
Trinidad &Tobago	-0.2546	-0.9264	927
Rwanda	-0.334	-0.3677	1521
Ukraine	-0.3458	0.8502	1336
Kyrgyzstan	-0.3657	0.1132	1414
Algeria	-0.3751	-0.0918	899
Turkey	-0.3936	-0.2496	1415
Malaysia	-0.4092	-0.2122	1282
Romania	-0.4231	0.2291	1289
Pakistan	-0.4504	-0.3016	1174

Nigeria	-0.4715	-0.3892	1758
Zimbabwe	-0.5386	-0.3928	1493
Libya	-0.5968	-0.5777	1790
Armenia	-0.6101	0.0197	927
Azerbaijan	-0.6525	0.0884	1000
Palestine	-0.681	-0.0655	899
Ghana	-0.6962	-0.7684	1550
Iraq	-0.7304	0.038	1070
Yemen	-0.7543	-0.254	609
Morocco	-0.8698	-0.0581	915
Tunisia	-0.8824	0.0326	1028
Jordan	-0.915	-0.3479	1162

Appendix E

Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item Value Index World Values Survey: Waves 4, 5, 6 (2001- 2008- 2012)

- 1- Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-Item Index

- 2- People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? (Two choices; first and second):
 - A high level of economic growth (M)
 - A strong defense forces (M)
 - People have more say about how things (M)
 - Trying to make our cities more beautiful (PM)

- 3- Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? (Two choices; first and second) :
 - A stable economy (M)
 - Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society (PM)
 - Ideas count more than money (PM)
 - The fight against crime (M)

Appendix F

Table: Mean Scores of (16-30) age category by Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item Index during 2010 and 2014 by Country Sorted by Highest Loads on Mean Column

Source: World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014)

Country	Mean	Sample Size
Sweden	2.81	213
Germany	2.76	175
Slovenia	2.71	157
Chile	2.68	244
Spain	2.47	244
Uruguay	2.45	229
South Korea	2.43	231
Philippines	2.42	235
Colombia	2.39	326
Japan	2.32	105
Poland	2.32	212
Mexico	2.3	416
Netherlands	2.3	92
Romania	2.21	226
Singapore	2.21	254
Turkey	2.18	296
New Zealand	2.17	92
Ecuador	2.14	364
United States	2.14	221
Estonia	2.11	237
Australia	2.1	229
Peru	2.1	344
Lebanon	2.08	339
Zimbabwe	2.08	453
Algeria	2.07	349
Nigeria	2.01	600
Taiwan	2	236
Qatar	1.98	326
Malaysia	1.96	296
Belarus	1.95	249

Country	Mean	N
Cyprus	1.93	332
Azerbaijan	1.9	335
Ukraine	1.88	252
Palestine	1.78	401
Trinidad and Tobago	1.78	249
Libya	1.77	445
Morocco	1.73	352
Iraq	1.68	375
Kyrgyzstan	1.68	341
Russian Federation	1.68	249
Ghana	1.64	581
Uzbekistan	1.59	270
Kazakhstan	1.55	348
Rwanda	1.55	466
China	1.51	234
Armenia	1.5	217
Jordan	1.41	313
Yemen	1.16	427
Egypt	1.08	396
Tunisia	1.07	403

Appendix G
Interest in Politics
World Values Survey: Waves 4, 5, and 6
(2001, 2008, and 2012)

- How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one answer):
 - 1- Very interested
 - 2- Somewhat interested
 - 3- Not very interested
 - 4- Not at all interested

Appendix H
Political Trust Index (PTI)
Arab Barometer Wave II: Egypt 2011

- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Citizens must support the government’s decisions even if they disagree with them”?
 - 1- I strongly agree
 - 2- I agree
 - 3- I disagree
 - 4- I strongly disagree

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Government employees are aware of citizens’ needs
 - 1- I strongly agree
 - 2- I agree
 - 3- I disagree
 - 4- I strongly disagree

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens
 - 1- I strongly agree
 - 2- I agree
 - 3- I disagree
 - 4- I strongly disagree

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? the government takes the opinions of citizens seriously
 - 1- I strongly agree
 - 2- I agree
 - 3- I disagree
 - 4- I strongly disagree

Appendix I
Political Efficacy
Arab Barometer Wave II: Egypt 2011

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Sometimes, politics are so complicated that I cannot understand what is happening
- 1- I strongly agree
- 2- I agree
- 3- I disagree
- 4- I strongly disagree

Appendix J
Pro-Authoritarian Attitudes
Arab Barometer Waves II: Egypt 2011

- I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with regard to the country's governance – for each one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? A democratic political system (ensures public freedoms, equality in political and civil rights, devolution of authority, and accountability and transparency of the executive authority)
 - 1- Very Good
 - 2- Good
 - 3- Bad
 - 4- Very Bad
-
- I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with regard to the country's governance – for each one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? A political system with an authoritarian president (non-democratic) who is indifferent to parliament and elections (Reversed)
 - 1- Very Good
 - 2- Good
 - 3- Bad
 - 4- Very Bad

Appendix K
Satisfaction with Political System
Arab Barometer Waves II: Egypt 2011

- I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what extent you trust each of them: the Armed Forces-Reversed
 - 1- I trust it to a great extent
 - 2- I trust it to a medium extent
 - 3- I trust it to a limited extent
 - 4- I absolutely do not trust it

- I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what extent you trust each of them: The government (the cabinet)-Reversed
 - 1- I trust it to a great extent
 - 2- I trust it to a medium extent
 - 3- I trust it to a limited extent
 - 4- I absolutely do not trust it

Appendix L
Pro-Democratic Orientations
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013

- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak (Reversed)
 - 1- I strongly agree
 - 2- I agree
 - 3- I disagree
 - 4- I strongly disagree

- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems (Reversed)
 - 1- I strongly agree
 - 2- I agree
 - 3- I disagree
 - 4- I strongly disagree

- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability (Reversed)
 - 1- I strongly agree
 - 2- I agree
 - 3- I disagree
 - 4- I strongly disagree

- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems
- 1- I strongly agree
- 2- I agree
- 3- I disagree
- 4- I strongly disagree