

Algeria Five Years after the Arab Uprisings

Findings from the Arab Barometer

April 15, 2017

Algeria Five Years after the Arab Uprisings

Findings from the Arab Barometer

Overview

The fourth wave of the Arab Barometer was conducted in May 2016, about five years after the Arab uprisings. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika remained in power in Algeria, but was an infrequent public presence amid ongoing health troubles. At the same time, low oil prices over the past several years had pushed Algeria to economic austerity, with declining revenues from oil leading to large budget deficits, declining foreign reserves, and efforts from the government to cut spending in many public sectors.

In this context, Algerians express significant economic anxiety, concern over corruption, distrust in politicians, and dissatisfaction with the quality of public services. They continue to perceive high levels of corruption in their political system and most did not see significant efforts to combat it. They also rate Algeria as less democratic in this wave of the survey than in any prior wave, while reporting higher levels of belief that democracy represents the best kind of political system than ever before. Moreover, perceptions about political institutions have been affected. For example, Algerians' assessment of the integrity of the 2012 legislative elections were significantly lower in 2016 than their assessments of the same elections in 2013. Still, most Algerians believe they are free to express opinions and that the press is relatively free, but they disagree that there is great freedom to assemble and protest.


Yet even with such grievances, Algerians are not highly mobilized: the overwhelming majority report having little interest in politics, spending little time following political news, and not participating in political organizations or events. Most Algerians continue to believe that political change should proceed gradually rather than all at once. Moreover, Algerians expressed relatively strong satisfaction with the security environment and the government's performance in providing security, and they continue to trust the armed forces more than any other political institution. Interest in emigrating from Algeria has declined in comparison to prior years.

Amidst these challenges, Algerians' views on some social and religious issues have shifted toward greater conservatism. Compared to 2013, for example, more Algerians believe that university education is more important for boys than for girls and that married women should not work outside the home. In addition, Algerians were more open in 2016 to religious leaders influencing elections and government decisions than they were in 2013.

In international relations, Algerians would like to see consistent or stronger economic relations with most countries, with the notable exception of Iran. At the same time, Algerians consider most outside powers as having a negative influence on Algeria. The United States is viewed in the most negative light with respect to democratization in Algeria, and most Algerians say the most positive thing the United States could do would be to leave the region alone. Most Algerians continue to hold ambivalent views toward globalization and see external factors playing a large role in explaining Algeria's lack of development.

The Economy and Corruption

Likely reflecting the negative impacts on Algeria's economy from the slump in oil prices over the past several years, only a quarter of Algerians (27 percent) rate their country's current economic situation as either good or very good, a significant drop-off from the 66 percent who rated it as good or very good when asked in 2013. Algerians are also pessimistic about the future, with only 27 percent saying they believe the economic situation will be better or much better 5 years from now. However, most Algerians (53 percent) also believe that the economic situation is better or much better than it was five years ago.



Algerians are generally more positive about their own household's economic situation than they are about the national economic situation. Fifty-two percent say their current household economic situation is good, and 8 percent say it is very good.


Algerians are split fairly evenly on the question of whether they feel they are being treated equally by the government: 43 percent feel they are to a medium or great extent, while 54 percent feel they are to a little extent or not at all. Perceptions of the government's lack of respect for Algerians' needs and aspirations is a major source of grievance and political strain in Algeria. Protests and riots frequently revolve around claims of *hogra*, the feeling that the government displays a disregard for its own people. In the survey, evidence of this sentiment shows up clearly in the disjuncture between Algerians' perception that the government is aware of citizens' needs (49 percent agree or strongly agree) versus their perception that political leaders are concerned with ordinary citizens (just 12 percent agree, and 2 percent strongly agree).

Algerians express mixed views on whether the state is undertaking far-reaching reforms. Forty-two percent say yes, while 50 percent say no, and 7 percent state they do not know, with most respondents only moderately certain of their response: only 9 percent say definitely yes, 33 percent say yes, 33 percent say no, and 17 percent say definitely no.

While Algerians have access to free health care and education, the quality of public services remains a major concern (see Appendix Table 2). Nine out of ten Algerians worry that there is no possibility to give their children a good education (71 percent worry very much), and 66 percent say they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the educational system. A similar proportion (67 percent) are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the health care system. Views are slightly more positive when Algerians are asked about their satisfaction with government performance in improving basic health services (61 percent say it is bad or very bad) or addressing educational needs (58 percent say it is bad or very bad). Only 7 percent say they are very satisfied with the educational system, and only 6 percent say they are very satisfied with the health care system.

