



## **The Arab Barometer Project**

**Arab Republic of Egypt**

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## Public Opinion Report on the Most Important Political and

### Social Issues in Egypt

#### Introduction:

<b>Table (1): Sample Distribution in Governorates of the Arab Republic of Egypt</b>	
<b>Governorate</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Cairo	10.6
Alexandria	6.3
Port Said	0.9
Suez	0.8
Damietta	1.6
Dakahlia	7.5
Al Sharqia	8
Qalyubia	6.2
Kafr el-Sheikh	3.9
Al Gharbia	6.1
Monufia	4.7
Beheira	7.3
Ismailia	1.6
Giza	4.8
Beni Suef	3.5
Faiyum	3.8
Minya	5.9
Asyut	5.1
Sohag	5.1
Qena	4.5
Aswan	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

To measure public opinion in the Arab World, the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies has conducted the second round of a public opinion survey in Egypt. The first round of surveys took place four years ago between 2006-2007. Notably, this is the first time the center has participated in this project. The second round of surveys took place in 11 countries in the Arab world in cooperation with the Arab Reform Initiative and with the participation of a number of experts and research centers in those countries. This survey was based on a sample of 1200 households distributed among Egypt's governorates as detailed in Table 1.

Interviews were conducted in 120 different residential

sites. The sample was chosen using a Kish table. The fieldwork took place from June 17-30, 2011. A clustered multistage sample was stratified by governorate and further stratified by urban/rural divisions in each governorate. The sample was drawn in accordance with the general framework of the 2006 Census, which was updated with the 2010 CAPMPAS Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption survey.

The sample of 1200 households was selected from 120 residential sites. No fewer than 10 interviews were conducted in each block and the margin of error was  $\pm 3\%$ .

This survey was conducted 5 months after the onset of the Egyptian revolution on 25 January 2011. Therefore, the results reflect Egyptian public opinion after the beginning of the Arab Spring. As a consequence of the timing, a large degree of optimism is observed in the responses. Response rates were high and interviewees were generally greeted with an enthusiasm reflecting developments in Egypt following the overthrow of former President Hosni Mubarak. At that time, the economic downturn and political divisions that came to plague Egypt had not yet become fully manifest.

### **Section One: General and Economic Topics**

The survey examined the attitudes of Egyptians concerning their general well-being and the challenges that face their country in 2011. It also included questions on the economic well-being of the country and the economic prospects of Egyptian families.

The full effects of the economic crisis that followed the revolution were not yet present, and the state of the economy (with low household income, high unemployment, high poverty rates, and inflation) was the main challenge facing Egypt, according to 82% of those surveyed. The next most cited concerns were security and stability and financial and administrative corruption, cited by 7% of respondents. Accordingly, we can say that the state of the economy and economic welfare occupies the minds of most Egyptians and represents the clearest threat to Egypt's future.

In addition, the survey examined the confidence in the ability of the government to face the challenges ahead. The results show that 35% of Egyptians surveyed express high confidence in the government's abilities, while the plurality (49%) has a moderate degree of confidence. On the other

hand, 13% of those surveyed express a lack of confidence in the government, while 3% have a complete lack of confidence. Despite the relative confidence exhibited with regard to their government's ability to face the ongoing economic hardships, 77% of Egyptians still describe the current state of the economy as bad compared with 23% who consider it good. Furthermore, 79% of those surveyed note that their household incomes do not cover their needs while 21% report that it does. This is in line with economic indicators, demonstrating that the consequences of the economic downturn were evident to respondents.

In an attempt to explore additional sources of income, 97% of the sample said that they did not receive any remittances from abroad while only 3% noted that they receive remittances periodically each year. Despite widespread economic concerns, the survey found that 83% of Egyptians surveyed own their own home, while 16% live in rented houses. This can be explained by looking at the dynamics of rural areas in Egypt, which include 52% of respondents; a number that corresponds with the rural/urban ratio in the country. Houses in rural areas are generally owned by their residents and passed down through generations. Furthermore, the remaining portion of home ownership is likely to be traditional or economical in nature and is not evidence of the socioeconomic status of the owner.

Despite the negative perception of the economy and general awareness of the looming economic crisis, respondents are generally optimistic about the future. Overall, 82% expect the economy to improve within the next 3 years. Only 11% expect it to remain the same, while 7% expect it to worsen.

Furthermore, in line with the overall sense of optimism after the revolution, the survey reveals that 89% of respondents are not seeking to emigrate from Egypt. Among the 11% who are seeking to emigrate, 8% state that they are trying to for economic reasons, 2% for political and economic

reasons and 1% for other reasons. The general objection to the idea of emigration can be explained by the overall optimism portrayed by Egyptians when it comes to their country's economic and political future.

As for levels of interpersonal trust, 56% of Egyptians agree that most people can be trusted, while 45% disagree. Although the country's security and stability is viewed as the second most important challenge facing Egypt, 53% of respondents indicate that they feel safe and secure, while 48% of them feel that they are unsafe.

## **Section Two: An Eye on Democracy**

The survey also explored the attitudes of Egyptians towards democracy. One question asks respondents about the most important feature of democracy. Three of these features are political (elections, freedom of expression, and equal political rights) and three are socio-economic (reduction of inequality, provision of basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter, and the elimination of financial and administrative corruption).

A majority of Egyptians (76%) rank socio-economic features first, with 32% saying the provision of basic necessities is the most essential feature of democracy, 32% saying it is reducing inequality, and 12% that it is the elimination of corruption. Meanwhile, only 23% of respondents choose political features, including 13% who think the most important feature is equal political rights, 6% saying it is free elections, and 4% choosing freedom of expression. As a result, we can see that the definition of democracy in the eyes of Egyptians does not correspond with many traditional definitions. Instead, Egyptians understand democracy to be primarily associated with socio-economic affairs, or redistribution. Nevertheless, 79% of Egyptians agree that, despite its flaws, a democratic system is the best political system compared with 21% who disagree. This preference for a democratic system could explain why most Egyptians refuse to justify any violation of human rights for the sake of

maintaining security. Overall, 66% of those surveyed say that violating human rights in the name of security is not justified at all, 17% indicated that it is justified to a limited extent, 13% say it is justified to a medium extent, and only 4% indicated that it is justified to a great extent.

Further highlighting the optimism of Egyptians after the 25 January revolution, 86% of respondents say that democracy is suitable for Egypt to some degree (39% suitable, 31% moderately suitable, and 16% completely suitable), while 10% think that it is not and 4% think it is not at all. However, these results do not necessarily indicate that most Egyptians will accept a democratic system, as there exist nuanced differences that should be taken into consideration when evaluating the suitability of democracy for Egypt. People in rural areas are slightly more likely to favor a democratic system (80%) than people in urban areas (77%). Furthermore, it appears that the Egyptians 46 years and

<b>Table (2): Supporters or Strong Supporters of a Democratic System According to Education Level and Age Group</b>				
<b>Urban and Rural Areas %</b>				
	<b>Urban %</b>		<b>Rural %</b>	
<b>Supporters or Strong Supporters of a Democratic System</b>	77		80	
<b>Education Levels%</b>				
	<b>Less than High School Diploma</b>	<b>High School Diploma</b>	<b>Associate Degree</b>	<b>College Degree</b>
<b>Supporters or Strong Supporters of a Democratic System</b>	75	83	78	77
<b>Age Groups %</b>				
	<b>18-25</b>	<b>26-35</b>	<b>36-45</b>	<b>46+</b>
<b>Supporters or Strong Supporters of a Democratic System</b>	80	78	79	78

older are slightly less supportive of a democratic system (78%) than younger respondents. The appeal of democracy is also weakly correlated with education: people with a high school degree are the most supportive of democracy (83%).

There is also a link between those who oppose (oppose and firmly oppose) democracy and those who believe that democracy is not compatible with Islam. This can be seen in Table 3 below.