The economy and corruption remain the most commonly cited among Algerians' top two concerns (see graph below and Appendix Table 5). Half of Algerians cite the economic situation and 27 percent cite corruption as their top concern. Fifteen percent list the economic situation and 27 percent list corruption as their second-highest concern. Other concerns that a significant proportion of Algerians cite are internal stability and security (18 percent cite as their second-highest concern) and foreign interference (19 percent cite as their second-highest concern). Relatively few Algerians are concerned with democracy (12 percent cite it among their top two concerns) or religious extremism (13 percent cite it among their top two concerns).

Algerians' Top Concerns in 2016




Algerians overwhelmingly see corruption in their political system, and most of them do not believe the government is working to crack down on it. These views likely reflect a series of prominent corruption scandals in recent years. Sixty percent say there is corruption to a large extent, 25 percent to a medium extent, and 11 percent to a small extent; only 3 percent say there is no corruption at all. Meanwhile, just eight percent of Algerians believe the government is working to crack down on corruption to a large extent, and 27 percent to a medium extent. Nearly a third of Algerians (31 percent) say the government is not working to crack down on corruption at all.

Personal experiences of corruption and perceptions of unequal access to opportunities are also widespread. Nearly six-in-ten (58 percent) of Algerians say that use of *wasta* (personal connections) to get a job opportunity is extremely widespread, and another 34 percent say it is used sometimes. Around a third of Algerians (34 percent) say they or someone they know have been required to receive a certificate of good behavior from the police in order to obtain a passport, identity card, or other document from local government institutions.


Emigration

Even as Algerians express pessimism about their economy, only about a quarter (22 percent) of Algerians say that they think about emigrating, representing a declining desire to emigrate compared to past waves. However, men are twice as likely to say they think about emigrating as women—30 percent of men say they want to emigrate, compared to 17 percent of women. However, desire to emigrate varies substantially by age group. Among Algerians ages 18-24, nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of men think about emigrating, and about a third (33 percent) of women do. Among those ages 25-30, 39 percent of men and 23 percent of women think of emigrating. Among those ages 31-36, 25 percent of men and 5 percent of women think of emigrating. Almost no women above age 44 say they think of emigrating, and fewer than 10 percent of men do.

Interest in Emigration
% Saying They Think About Emigrating



Desire to Emigrate by Age Group




Among those who do think about emigrating, most cite either economic reasons (47 percent) or a combination of economic and political reasons (30 percent) as the source of their desire to emigrate. The majority (68 percent) think of emigrating to Europe, with the United States or Canada a distant second (20 percent). A minority (8 percent) think about emigrating to Saudi Arabia or another Gulf country.¹

¹ Please note respondents could cite multiple desired destinations.


Security

Algerians feel more secure than they have in the past, but their sense of security varies widely. 70 percent feel their personal and family safety and security are ensured or fully ensured, while 29 percent feel it is not ensured or absolutely not ensured. Most Algerians worry about being harassed or threatened on the street with women being more likely to have this worry than men (see Appendix Table 2). Ninety-two percent of women worry about harassment (75 percent very much), and 81 percent of men worry about harassment (58 percent very much). Terrorism remains on Algerians' minds: 89 percent worry about a terrorist attack in their country (73 percent very much).



Trust in Political Institutions


Algerians continue to trust the armed forces significantly more than any other political institution. Three-quarters trust the armed forces a great deal or quite a lot. The next most trusted institution is the police (60 percent), followed by 48 percent who trust religious leaders and 37 percent who trust the courts and legal system. Parliament and political parties are the least trusted political institutions: only 14 percent trust political parties and 17 percent trust the parliament a great deal or quite a lot. Unsurprisingly, politicians are also viewed poorly. Asked to rank politicians' honesty on a 7-point scale with 1 representing the most dishonest, more than half of Algerians rated politicians as a 1 (28 percent) or 2 (25 percent).



Algerians express the greatest satisfaction with government performance in providing security, with 24 percent saying government performance in this area is very good and 43 percent saying it is good. They are least satisfied with government performance related to economic matters: keeping prices down (14 percent say it is good or very good), narrowing the gap between rich and poor (15 percent say it is good or very good), and creating employment opportunities (18 percent say it is good or very good). Nearly half (48 percent) say the government has done a very bad job keeping prices down.


Satisfaction with Government Performance

% Saying Good or Very Good



Opinions About Politics

The majority of Algerians disagree with the idea that you must support the government even if you disagree with it (68 percent disagree or strongly disagree). Fifty-eight percent agree that Algerians can criticize the government without fear, while 38 percent disagree. At the same time, Algerians remain uncertain about many aspects of politics, with 73 percent agreeing or strongly agreeing that “Sometimes, politics are so complicated that I cannot understand what is happening.”



Alleviating Poverty

Algerians describe themselves as very interested in helping the poor, even if it costs them personally. Thirty-eight percent say they would help the poor even at a large personal cost, and another thirty-eight percent say they would do it at a small cost. Half (50 percent) say that they want to help the poor primarily because they believe God will reward them for it, and another third because it makes them sad to see people suffer (21 percent) or they enjoy making the less fortunate happy (19 percent). Nearly half of Algerians (45 percent) believe the best way to help the poor is by encouraging *sadaqa*, or private charity. Only 14 percent believe raising their taxes is the best way, while 24 percent say that neither taxes nor *sadaqa* is the best way to help the poor.


Elections and Parliament

The most recent parliamentary elections in Algeria took place in 2012, before the third wave of the Arab Barometer was undertaken, and the next parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2017. Answers to questions about the most recent parliamentary elections in this wave of the survey can therefore be compared to the results from the third wave to examine consistency of responses as distance from the election increases.

Thirty-four percent of Algerians say that they voted in the last parliamentary elections, and 12 percent say that they went to any campaign rallies. Evaluations of the elections were mixed: 9 percent said the last parliamentary elections were completely free and fair; 19 percent said they were free and fair with minor problems; 13 percent said they were free and fair with major problems; 36 percent said they were not free or fair; and 22 percent said they did not know enough to evaluate the integrity of the last elections. These figures demonstrate a significant decline in confidence in the integrity of the same legislative elections since the third wave of the Arab Barometer conducted in 2013. Such a dramatic drop-off could reflect either a genuine change over time relating to new information about the quality of the 2012 legislative elections. However, far more likely is that Algerians' current negative perceptions of government performance and the economy have altered how they evaluate the integrity of the last elections.

Assessment of Most Recent Elections

% Saying Last Legislative Elections were free and fair




The Media

Like most other nationalities surveyed by the Arab Barometer, Algerians state they are largely uninterested in politics. Overall, 83 percent say they are not interested or not at all interested in politics, compared with only 4 percent who say they are very interested. Perhaps as a result, most Algerians do not follow political news closely. Large proportions of Algerians state that they rarely or never use either the television (41 percent) or daily newspapers (61 percent) to learn about political news (see Appendix Table 8). Television does attract a substantial following, however: 32 percent state that they learn about political news from the television daily. A large proportion (61 percent) say that they do not know whether the media they might want to access (newspapers, magazines, foreign books, etc.) are sometimes forbidden by the government and/or its agencies. Seven percent said that they are not forbidden, and 25 percent said that they are.

Algerians' rates of internet usage vary widely. Thirty-eight percent state they do not go on the internet at all and 4 percent less than once a week, while 36 percent state they are either go online at least once daily or are online almost all day long. The remaining 25 percent use the internet at least once a week. Among those who use the internet, the majority state they do not use it to learn about politics. Twenty percent say they have used the internet to find out about political activities, and 10 percent to express political opinions. Most Algerian internet users are Facebook users (83 percent) but far fewer are on Instagram (27 percent) or Twitter (19 percent).

Internet Habits (% Responding Yes)




Democracy

As found in prior waves of the Arab Barometer, very few Algerians belong to any organizations or formal groups (9 percent) or political parties (2 percent). Few Algerians have attended a political meeting or signed a petition in the past three years (13 percent) or participated in a protest in the past three years (5 percent). More than half of those who have participated in a protest or demonstration have done so more than once.


Using a 10-point scale, Algerians believe their country is moderately democratic, with a median score of 5—a lower average rating than in any prior wave of the Arab Barometer. They are more likely to believe that democracy is appropriate for their country (median score 6), and less likely to be satisfied with the government (median score 4). See Appendix Table 10 for a full breakdown of responses.