<b>Table (3): Opponents or Strong Opponents to a Democratic System as a Result of Lack of Compatibility Between Democracy and Islam</b>				
<b>Democracy is not compatible with Islam %</b>				
	<b>Strongly Agree%</b>	<b>Agree %</b>	<b>Disagree%</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
<b>Opponents or Strong Opponents to a Democratic System</b>	7	13	43	37

The majority of Egyptians (98%) consider the democratic system (defined as incorporating political and civil freedoms, equal rights, periodic transition of power, and accountability) to be good or very good for Egypt, which reflects popular support for democracy and democratic values among Egyptians. Meanwhile, 11% consider authoritarian rule to be good or very good, which suggests that the recent overthrow of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime has had a large effect on Egyptians. As a result, only 12% of Egyptians say a system governed by a strong leader that makes decisions without considering electoral outcomes or the opposition is appropriate or very appropriate. However, 61% of Egyptians say that a technocratic system of governance would be appropriate for Egypt. Meanwhile, 20% of respondents believe that a system based on Islamic law without parties and elections is appropriate or very appropriate for Egypt, compared with 65% who believe that it is not favorable at all. These findings suggest that Egyptians think favorably of Sharia but desire it to be applied within a democratic framework. This result is reinforced by the fact that 20% of respondents believe a system in which only Islamist parties compete in elections is appropriate or very

appropriate for Egypt. These results indicate that Egyptian support for Sharia does not necessarily translate into support for Islamic political organizations.

### **Section Three: Citizenship and Rights**

The survey also examined values and approaches towards citizenship by assessing feelings of equality, interest in politics and participation in political and civil activities. Those questions are based on the understanding that citizenship is inseparable from those rights that ensure equality amongst citizens as well as civil and political participation, all of which frame the relationship between citizen and state.

The results indicate that Egyptians do not feel that equality is overly prevalent amongst citizens. Only 20% feel that they are treated equally to other citizens to a great extent, while 45% feel they are treated like equals to a medium extent. Meanwhile, 19% feel they are treated equally to a limited extent and 16% say not at all. This indicates that most Egyptians think that the principle of equality, as a basic right, is not effectively applied in Egypt.

There was no difference in views between those living in rural areas and those living in urban ones (35% each). However, feelings of inequality correlate negatively with age; 39% of those between 25-18 years of age and 38% of those between 26-35 years of age harbor perceptions of inequality between citizens. By contrast, only 32% of those ages 36-45 and 31% of those 46 and older said the same. Furthermore, feelings of citizen inequality are highest among those who have a high school diploma, with 44% feeling they are treated equally with citizens to a limited extent or not at all.

<b>Table (4): Percentage of Egyptians that feel that they are treated equally to a limited extent or not at all compared to the rest of citizens</b>				
<b>Education Levels%</b>				
	<b>Less than High School Diploma</b>	<b>High School Diploma</b>	<b>Associate Degree</b>	<b>College Degree</b>
<b>Treated equally to a limited extent or not at all</b>	35	44	30	34
<b>Age Groups %</b>				
	<b>18-25</b>	<b>26-35</b>	<b>36-45</b>	<b>46+</b>
<b>Treated equally to a limited extent or not at all</b>	39	38	32	31

In an attempt to understand and explain perceptions of inequality in Egypt, we asked if citizens felt that they could easily access the relevant official to file a complaint when their rights were violated. In response, 46% it was not easy, including 28% who said it was difficult and 18% who said it was very difficult. Meanwhile, 19% considered it easy (17% easy and 2% very easy). However, 35% of Egyptians indicated that they have never attempted to file a complaint after a violation of their rights.

### **Interest in Politics**

The survey attempted to gauge degrees of interest in politics. This is important because exercising citizenship rights requires interest in public life and political affairs. In another testament to the wide-ranging effects of the January 25 revolution, 87% of Egyptians express at least some interest in politics (18% very interested, 38% interested, and 32% a little interested), compared to 13% of Egyptians who say they are not interested. Television is the news source of choice for following political news. Overall, 64% of Egyptians say they follow politics through television daily, 25% do so a few times a week, 5% a few times a month, 4% very rarely, and just 3% don't follow the news at all by television.

In comparison, newspapers are not a main source of news for Egyptians interested in following politics with 47% indicating they do not read newspapers at all. Meanwhile, 12% of those surveyed say that they keep up with daily news through newspapers, 16% do so weekly, 9% monthly, and 17% rarely. These findings are likely due in part to levels of illiteracy in Egypt or newspapers' loss of credibility among citizens.

More than half (56%) of Egyptians do not follow the news on the radio. Radio has generally been declining in popularity in the country after the rise of television. Overall, 27% of Egyptians follow the news on the radio, 6% listen to it daily, 5% weekly, and 6% monthly.

As for the internet, 72% of Egyptians do not use the internet to follow news at all. This is perhaps a result of limited availability. It is unsurprising that relatively few Egyptians use the internet to follow the news. Just 9% do so daily, 6% weekly, and 3% monthly while 11% say that they rarely read news on the internet.

Despite Egyptian's clear interest in politics, 83% of Egyptians say that sometimes politics are so complicated that they cannot understand what is happening. Likely, this result is due to the dynamic and complex nature of the rapid political transformations experienced by Egypt since January 25. It has become difficult, even for experts, to predict political developments in the country. It is natural for citizens to find it difficult to follow politics, given the newness of political participation. Now citizens find themselves bombarded by revolutionary updates, statements by various political movements and parties, details of economic and security crises, and relentless demands and accusations pointed in all directions.

### **Participation in Political Activities and Events**

The survey also includes questions about the extent to which Egyptians exercise their political rights both publicly or via the internet. These questions are based on an understanding that the practice of

citizenship includes rights and obligations that require a degree of interest in political affairs. Moreover, political participation is, in essence, an expression of the principles of citizenship.

In testament to the transformation in Egypt's political conditions, 64% of Egyptians did not participate in the most recent parliamentary elections in October 2010. However, the revolution marked an increase in those numbers, as the November 2011—January 2012 elections (conducted after the date of the survey) witnessed far greater participation.

Although massive protests were common across Egypt during the revolution, 92% of Egyptians did not participate in the protests that toppled Mubarak's regime from January 25 to February 11, 2011. However, most joined the protests after the first day. Furthermore, 72% of Egyptians do not have relatives, acquaintances, or friends who participated in the protests. The relatively limited participation levels nevertheless culminated in the overthrow of the regime. This reflects the weakness and feebleness of the authoritarian regime and its institutions, and its failure to contain popular protests through political means, instead relying on violent tactics that only led to the demolition of the pillars of the system. These factors can be measured neither quantitatively nor qualitatively. Yet, we now know that the determination of only 8% of Egyptians, their commitment to their cause, their belief in the justice behind their demands, and the support they received from the rest of society resulted in the success of the revolution.


As for participation in political events and activities online, 80% of those surveyed noted that they do not use the internet at all, while 11% indicated that they use it daily, 6% weekly, 2% monthly, and 1% annually. These results support the aforementioned findings that internet usage in Egypt is relatively low. Of those who do use the internet, 66% say they use it to find out about political activities taking place in their country while 52% use it to express political opinions. Additionally, 67% internet users go online to find out about opposing political opinions in their country.

## Section Four: Religious Values

This survey also examined the views of Egyptians when it comes to the role of religion in society, its effect on the daily lives of people, and its relationship to politics and democracy. Considering that Egyptians are known for their moderation and opposition to radical extremism, we found that the vast majority of those surveyed (61%) indicated that they considered themselves religious to some extent, 37% of them consider themselves religious, and only 2% considered themselves nonreligious.

The fact that most Egyptians consider themselves religious does not mean that they agree on the role of religion and religious values in social and political life. In fact, public opinion is split when it comes to whether religious practices should be separated from politics and society. The survey reveals that that 80% of Egyptians agreed that religion is a private matter that should be separated from political and social affairs compared with 20% who are opposed. This position reflects a clear preference by Egyptians for a civil state instead of a religious one.