Assessments of Democracy & Government in Algeria

On a Scale of 0–10




As prior waves of the survey have also found, most Algerians (69 percent) support gradual over radical political reform and conceptualize democracy's essential characteristics in primarily socioeconomic terms. Twenty-eight percent strongly agree and 41 percent agree that reform should be little by little instead of all at once. However, this marks a nine-point decline from the 78 percent of Algerians who agreed or strongly agreed in 2013 that change should be little by little, suggesting that frustrations with the status quo may be rising—though they are not as intense as in 2011, when only 54 percent of Algerians agreed or strongly agreed that change should be gradual.



The concept of democracy contains multiple elements, and Algerians tend to conceptualize its most essential characteristics in primarily socioeconomic terms, although less exclusively than in neighboring countries. Asked to choose the most essential characteristic of democracy from among several options provided, 40 percent choose “basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter are provided for” and another 16 percent choose “government provides people with quality public services,” while only 30 percent choose “the legislature has oversight of government,” and 13 percent choose “people are free to organize political groups.” Another 2 percent say they don’t know, and fewer than 1 percent refuse to answer. Two similar questions with varied wording of the options yield similar results, although notably, the most popular response in one framing of the question is “the government ensures law and order” (34 percent), which is narrowly more popular than “the government ensures job opportunities for all” (30 percent).

Despite varying understandings of the meaning of democracy, Algerians are supportive of this type of political system in the abstract (see Appendix Table 11). A higher proportion than in any prior wave of the survey either strongly agreed (24 percent) or agreed (50 percent) that while a democratic system may have problems, it is better than other systems. More than a third (37 percent) state that their opinion on democracy is closest to the statement, “Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government.” A similar proportion (36 percent), however, believe that “under some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable,” and a quarter (26 percent) believe that it does not matter for them what kind of government Algeria has.

Algerians express some concern about certain potential weaknesses of a democratic system. For example, 31 percent agree or strongly agree that democratic regimes not effective at providing order or stability. Even more Algerians agree that “citizens in our country are not prepared for a democracy system” (42 percent agree or strongly agree), that under a democratic system, economic performance is weak (37 percent agree or strongly agree), and that democratic regimes can be indecisive and full of problems (38 percent agree or strongly agree).




Algerians hold diverse views on what a suitable form of government for Algeria looks like (see Appendix Table 12). A narrow majority of Algerians (51 percent) believe that “a parliamentary system in which nationalist, left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist parties compete in parliamentary elections” is a very suitable or suitable form of government for Algeria. A further 17 percent believe it is somewhat suitable, but nearly a quarter (24 percent) state it is not suitable at all.

Other possible forms of government garner less support, but there is significant variation. Notably, 22 percent of Algerians believe a system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections would be suitable, whereas 45 percent believe such a system would be not suitable at all. In contrast, only 11 percent believe that a parliamentary system in which only non-religious parties compete would be suitable or very suitable, and 10 percent believe that a political system governed by a strong authority which makes decisions without considering

electoral results or the opinions of the opposition would be suitable or very suitable. Slightly more Algerians (15 percent) would see as suitable a system that provides for the needs of its citizens without giving them the right to participate in the process.

Civil Liberties


Most Algerians (60 percent) feel they are at least somewhat free to express their political opinions. Most also believe that the press is free to a medium or great extent (60 percent), that they enjoy freedom to join political parties to a medium or great extent (55 percent), and that they are free to join civil associations and organizations to a medium or great extent (60 percent). However, the degree to which they feel able to participate in other political activities is somewhat lower. Just 37 percent believe they are free to participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations to a medium or great extent. These findings reflect prior survey results as well as observations of Algeria that confirm its relatively free press and freedom of association, alongside frequent and usually harsh crackdowns on public demonstrations, strikes, and riots (see Appendix Table 14).



Algerians are roughly evenly split on whether there are human rights violations taking place in their country: 46 percent say yes, 48 percent say no, and 6 percent do not know. They also hold varying views on whether human rights violations in pursuit of security and stability are justified. Fifty-eight percent say they are not justified at all, versus 21 percent who say they are completely or somewhat justified.

Culture and Religion


As in previous waves, the survey found a wide range of views on women's rights and roles, with the most conservative attitudes found in response to questions about participation in politics (see Appendix Table 15). Attitudes toward gender roles took a noticeably conservative turn in the fourth wave relative to prior waves and particularly compared to the third wave. One possibility is that the economic trends and anxiety Algerians express are contributing to more conservative attitudes on questions about the relative importance of men accessing higher education, working outside the home, and taking on political leadership roles.