The relationship between the degree of religiosity and views on whether religious practices are private is strongly correlated. The people who describe themselves as religious strongly agree (73%) that religious practices should be separated from sociopolitical affairs. A relatively similar level of



those who consider themselves somewhat religious (84%) say the same.

<b>Table (5): The Positions of Self-identified Religious or Somewhat Religious Egyptians When It Comes to the Separation of Religion from Socioeconomic Affairs</b>				
<b>Religious practices are private matters that should be separated from socioeconomic life</b>				
	<b>Strongly Agree%</b>	<b>Agree %</b>	<b>Disagree%</b>	<b>Strongly Agree %</b>
<b>Religious</b>	36	37	21	6
<b>Somewhat Religious</b>	42	42	13	3

- **Religion and Egyptian Views on Some Socioeconomic Affairs**

The survey explored public opinion toward lotteries, banks charging interest, and marriage, in an attempt to evaluate the impact of religiosity on some social issues. Participation in lotteries is generally considered un-Islamic, but 11% of Egyptians indicated that they would participate in the lottery. Among the others, 17% say that they would not in fear of losing while 67% say that they would not out of principle.

Linking Egyptians' attitudes towards lotteries through with religiosity helps explain these differences in attitudes. Among those who consider themselves religious, 71% say they would not participate in a lottery out of principle. Similarly, 70% of those who are somewhat religious say the same.

<b>Table (5): The Positions of Self-identified Religious or Somewhat Religious Egyptians When It Comes to the Participation in Lotteries</b>				
<b>If you had the opportunity to participate in a lottery, would you buy a lottery ticket?</b>				
	<b>Definitely yes%</b>	<b>Yes %</b>	<b>No, because I Won't Win%</b>	<b>No, out of Principle %</b>
<b>Religious</b>	3	7	19	71
<b>Somewhat Religious</b>	2	11	17	70

Regarding bank interest, 55% agree with the statement, "In order to meet the demands of the modern economy, banks should be allowed to charge interest", while 45% disagree with the

statement. Furthermore, 54% of those who consider themselves religious disagree with this statement while 46% agree. Among those who consider themselves somewhat religious there is a similar divide: 61% agree while 39% disagree. Thus, it does not appear that personal piety is a primary factor that explains why some Egyptians oppose charging interest on loans.

<b>Table (7): The Attitudes of Egyptians who Self-Identified as Religious or Somewhat Religious, When It Comes to the Opinions on Charging Interest on Loans</b>		
In order to meet the demands of the modern economy, banks should be allowed to charge interest		
	<b>Strongly Agree Or Agree %</b>	<b>Disagree or Strongly Disagree %</b>
<b>Religious</b>	46	54
<b>Somewhat Religious</b>	61	39

Additionally, the survey asks questions about proper female attire, including whether respondents agree or disagree that “Women should wear modest clothes without needing to wear the hijab.” A majority of Egyptians (61%) agree with the statement while 37% disagree. However, religiosity is not strongly linked with attitudes towards women’s dress. Overall, 62% of those who identify as religious say that women are required to dress modestly but do not have to wear the hijab while 38% disagree. Results are similar among those who consider themselves somewhat religious.

<b>Table (8): The Attitudes of Egyptians who Self-Identified as Religious or Somewhat Religious, on Whether Women are Required to Wear the Hijab</b>		
Women should wear modest clothes without needing to wear the hijab		
	<b>Strongly Agree or Agree %</b>	<b>Disagree or Strongly Disagree %</b>
<b>Religious</b>	62	38
<b>Somewhat Religious</b>	62	38

As an alternative measure of religiosity, 64% of Egyptians say that they would object to a marriage between a close relative such as a daughter, son, sister, or brother and a man or woman that does not pray. While 11% would not object, 22% would object to a limited extent, and 8% would

somewhat object. In this case, the degree of religiosity is strongly correlated with this belief as 70% of religious people and 61% of those who are “religious to some degree” say that they would object to their relatives marrying a person who does not pray.

**Religion and Political Affairs**

The survey also examines Egyptian public opinion concerning the role of religion in politics. The results reveal that 83% of Egyptians disagree with the statement, “Democracy is a system that is incompatible with the teachings of Islam”, while 17% agree. Thus, the vest majority of Egyptians see no conflict between Islamic governance and democratic principles.

In addition, 22% of Egyptians agree with the statement, “In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy fewer political rights than Muslims,” while the vast majority (78%) disagree. Results do not vary by degrees of religiosity, which reflect a high degree of social cohesion that ties Egyptians together despite their religious views.

<b>Table (9): The Attitudes of Egyptians who Self-Identified as Religious or Somewhat Religious, on the Rights of Non-Muslims</b>		
<b>In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy fewer political rights than Muslims</b>		
	<b>Strongly Agree or Agree %</b>	<b>Disagree or Strongly Disagree %</b>
<b>Religious</b>	22	78
<b>Somewhat Religious</b>	23	77

When asked to evaluate the statement: “Religious scholars should have influence over the decisions government,” 63% of Egyptians agree and 37% disagree. Meanwhile, 88% agree with the statement: “Religious leaders should not interfere in voters’ decisions in elections,” while 12% disagree.

Additional questions examined the role of religion in the process of law making. Respondents were asked if the government and parliament should enact laws in accordance to the “people’s wishes,”

“Islamic law,” or “people’s wishes in some instances and Islamic law in others.” Overall, 80% say that laws should be made in accordance with sharia, 78% say they should adhere to the sharia in some instances and people’s wishes in others, and 73% say they should follow the wishes of the people. Some respondents may believe that people’s wishes and the sharia do not diverge, which could explain these results.

Levels of personal religiosity are weakly correlated with preferences for the source of laws. There are no significant differences between the views of the respondents that self-identify as religious and those who are somewhat religious. However, those who are somewhat religious (80%) are slightly more likely than those who are religious (75%) to say laws should be made in accordance with the sharia in some areas and people’s wishes in others. Ultimately, linking these findings to perceptions about the separation of religion and state, we can conclude that Egyptians seek legislation that is compliant with the wishes of the people as long as it does not clash with the principles of Islamic law. However, we cannot conclude that Egyptians consider Sharia to be the sole legitimate source of legislation.

<b>Table (10): The Attitudes of Egyptians who Self-Identified as Religious or Somewhat Religious, on Legislation</b>		
<b>The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with citizens’ wishes with regard to certain subjects and in accordance with Islamic law with regard to other subjects</b>		
	<b>Strongly Agree or Agree %</b>	<b>Disagree or Strongly Disagree %</b>
<b>Religious</b>	75	25
<b>Somewhat Religious</b>	80	20

There is a strong link between religion and politics in Egypt. This relationship stems from religion’s central role in the lives of Egyptians on one hand, and the integration of religion in popular culture on the other. However, not every political matter is directly linked with religiosity and this distinction suggests that the Egyptians are open to discussing and reevaluating their opinions, even


when their opinions are based on religious conviction. Thus, it appears that with more effort, it would be possible to effectively separate religion and state in Egypt, a separation that has now become a pillar of any modern civil state. This is especially true considering the fact that 80% of Egyptians support the separation of religion and political, economic, and social practices.

### **Section Five: The Role of Women in Society**

The survey also included questions about women and their role within society. In general, Egyptians support equality between men and women, including in the work force (73%), the right to choose a spouse (86%), or the right to file for divorce (78%). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that a sizeable minority disagrees ranging from 14% to 28% that do not agree with the aforementioned forms of equality.

The views of Egyptians about women's roles differ significantly by gender. For example, only 58% of male respondents say women should have the right of women to work outside the house, but 87% of women say they can. When it comes to choosing a spouse, 87% of men say they have the right to choose their spouse compared with 94% of women. The same trend applies to divorce rights; 67% of men approve compared with 91% of women.