Fewer than half of Algerians agree that a woman can become president or prime minister of a Muslim country (22 percent agree, 14 percent strongly agree), and most agree that men are better at political leadership than women (34 percent agree, 47 percent strongly agree). Most also agree that husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family (32 percent agree, 46 percent strongly agree).

There is wider variance on views about education, work, and inheritance. Most Algerians value education, including higher education, for both genders, with 38 percent disagreeing and 35 percent strongly disagreeing that university education for males is more important than university education for females. Meanwhile, most Algerians agree (45 percent agree, 26 percent strongly agree) that a married woman can work outside the home if she wants to, but the proportion agreeing with this sentiment declined between 2013 and 2016. A large majority of Algerians agree (34

percent agree, 61 percent strongly agree) that women and men should have equal rights to inheritance. Most likely, respondents interpreted this question to mean equal access to the inheritance rights afforded to them under traditional interpretations of Islamic law, in which men inherit twice as much as women.



Algerians demonstrate less prejudice with respect to race or nationality than with respect to religious differences (see Appendix Table 16). Asked whether they would like or dislike neighbors of particular backgrounds, 51 percent of Algerians said they would dislike or strongly dislike neighbors of a different religion, and 46 percent said they would dislike or strongly dislike neighbors of a different sect of Islam. By comparison, 31 percent said they would dislike or strongly dislike neighbors of a different race or color, and 37 percent would dislike or strongly dislike neighbors who were immigrants or foreign workers. Similarly, concerns about the religiosity of a possible spouse weighed more heavily than concerns about his or her socioeconomic status: while 66 percent said a suitor not praying would constitute a large or moderate obstacle to marriage, only 28 percent said that a suitor being from an incompatible social class would represent such an obstacle.

In line with the opinions noted above that most Algerians would find a parliamentary system with both secular and Islamist parties appropriate for Algeria, most Algerians (64 percent) believe that the law should rest partly on sharia and partly on the will of the people. However, 29 percent state that they believe the law should rest entirely on sharia, and about half (53 percent) state that they would prefer a religious political party to a non-religious political party. Most Algerians do not believe that religious practice is only a private matter separated from socioeconomic life

(64 percent disagree or strongly disagree, see Appendix Table 17). Algerians are evenly split on whether religious leaders should have influence over the government (44 percent agree or strongly agree, 51 percent disagree or strongly disagree), as well as on the question of whether the country is better off when religious people hold public positions in the state (44 percent agree or strongly agree). On both measures, Algerians report a more welcoming attitude toward the role of religious people and religious clerics in government than in recent prior waves of the Arab Barometer, and similar levels to attitudes expressed in 2006 during the first wave of the survey. In retrospect, it appears that the lower levels of support for religious influence in government expressed in 2011—amid the outbreak of the Arab Spring—were an anomaly. One possible interpretation of this finding is that that historical moment suggested a different, more secular path forward for Algerian politics could succeed, even if the impact of the Arab Spring in Algeria itself was muted. Another possibility is that rising concerns about terrorism around the region, including in neighboring Tunisia, have increased appreciation for establishment religious guiding public morality and religious interpretation. A third possibility is that the economic distress and dismay at corruption that Algerians express has led to a desire for greater morality and honesty in government, and that religious leaders are believed to embody these traits. Absent further study, however, these possible explanations are speculative.

Attitudes About Religious Leadership in Government

% Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing




Table 18 in the Appendix presents attitudes on additional questions relating to the intersection of religion and public life. Most Algerians agree or strongly agree that banks in Muslim countries should not charge interest because it is

forbidden in Islam (84 percent), and most disagree or strongly disagree that this rule should be relaxed to meet the demands of the modern economy (66 percent).

Most Algerians agree or strongly agree that it is acceptable for male and female university students to attend classes together (62 percent); and that while women should dress modestly, Islam does not require wearing a hijab (52 percent).

Furthermore, a majority disagree or strongly disagree that democracy is a Western form of government that is not compatible with Islam (61 percent).