## Egyptian Men and Women That Supported the Following Rights %



The attitudes of Egyptians are more complex when it comes to polygamy. Only 15% of Egyptians agree with the statement: “The law should not allow a man to marry more than one woman” while 85% disagree. By contrast, the majority of Egyptians (67%) agree with the statement that “the first wife’s consent is a prerequisite for permitting a man to marry a second woman” while 33% disagree. This means that the majority of Egyptians reject a law that would prohibit polygamy. Yet, most believe that polygamy is only permissible with the consent of the first wife.

Examining responses by gender, the results show that about half of men say a wife’s consent is required to marry another women compared with 87%. Meanwhile, when it comes to polygamy only 7% of male respondents agree it should be prohibited compared with 23% of females.


## Egyptian Men and Women That Agreed With the Following Statements %



Most Egyptians reject the idea of a woman holding high-level political positions such as prime minister or president. Fully 73% disagree with this proposition. However, when asked whether women could be judges, there is a clear split between Egyptians with 48% saying a woman could be a judge compared with 52% who disagree.

Again, there are significant differences in opinion by gender. Overall, 35% of women are comfortable with the idea of a female political leader while only 20% of men say the same. Similarly, women are more supportive of female judges (63%) compared with men (35%).

## Egyptian Men and Women That Supported Women Filling Political and Judicial Positions %



### Section Six: Public Institutions and Confidence in Them

Nearly all Egyptians express confidence in the armed forces (99%), with 82% trusting them to a great extent, 15% to a moderate extent, and 2% to a limited extent. Only 1% of the sample does not trust the armed forces at all.

Trust in the judiciary is also very high. Again, nearly all Egyptians (95%) trust the judiciary, albeit to varying degrees (57% to a great extent, 31% to a moderate extent, and 7% to a limited extent) while 5% do not trust the judiciary at all. These attitudes are historically consistent, as Egyptians have typically trusted the judiciary.

Trust in the government is also high. Only 9% of Egyptians do not trust the government at all. The vast majority (91%) have confidence in this institution, but again to varying degrees (45% trust it to a great extent, 36% to a moderate extent, and 10% to a limited extent). This finding suggests that Dr. Issam Sharaf's government secured a large degree of support but that it has failed to effectively

use this support to its advantage, leading people to eventually demand his resignation, and later the resignation of Dr. Sharaf himself.


Despite the general impression that emerged after the revolution that Egyptians lacked trust in police, the survey reveals more than eight-in-ten Egyptians (82%) have faith in the police albeit at varying degrees (22% to a great extent, 33% to a moderate extent, and 26% to a limited extent) while 18% do not trust the police at all.

Nearly three-quarters of Egyptians trust civil society organizations (72%), although again to varying degrees (16% to a great extent, 39% to a moderate extent, and 18% to a limited extent), while 28% do not have any confidence in civil society organizations.

Trust in political parties is substantially lower. Only about six-in-ten (58%) of those surveyed are confident in parties. Just 7% trust them to a great extent, 28% to a medium extent, and 24% to a limited extent, while 42% do not trust them at all.

The graph below demonstrates the degrees of public confidence in each public institution:

## Confidence in Public Institutions %



The high levels of trust that the Egyptians have in public institutions after the revolution (government, judiciary, police, and armed forces) lead to optimism that the Egyptian society, through the support of those institutions, will be able to move forward in its steps towards building a modern civil state that is based on the will of the people through free and fair elections, no matter what the results of those elections turn out to be.

Moreover, in addition to high levels of confidence in political institutions, we see that the vast majority of those surveyed believe the government has fulfilled its duties. The vast majority (86%) expresses positive attitudes towards the government's performance (31% say very good, 46% good, and 8% fair). Meanwhile 15% rate the government's performance poorly (12% consider it poor and 3% very poor). Additionally, we find a majority of Egyptians (72%) agree that first government of Dr. Issam Sharaf is doing its best to provide services to citizens.

Nevertheless, corruption remains a major problem in Egypt. This concern is perhaps linked to perceptions towards the remnants of the previous regime. We find that the majority of Egyptians (82%) think that there is corruption within the state's institutions and agencies. Additionally, 49%

of Egyptians assert that obtaining employment through connections is extremely widespread and a further 31% say employment is sometimes obtained through connections. Only 11% say they are not aware of any relevant experiences while 9% say employment is obtained without connections. Most likely, these perceptions about corruption are linked to experiences under the former Mubarak regime given that the survey was conducted only five months after the revolution.