International Relations


Asked what direction they would like to see future economic relations with other countries take (see Appendix Table 19), Algerians were most bullish on Turkey (45 percent want stronger relations) and, at roughly equal levels, the United States (34 percent), the EU (35 percent), and Russia (35 percent). Meanwhile, around a third of Algerians would like economic relations between Algeria and major economic partners to remain the same: the United States (35 percent), Saudi Arabia (38 percent), Iran (35 percent), Turkey (33 percent), the European Union (35 percent) and Russia (31 percent). Algerians had the most negative views toward Iran: just 19 percent wanted economic relations strengthened, while 35 percent wanted them weakened.

Most Algerians believe that major world powers have either neutral or negative effects on the development of democracy in Algeria (see Appendix Table 20). Algerians are most neutral toward their neighboring countries (42 percent see their influence as neither positive nor negative) and Russia (40 percent are neutral). The United States is seen by many Algerians (43 percent) as having a negative or very negative influence.

Relatedly, nearly half of Algerians (47 percent) believe that the most positive thing the United States could do for their country is not get involved in the region. The second most positive potential action was resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict (21 percent). Frustrations toward US policy is clear in other questions as well. More than half of Algerians say that American demands for reform are either unacceptable on principle (26 percent) or unacceptable because they are harmful to Algeria's national interests (34 percent). Algerians are also not very likely to say that, regardless of U.S. foreign policies, most ordinary Americans are good people: 50 percent agree, while 34 percent disagree and 16 percent say they do not know—possibly a reflection of Algerians' limited interactions with Americans. At the same time, the majority (65 percent) agree or strongly agree that American and Western culture have positive aspects, although in Algeria this may reflect more on attitudes toward European rather than American culture. In fact, after Israel (39 percent), the United States is seen as the greatest threat to stability for Algeria (27 percent).

Algerians are divided on whether it is a good thing that the world is getting more connected: 51 percent say it is somewhat or very good, 25 are neutral on the question, and 22 percent say it is somewhat or very bad. These lukewarm feelings reflect a continued sense among Algerians that the outside world is often a harmful influence. Most Algerians blame either predominantly external factors (33 percent) or a mix of external and internal factors (41 percent) for Algeria's lack of development. Nearly half (45 percent) strongly agree, and another 31 percent agree, that Western interference is an obstacle to reform in Algeria. Around a third (31 percent) strongly agree, and another third agree (30 percent), that interference from Arab and Islamic countries within the region is an obstacle to reform in Algeria. In 2016, Algerians were more likely than in prior waves of the Arab Barometer to blame primarily external factors for Algeria's lack of development.

Attribution of Blame for Lack of Development



Additionally, Algerians are concerned about growing sectarian division across the region: 31 percent are concerned to a great extent, and 29 percent to a medium extent.

Select Demographics

Just over a third of Algerians (37 percent) report that they work. Among those who work, 38 percent work in the public sector, and 54 percent in the private sector (with 8 percent reporting “other” or refusing to answer). Among those who do not work, just under half (44 percent) are housewives, a fifth (20 percent) are students, and roughly a fifth (21 percent) are unemployed.

In terms of economic conditions, 60 percent of Algerians have at least one computer in their home, and 37 percent own a car within their family. Around half (48 percent) have a non-smart mobile phone, and about half (49 percent) have a smartphone with access to the internet.

Around a third of Algerians describe themselves as religious (33 percent), while 55 percent say they are somewhat religious. Just 12 percent say they are not religious.

More than half Algerian families are well-off enough that they are able to cover their expenses without notable difficulties (41 percent) or well enough that they are able to save (17 percent). A further 29 percent face some difficulties meeting expenses, and 11 percent report facing significant difficulties. Most Algerian families (84 percent) do not receive any remittances from abroad. Only 3 percent report receiving remittances as frequently once a month, 6 percent receive them a few times a year, and 4 percent receive them once a year.

About the Survey

The Arab Barometer is a public opinion survey conducted in partnership between academics and survey experts in the Arab world, the United States and Europe. The survey in Algeria, conducted from May 3-18, 2016, was led by One to One for Research and Polling. The survey included 1,200 respondents randomly selected from all 48 governorates across all regions of the country. The survey was conducted face-to-face in the respondent's place of residence and has a margin of error of ± 3 percent.

To date, the Arab Barometer has conducted 38 national surveys over three waves including more than 45,000 interviews in 15 Arab countries. The fourth wave includes 9 countries and more than 11,000 interviews. For more information about the project, please visit www.arabbarometer.org.