More hopefully, the January 25 revolution has provided Egyptians with the opportunity, for the first time, to express their true opinions of the parliamentary elections that took place in Egypt in October 2010. The majority of Egyptians (86%) say they were neither free nor fair while 14% believe that they were free and fair to varying degrees (9% completely free and fair, 3% free and fair but with a few minor issues, and 3% free and fair but with major issues). Fortunately, those attitudes are linked to the former instead of present era of Egyptian politics.

### **Section Seven: Arabs and International Affairs**

This section focuses on Egyptian public opinion as it relates to international affairs and the Arab world. It is important to examine the major challenges that face Egyptians on the regional and international arena, their opinions on the factors that have impeded the progress of the Arab world, and their vision for the future of Egypt and the Arab region with respect to the balances of power and relationships that link them to the region and the world.


Overall, 37% of Egyptians consider the economic well-being of the region to be the most important challenge, followed by security and stability (33%), the termination of foreign intervention (12%), and the elimination of financial and administrative corruption (10%). Only 4% name the Palestinian cause or democratization respectively.

The majority of Egyptians attribute the lack of development in the Arab world compared to other parts of the world on a combination of internal and external factors (48%), while 33% say internal factors play the primary role, and 19% consider external actors the main factor.

The majority of Egyptians say that external demands for reform are acceptable. The plurality (40%) says they are acceptable with conditions while a further 28% say they are fully acceptable.

Meanwhile, 18% consider them unacceptable out of principle and 14% say they are unacceptable because they are harmful to national interests. Despite the clear openness towards international demands for reform, the majority of Egyptians (91%) consider foreign interference to be a barrier to political reform in Egypt.

### Egyptian Views on Foreign Demands for Reform %



### Perceptions of the United States:

There is a clear split amongst Egyptians when it comes to their perceptions of the United States.

The majority (57%) agrees (17% strongly agree, 40% agree) with the following statement: “The


United States' interference in the region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere," while 33% disagree or disagree strongly.

As for public opinion of the American people, 55% agree with the following statement: "Despite negative U.S. foreign policy, Americans are good people," while 45% of people disagree. From a cultural perspective, there appears to be more of an appreciation for the U.S. Fully 63% agree that "American and Western culture have positive aspects" while 37% disagree. This result reflects the ability of Egyptians to draw a line between the policies adopted by the governments of the U.S.—which is considered by many to pursue policies that have an adverse effect on the Arab world—and the culture and practices of its people. Egyptians seem to have a positive perception towards Americans to some degree, and this view is linked to the cultural product offered by the U.S.

#### **The Arab Israeli Conflict and the Palestinian Cause:**

The vast majority of Egyptians, nearly eight-in-ten, believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict is an impediment to political reform in Egypt while 20% disagree. As for their positions on Israel as a Jewish state, the vast majority (62%) do not believe the Arab world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East, while 38% say the Arab world should accept Israel only when the Palestinians accept it as a Jewish state.

## Is the Arab-Israeli Conflict a Barrier to Political Reform in Egypt?



Additionally, 63% of Egyptians agree with the proposal that there should be mutual recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish people and Palestine as a state for the Palestinian people.

Furthermore, the majority of Egyptians (85%) believe that reaching a solution to the Palestinian cause is a prerequisite to ending terrorism, while 15% disagree.

Despite clear support for the Palestinian cause, 74% of Egyptians support the continuation of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (44% strongly agree, 30% agree), while 26% favor terminating it. Perhaps, this belief is linked to the fact that 56% of Egyptians favor opening up to the outside world to a greater extent. Thus, although Egyptians ardently defend the Palestinian cause and Jerusalem, they also care about their national interests and desire stability by maintaining peace with Israel, hoping that that may facilitate an opening with the rest of the world.